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The Problem of Error in Amerloan New Realian.
I . Introduction.
It ia a coraraonplaca of modern thought, ixnder the thorough-
going domination of the evolutionary point of view, that no subject
can be adequately or fruitfully investigated apart from the concrete
historic complex of Afhioh the subject in question forms an integral
part. To be sure, the exhaustive inquiry into the relational context
of even so inconsiderable an item of investigation as a flower in a
crannied wall iwould involve, as we are assured by laureated inspir-
ation, the reading off of the abstract and brief chronicle of the
cosmos. The magnitude of such a task inclines investigators to
the much more modest attempt to set forth the proximate and relative
rather than the ultimate and absolute contexts of the subjects of
their inquiry. It is with this two-fold necessity in view,in one
aspect constraining and in another quite as restraining, that the
problem of the present investigation is approached through a summary
statement of the genesis, the developm.ent, and the differentiae of
philosophic realism in general.
It should be said at the outset that realism, broadly con-
ceived, is no innovation of modern speculators. Indeed, all specula-
tion, in 30 far as it is an attempt to construe reality, to ascertain
the nature and limits of the category of being, may be said to be,
so far forth, reali Stic Only a view which should seek to resolve
all that so persistently appears to be into ultimate unreality
could, in the root sense of this much-abused term, be said to be
other than realistic. However, it is not necessary, in order to make
out an ancient pedigree for realism, to construe the terra in this
ultra elastic and narrowly etymological fashion. Moreover, so to
employ the term would do violence to the historically well attested
usages accorded to it.

Though the term is of mediaeval ori if»;in, resulting from the
Scholastic diwDUte over the relation of particulara to universale,
when first employed it was, as iVilliam James said of hia Pragmati st^,
but "a new name for some old ways of thinking," In their attempt to
work out a solution of this problem, the Schoolmen were thinking over
after them the thougjhits of the great Greeks, though, to be sure, with
ends in view removed by a diameter from those which actuated their
Hellenic predecessors. The problem as presented to Greek thought
arose under the spur of the radical scepticism, both theoretical and
practical, of the decadent oo-ohiats. In its practical phase, this
scepticism was relentlessly attacked by the genial Socrates, iriven
to persistent dialectic by hia ever-present daemo>n. Sceptic though
he was concerning matters cosraological (see Veber, History of PhilosoDhy,
Translation by Thilly,p. 65),he never doubted the nossibility of attain-
ing assured knowledge in the field of morality. Accordingly, he plied
his spiritual midwifery in the firm conviction that thereby he might
aid hia co-di aputants in bringing very truth to birth. In order to
achieve this end, he proceeded to elicit from variant conflicting
particular opinions basic unities, to disengage the general from the
particular, to precipitate from individuals universal concepts con-
cerning the definition of which there could be no disagreement among
rational beings. Here we have an incipient "realism," Each of the
many terms so glibly bandied about by sophistic disputants is held to
be reducible to "the what", — to tf--,a solid core of identity in the
midst of difference. The locus of the one, as of the other, would ap-
pear to be the minds of men (see Eucken,rhe Problem of Human Life, Trans-
lation by Hough 19), but the former vary with varying individual men,
the latter being uniform for all men. The point for our present pur-
pose ia that the concept, the universal, is accorded a status superior to
that which is accorded to the particular^ in that the former is viewed

as grounded in the common structure of all human thought , and, there-
fore, as ^so far forth Ob jective" , whereaa the latter la vieved as
vitiated by the caprice and eccentricity of individual human think-
ers, and as, therefore, 30 far forth, " sub jective. " At the hands of
Plato, the Socratic doctrine of universals underwent a radical trans-
formation. Finished aristocrat that he •vas,the greater disciole of the
great teacher was sickened by the disgusting spectacle of degenerate
Athenian democracy, in which, as he remarked(33e Republic, ), every-
thing was just ready to burst with liberty, and was driven by his
profound contempt for the fickleness of the rabble to seek, as Kijcken
has suggested (see The Problem of Human Life, Translation by Hough, p«
19 ) , stabill ty in a cosmic, as opposed to a social regulation of life.
This stabilization he effected by expanding the range of Socratic con-
cepts to include those applicable to the order of nature as ^vell as to
the sphere of conduct and by hypostati zing these concepts in a world of
indefectible ideas, not dependent upon any mind or society of minds for
their exi sterce, but consti tuting, in their sternal self-sufficiency, the
essence of reality itself. The concepts employed in human thought he
conceived as bringing thougfit into coincidence 'vit":' these cosmic ideas,
whereas opinions based on perceptions he held to be vitiated by their
dependence upon sensfi ob jeots
,
possessed, at best, of but a quasi reality,
whose degi^ee was conditioned u^on the measure of the object's partici-
pation in the idea. Here we have an explicit and unqualifiei ''realism*',
in which the universal is ii stingui shed from the particular , not only by
being grounded in the structure of all human thoug!at,but by being worked
into the warr) and woof of utterly objective reality, into the very struc-
ture of cosm.ic being, which valid human thought unerringly reproduces.
This glorification of universals, whereby they were set on high forever,
a hierarchy of oosmac aristocrats splendidly transcending the evanes-
cent things of sense, provoked a demurrer from Stagira's greatest son.

This demurrer' -vaG directed against the tranacendence of the univerBala.
Ari stotle, true to the en-oirical tradition of hi 3 earlier training-", re-
fused to oonoede to universal 3 the exalted Tjlaoe in the empyrean whicli
his venerable master of the Academy had assigned to them. Far from
deraying them standing-room in the universe, hcvever, he stoutly affirmed
their reali ty, insi sting only that they should not be hypostatized so aa
to set them ar^art in an order independent of and superior to the world
of sense perception. His motive was, by thus "saving the ap-nearanoes"
(see Hoernl^'s "Studies in Contemporary "Metaphysics"
,
Chap. IT), coimpli-
cating them .vith universale in one coherent system, to make room for a
valid structure of science and thereby enfranchise the human spirit in
the vorld that noA^ is rather than in a lifted and far-shining realm
beyond the fleeting scenes of time and sense. ^''or the purpose of our
present inquiry, the si^mificant point at this juncture is that Aristotle
held for a realisni of individuals and universale in which matter and
form were united in individual substances. It should be added that the
reality of such individual substances was conceived as not dependent
upon the presence of the substances in any mind or minds In the form
of concepts, but rather as grounded in the stable structure of the ob-
jective order (see Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book II).
The next developments in realistic theory which are immediate-
ly relevant to our purpose occurred over a millenium after the death of
Aristotle. The scene of these developments was among the vigorous young
nations of western Europe and the occasion was the need for a philosophic
formulation of and defense for the dogmas of Catholic Christianity. The
immediate text for the long series of discussions -which eventuated in
these developments was a passage in Boetius* Latin translation of Por-
phyry's I sagoge to the categories of Aristotle, one of the fe.v precious
remnants of ancient speculation which were at the disposal of the
earlier Schoolmen as they set about their endeavor to philosophize.
I\
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The passage In qu9stion,a3 it aDoears in the translation of Boetius,
reads aa fol loivs : "Mox de generibus et dpeciebus illud quidem aive
Gubaiatant, 3iv9 in aolia nudia intell estibua posita aint,alv9 aub-
aiatentia corporalia aint an incorporalia, et utruTi ae-oarata a aen-
aibilibua an in aenaibilibus posita et ciroa haec consi atentia,
die ere reouaabo ; al ti aaimura enira negotiurc eat hujusmodi et raajoria
egena inquiaitionia*" Porphyry here has atated the problem which
•,vaa the atorm-conter of Soholaatio debate throughout the ^Tiddl0
Ages, though the laaue waa not olearly drawn and envisaged in rela-
tion to its total conaequencea until the latter half of the period
30 denominated. The oaa^age quoted not only state! the Droblera
which concerned Scholastic thought, but alao Indicated all of the
main theoretical solutiona of the Droblen which ^vere successively
brought forth and defended in the heated controverai es of the School-
men. It '.vill be noted that Porphyry declined in the passage quoted
to adjudicate the case of the status of genera and apecies. The
reason for hi a failure to do so was not, certainly, any least indecision
in hia o.7n nind, confirmed Neo-Platoni at that he vaa, vith regard to
the problem, but rather a conviction that the settlement of the point
was not relevant to his purpose in vriting the Prolegomena. Though
an adequate treatment of the issue by former philosophers is implied
by the I sago ge, nothing is said therein -.vith regard to the several
attitudes of the philosonhers concerned.
The refinements and nuances of the Scholastic discussion
of the problem raiaed by Porphyry need not detain ua here. An ex-
amination of them would involve the treatment of the host of thinkers
from the Incipient Scholastic Erigena in the ninth century to the last
great Scholaatic ,Occam ,in the fourteenth century. Suffice it to
say that in the course of this half milleniurr all three of the main
aolutions of the problem vhich were suggested in the rjasaage from the
(I
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laagoge , clalTied charnpionB among the loctora of the Sohoola. The
viev that universal 3 are ''in aoli a nuii a in tel lec tibua poai ta'*
waa expounded in the extreme norainaliaTi of Hoacellinua ( obi t oa.
1126 A. D. ), -vho, if ve may trust the testimony of An selra, taught that
univeraala are mere f1 a tua voola
,
empty breathinp;3 of the voice; in
the aermoniara" or " conceptual! am" of Abelard { 107'^-114??) ; and in the
"terminiam" of 'Villiam of Occam (oa. 13ao-134'7),:vho vieved the
univoraal aa only a "mental concept aignifying univocally aeveral
aingulara." i''or all of theae, " univeraalia aunt re al l a poat rea" ;
the univeraala are denied a status as independent of particulara
or aa coimplloated vi th particulara in the structure of objective
reality. It should be otaervod that the term "objective" ia here
uaed in ita modern aenae,not in the preciaely reverse ai gnification
wliich it carried to mediaeval thinkera. The vie.v that universale
are " aubaia tentia .... a er>arata a senaib ilibua " , that they are aub-
aLancea and separated from fsenaible things, vas expounded in the Platon-
ic realism of Anaelm ( 1033-110? ) and, assuming the trustworthinesa of
Abelard's reports in his Hi ato ri a calami t a turn m earum , al so in the doc-
trine of '7illiam of Ohampeaux ( 1070-1131) , at least in its earlier phase,
that the universal ia "res una ea sen tial iter" , 'vhich substantial essence
is present " secundum totam auam guantitatea"in each particular into
which it ia Individuated. Here, in good Platonic mode, universal a are mad
the stable core of objective reality and particulara are reduced to de-
pendence upon them, --" universal ia aunt real i
a
ante rea," The view that
univeraala are " aubai atentia . . . .in aensihilibua poai ta £t oi_rc3^ haec
conai atentia" , that univeraala are aubatances having their locus in sen-
sible things, claimed aa ita exponent the moat famous of the Schoolmen,
Thomas Aquinaa (ca^. 12*35-1374) , who held that univeraala exiat in
particulara, of which they conatitute the " quiddi ta a" or "whatneaa."
(
Here
-/e have the realian of Aristotle reaffirmed in Scholaatic phrase,
—
** \iniver3alia aunt realla^ i_n rebus."
It is from these ocholastic disputations that the term
"realisjTi" takes its rise. Specifically, the origin of the term ia
found in the faTious trio of formulae representing- universal s as
" realia" "ant e res", "in rebus" , or " post £9s. " By a strange trick
of shifted meanings,
"
reali a" , a Low Latin derivative from "res", thing,
carae to signify, not the mark of concrste individual things as dis-
tinguished from mental images, perceptions, ideas of them, but rather
the mark of substantial existence as a universal, whether in isolation
from or In conjunction with the narticulars which are the data of
sense experience. The " post res" doctrine, denying, as it did, such
substantial existence to universal s, and reducing them to a Durely
subjective status in individual human minds, is not, therefore, real-
istic in the Dropdr mediaeval sense of the term. It was rather a
sub jec tivi Stic, an " ideali stic" , theory of the nature of universal s.
Between the fourteenth century and the twentieth, numerous
forms of realistic metaphysics were successively set forth. '^he
Cartesian dualism contained what has been termed an "inferential"
realism. Spinoza's monism was a realism of substance, with attribute
and mode as secondary categories. Leibnitz's spiritualistic pluralism
was a realism of monads. Kant, in his doctrine of Dinge-an-aich, T)ropound
ed a noumenal reali sra, while Fullerton finds him as3uming,in the "Refuta-
tion of Idealism" , the r6'lQ of an unwilling witness in behalf of naive
realism. The Hegelian tradition, with its characteristic equation of
logic and metaphysic , i s a Begri ffsreal i smus . Herbart,with his dis-
tinction between Vorstellungen and Real en , between ochein and Sein
,
thouiSji,as Hbffding has pointed out, his tendency to employ mental
analogies jvhen attem-oting to specify the nature of his "reals" pre-
vents us from classifying him as a realist of the extreme ob jectivistic
(
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type,l3 a qualifleci raaliat. The list of varieties of raai^isni might
be extended indefinitely, but such an extension would throw little li^t
upon the genius of the movement vhich is the subject of our inquiry.
The reason for this is that the New Realism, particularly in its Amer-
ican form or forrasjhas certain unique characteristics -.vhich distinguish
it from all other realisms. In its positive ohase it is, to be sure, an
attempt so to revamp naive realism as to free the latter from the con-
tradictions resultant from its unsophlstication. In its negative phase
the new doctrine is a war to the death with subjectivism in all of its
forms. The term New Reali sm, then, i s to be understood, not' wholly after
the analogy of such terras as Neo-Pythagoreani sm and Neo-Platonism, which
stood for movements intended, at least ostensibly, to revive the doctrines
suggested by the substantive term, but rather as indicative of a type of
theory which demands that the major emphasis fall upon the adjectival
term in its descriptive label. It is far from all novel ty, however, for
its historic affiliations are unmistakably clear. Cohen suggests that
the New Realism will doubtless be dubbed by its critics the **neo-3oholas
ticiam** and Tawney expresses the opinion that the New Realists "probably
have more in common with Aristotle than with any other philosopher of
history** ( Jour. Phil. , etc. , Vol. X, p. 314 and Phil .Rev. , Vol .XXII , p. 288 ).
Representatives of the New Realism have repeatedly orofessed kinship
with naive realism. Thus Pullerton's constantly reiterated emphasis
upon the importance of the opinions of The Plain Man and his insistent
defense of the objective validity of Everybody's Vorld unequivocally
ally him with uncritical realism. "The pendulum", so he writes, "is swing
ing in the direction of the spontaneous thought of manklni, of the belief
of the ages. Man is naturally a real i st, though it is undoubtedly true
that the uninstructed man is a rather stupid realist" (Essays in Honor of
William James, pp. 6f) , However, our learned philosopher makes no scruple

about aelacting this rather atupi^l man ae hla philoaophlo Tnodel'
Again, Montapxie, 'vri ting for the Platfomn Reali sts, saya, " The new
realiata' relational theory la in esaentiala very old. To under-
stand its meaning it ia necessary to go back beyond Kant, beyond
Berkeley, beyond even Locke and Desoartea far back to that primordi-
al comrnon sense vhioh believes in a world that exists indenendently
of the knowing of it, but believes also that that same independent
world can be directly presented in consciousness and not merely repre-
oented or copied by 'ideas"* (The New Realise, p. 10 ). Holt, utterly
guiltless of any suspicion of naivete though he assuredly i s, confesses
,
•'To Professor Hoyce,and to the studies undertaken with his guidance,
I owe my notions of the conceptual nature of the universe a verity
which to me argues not for idealism, but for a realism of perhar>s, even,
a thoroughly naive sort" {The Concept of Consciousness, p. XIII )
,
It would, however, be saying too much to affirm that all of
who
those^^count themselves protagonists of American New Realism trace
their descent directly from the uncorrupted genius of primordial
common sense. Marvin, for examnl e, professes to have attempted to
"formulate briefly and rigorously that' type of neo-realism which
is a return at least to the spirit, thou^ not always to the letter,
of Plato and Aristotle" (A First Book in Metaphysics, d. VIII ) . Perry
informs us /'Modern realism is closer to the monistic realism of 'ideas'
suggested by Hume, than to the dualistic realism of mind and matter,
propounded by the Scottish ochool;and this in snite of the fact that
the Scottish philosophy was Drimarily a polemic, in the name of 'real-
ism*, against Hume, as the last and most outrasreous of the idealists"
(Present Philosophical Tendencies, pn. 307f). Indeed, primordial common
sense must be conceded to lie far, far back of the positions assumed
by most of these its reputed spiritual offspring; ve suspect that Spauld
((
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ing'a " Neo-realii5ra of Ideal a" (The Ne^v Rational! isra, p. VI ) jvould
to
seeniyyanontaneoua thought a strange doctrine, if rot an alien tonrue.
It would appear, in vie-v of theae oonalderatione, to "be less difficult
to charactorize theae nevf philosophers by reference to what we have
termed the negative phase of their thought, namely ^ their ODPOaition
to 3ub jectiviam, than by attempting to demonstrate their extraction
from identical philosophical parentage. It is a notewrthy fact that
this group of thinkers (the "tendency** has not yet become, by any
means, a school ) ire found to be marked by r^uch more of unanimity
in respect of their ODOosition to subjectivism than by consensus
of opinion concerning the form which the objective interwretatl :")n
of reality shall take. Even when six realists collaborate in the
construction of a platform, they discover that provision must be made
in the superstructure erected thereon for at least three private com-
partments for the housing of irreconcilable philosophic progeny.
'Vitness the notes by Montague, Hoi t, and Pitkin which appear in the
aptjeniix at the close of The New Realism. "/here collaboration has
not been attempted, a persistent propounding of some form of objectivism
is often virtually the only bond which unites the various realisms.
Indeed, the affirmation of a self-sufficient objective order mi^t well
be said to be the specific differentia of the New Realism. Fullerton
has, at least by imolication, said as much, when remarking, " The philosophic
reader will recognize that I have felt it necessary to follow a path
which leads in the same general direction as that chosen by a goodly
number of contemporary writers. These modern realists are men of keen
mind who appear to be impressed with the necessity of doing full justice
to our experience of the world as it presents itself in the actual body
of human knowledge. X may mention the names of '^oodbridge, Mc Gil vary,
(I
(
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Miller, Hoi t, Marvin, !lontap:ue, Perry, Pi tkin, opaulding, and KemD-Srri th
They do not in all respects agree with each other, and certainly I do no
exuect them to ariDrove all the opinions which I exDresa. But they ap-
pear to me to he pressing on, each as beat he can, toward the same goal.
If I understand them aright, it is that which I have set before myself -
the working out of a sober reali sra, which will not refuse to accent sug-
gestions from the idealist where such seem helpful, but which will take
pains not to be misled into doing injustice to th_e unmi stakably real_
world given in experience** (The 'Vorld We Live In,pp. Vlllf ). The under-
scoring is mine. This recurrent interest in objectivity is so char-
acteristic of the genus realist that realistic doctrine were better
deal isnated, as Sheldon has suggested (Strife of Systems and Productive
Duality, p. 173), Ob jectivism. Indeed, the terra realism is "an egregious
misnomer, implying as it does an opponent defending 'unreal! sm* who
never existed** (op « cit « ,p» 17:^). By reason of its thoroughgoing ob-
joctivi sra, Sheldon would characterize the modern realistic movement,
in its intellectual! Stic, pragmatic, and intuit! onistic forms, as i^reat
Objectivism. Our concern is solely with the movement in its intel-
lectualistic form, as only those representative of this form have des-
ignated themselves as **new," Objeotivists they all are in a graduated
scale of Greatne ss. They would all agree that reality exists Independ-
ent of its presentation to or conception by consciousness.
For all of these realisms, from the most naive to the moat
utterly sophisticated, the problem of the relation between the knower,
or the "knowing process", as the Platform Realists would prefer to say,
and the object knom is of crucial si gnifi cane e, whence it follows that
the problem of error presents to them all a perpetual and inescanable
crux. Montague is unquestionably correct in asserting that in a world
r
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where there was no such thing as error, the uncritical eni ste'^ology of
naive realism jvould remain unchallenged. It undoubtedly is nrecieely
the discovery of error and illusion ^hich induces perplexity and leads
to atterrpts to arrive at a theory of the relation between the kno'ver
and the kno'^vn which shall account for these disturbing and intractable
phenomena (see The New Reall sm, pp« -^-S ) , The same author does not over-
state the importance of the problem of error for the more disillusioned
realisms when he writes, "Now the cause of the abandonment of naive real-
ism in favor of the dualistic or picture theory was the apparent hope-
less disagreement of the world as presented in immediate with the true
or corrected system of objects in whose reality we believe. It follows
that the first and greatest problem for the new realists is to amend the
realism of common sense in such wise as to make it comoatible with the
^ universal phenomenon of error and with the mechanism of perception upon
which that phenomenon is based and in terms of which it must be inter-
preted" (J. P.P. & S.M, ,Vol.IX, 1912,p.4P. Cf. also The New Realism, p. 10 ).
The fundamental character of the problem has forced its treat-
ment upon realistic writers, all of whom are at e-reat pains to set forth
definitive solutions and thus to prevent the collapse of their respective
interpretations of the world. Hence the present inquiry, for it is the
writer *s conviction that the oroblem, of error presents the gravest dif-
ficulties which confront a rigorous objectivism..
II. Contemporary Criticisms.
The crucial character of this problem for the realistic
polemic as a whole could not have failed to call forth "^uch critical
discussion of the issues involved. The discussion has, however, been
largely incidental , confined to critical reviews in the various journals
and casual treatments in a number of contemporary vorks on metaphysics,
e.£. Leighton's discussion in The Field of Philosophy, pages 354 to 3Pi8.
f/
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I?xcentin,i5: Kromer's .vork ani Rogers' paper in Essays in Critical Kealian,
the present writer is not aware of the oxiotence of any exteniei.
inquiry into this ohase of ne.i realiotic thought. Preparatory to
the setting foi-Lh of the writer*3 examination of the problem, there
follow summary oreaentations of certain typical instances of recent
criticism of ne'V roa.listic theory of error.
No moro persistent and unsparing criticisms have appeared
than those which have oome from the pen of Love joy. As early as 1911,
before the publicaLion of the volume of cooperative studies by the six
Platform Heali sta, Love joy had called attention to the seriousness of
the problem of error for the exponents of the fast-formulating realism.
In his Reflections of a Tempora-list on the New Realism (Jour. Phil.,
Psychol, and ooient. Meth. , VIII, pp. 589-599 ) he reduced the Wew S^alistic
polemic to two premises, a major and a minor, the former being the doctrine
of the externality of relations and the latter being the relational
theory of consciousness. The burden of his criticism was to prwve
that the minor premise, the relational theory of consciousness, was
quite incapable of accounting for subjectivism and error, since the
reduction of all of the facts of experience to a dead level of ob-
jectivity as real objects and real relations could result only in
the effectual obliteration of both of these categories.
Upon the a-oT)earance of The New Realism, with its sustained
efforts to meet the difficulties presented by this probl em, Love joy
subjected the proposed solutions of the eni.gma to further examination.
Two such critical inquiries merit our consideration. The first of
these appeared in the Philosophical Review for July, 19 13, (Phil . Rev.
XXII, pp. 419-4,^3) under the caption "Error and the New Realism," The
second was published almost synchronously as a revle"V of i'he ••ew
Realism and apr>eared in 3cienoe,N. i.
,
IvXVTI
,
Itovejoy prefaced his paper on "Error and the New Realism**
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with the followinfr re^narkg; " Tho prlnotnal gipnifioance of that inter-
eatinp; essay irijphilosophi cal collaboration entitl-^d The Ne'v Heali Bm can
he briefly and precisely stated. The volune constitutes the first ser-
ious attempt of the authors of the realistic platform* to face the
specific orobleTTi upon the solution of -vhich the tenability of the en-
tire general doctrine denends,—namely, the oroblem of error. The
writers seem to me to have come to deal with this issue, —which has
always been for them the loR:ically primary one,—somewhat tardily;
but they have now acknowledged with entire frankness and clearness
its crucial bearing uoon their philosophy, and have discussed it direct-
ly
,
fully, and with much fertility of resource " ( loc «. cit. , r). 410 1.
Love joy proceeds to call attention to the fact that, though
there are throughout the book under review repeated acknowled.gments
of the crucial significance of the nroblem of error for the whole
new realistic position, the authors of the cooperative studies are
unable to agree upon a single solution of this fateful -nroblem.
Hoi t, Wontague, and Pitkin nresent competing attempts at solution.
This division of opinion moves the reviewer to make two re'^arks in
passing, via.,** It is sadly discouraging to those who hope for an in-
creasing agreement in philosophy, that even thinkers sharing the
same general position are unable to unite in a common solution of
their prlncipnl problem, but instead find themselves obliged to
conclude their praiseworthy effort at cooperation with a series of
refutations of one another^ a solutions" and "The general principles
of the new doctrine evidently of themselves generate no exT)lariation
of the nature or possibility of error. No one obviouB theory on
the subject flows directly from the essence of neo-roalism as such;
it must be reached, if at all, by the addition of supnl ementary hypoth-
eses, and at no small cost of individual ingemiity "
(
loo, cit. ,p.4ll).
t'
i
There follov/o a criticiam of each of the threo proffererl solutions,
which are subjected to the tents of internal coriBi ntfincy, consistency
with admitted facts, and consistency with the fundamental principles
of the New Realism.
This detailed criticism is prefaced by a statement of the
fundamental principles of the New Realism and the main difficulty
which they .generate as regards error. These principles Love joy,
with entire nropri ety, reduces to two reali sm as such, and episte-
mological moniam:the theory that the object of percention (or other
cognition) is absolutely 'independent * of consciousness, and the
theory that the real object is, with no duplication or modification,
immediately present in consciousness, that the thincr~in-i tself and
the actual percept are * numerically identical ' lo<"- . ci t . ,p.41l\
These two basic theories have, in turn, a common root in the theory
that *^ consciousness (at least all perceptual and cognitive conscious'
nees) is never anything; but an external, non-functional and non-con-
stitutive relation between a set of objects, or between other objects
and a physical organism ( loc . cit_. , p. 41 1)« The argument from error
is directed against the relational theory of consciousness and the
doctrine of epi stemological moni sm, rather than against realism as
such, and consists in the objection that the theories specified
"obliterate the distinction between mere appearances and objective
realities." (lac. ci t. , p. 411)* "Neo-realism. when consi stent, seem-
ingly means *panob jectivism shades of the 1 exlcographers.* ). A very
welter of inconsi stencies and absurdities is on the hands of the
brave realist as soon as he has asserted such objectivity for hallu-
cinatory experiences, or even for normal perceptions, by reason of the
discrepant qualities which different percipients experience in one
and the same object at one and the same time. It requires sheer

sioec-'j.lot.lve obandoD to attrlbiitf^ such discrerjant qualltifip to one
only o'bjec''. afl itn " actual, inherent, non-relative rsrorierties 'l^c.
Git
.
,
p. 41*3)
.
Love Joy finds in Holt'e solution three lines of rrri'T'^^nt, each
desip^ned to meet a particular phage of the difficulty. The first of
these lines of argument attempts to account for "the ordinary decerjtions
of the senses and the multiple and discrepant impressiono received by
(loc. cit. ,p.4irB)«
different percipients from the same objects " The substance of Holt's
argument on this point is that " redupll cation, ^-usually the partially
altered or distorted reduplication,- of objects 'is a common feature
of purely physical systems, * where we never dream of invoking 'con-
sciousness' to explain the mul ti^li ci ty of copies or their aberration
from their originals " ( loc . ci
t
. ,
p. 41?\ Holt's entire argument, to-
getber with his ingenious illustrations touching this point, is quite
irrelevant to the objection raised by the critic of New fiealiaro, The
critici sm, direct ed against the i^e^v Realistic doctrln - n-r +h p "numerical
identity" of percept and object, is met by Holt with a naive admission
of the nuiperical di screteness of the objects of his illustration embedded
prove that
in many pages of polysyllables calculated to^consciousness need not bo
invoked to explain perceptual aberrations. In brief, he treats "argu-
ments directed against^ the 'theory of immanence' of the new realism as
if they were directed against its 'theory of independence '" ( 1 nc . ci t.
,
p.41'?f ) • Holt appears to equate "redunlic^- tion" and "identity" through-
out this entire portion of his argument, '.vith the result that he commits
himself to a virtual denial of the doctrine of "numerical identity",
and this without detecting himself in the act ; ion
.
cit.,r).413 and
footnote )
.
The second of Holt's lines of argument is an attempt to
disprove the subjectivity of the secondary qualities of material ob-
(
Jects. Holt inaiRt.fl that "quality is not an ultimate cetepory of
natural scionce," Science conceivea its objecta as deacribable in
quantitative, apatial , and temDOral terms. That there seem to be
pure qualities and irreducible qualitative differences present to
consciousnesB, therefore, requires explanation. '*It is needful, if the
'immanence* in conaciousness of the actual object is to be maintained,
either to contend that all sensory qual i a as such exist objectively
in the things to which, and in the places at which, they seem to be-
long;or else to contend that even these apparently purely qualitative
data in consciousness, which, seem irreducible and without com.mon
denominators, are really modes of quantity, and differ only quantita-
tively'J-Buch are the alternatives "vhich Lovejoy submits to the New
Realist. Having denied the objectivity of quali ti es, Hoi t is of
necessity committed to acceDtinp; the latter of these alternatives.
In so doinp;,he sets forth an elaborate hypothesis concerning the
nature of sensation, drawing upon neur-ologlcal and introspectional
evidence. Holt concludes, on the basis of the former type of data,
that sensory qualities ar© priinarily only differences in ti'^ie-
density of vibrationa, which are e/^n^o^^imately the sn^e i.r> the
stimulus and the nerve. Holt adds that there is an u-oDer, limit
to the ability of the nerves and the brain to receive or to
transmit vibrations; when the period of vibration in the stimulus
exceeds this limit, the impulses become fused, with the result that
"distinct qualities in their own right" appear. In reply to this
argument from neurological evidence, which, be it said in massing, is
not above reproach as scl enoe, Love joy is assuredly correct in point-
ing out that "to give rise to a quality is not to be that qaality;
and .... the objectivity of secondary qualities therefore still
lacks proof " (loo. cit. ,p.414). Turning to introspectional data,
((
IB.
Holt arpcuea from the fact that sensorv qualities constitute a
** f;raded sequence of similarity" to the conclusion that there can
not therefore, ultimately, be any such things as quail ti es, --a con-
clusion which Love joy contents himself with chall en^in,*^ on the
ground that logi^^'^Hy it follows not at all from the -oremises in
question. Holt*a chief reliance, ho'vever, is placed, so far as intro-
spection is concerned, Upon the argument that sufficiently skilled
introapectors are able to analyze secondary qualities into simpler
components. Lovejoy critloiaes this argument in two oarticulars,
viz., it is ill provided with evidential data and, in any case, "falls
far short of the conolusion to be proven, vi z
.
, that the com.ponents
in turn are still further anal yzable, and that what one gets at the
end of the process is a series of purely arithmetical or quanf tative
differences in space- and time-characters; --that, in short, a thorough
introspection reveals that what is actually present in the average
man's consciousness, when he thinks he is experiencing *blue', is,
—
even for himself , --nothing but an experience of a particular period-
icity of vibration.*" ( loc. cl t . , p. 41.^0.
The third phase of Holt's argument concerns hallucinations
and false judgments. Holt endeavops to meet the argument that the
ob jeotificatlon of hallucinations and false judgm.ents would result
in self-contradiction and that hence these phenomena point to the
existence of a realm of pure subjectivity by asserting that contra-
dictions do occur in utterly objective nature and that, therefore,
"self-contradiction creates no presumption a.gainet a thing's objective
reality.
"
(Love joy ) The point of Lovejoy's criticism is twofold : first
,
^ Holt confuses logical contradiction with dj/narcic opposition, and, second,
he admits that contradictions of a certain class must be termed "the
impossible unthinkable" but doers not meet the contention that con-
r
tradictions of just this aort arise if ve affirri the objective
reality of all hallucinations and false judgments y l ')C . ci t . , p.
41«^).
The analyaiB and criticism of Montague's account of error
follows in Lovejoy*s paper. MontagueU- explanation of the, status
of error in a N^w Realistic universe denends uDon his "highly orif^inal
and peculiar theory "by which the consciousness-relation is identified
with causality " ( 1 oc« ci t
.
, p. 41C;. Wontague conceives nature as corr-
posed of ultl'-'^ate units which he terms "events". Such units are "groups
Qf qualities standing in the ulti^nate relation of occupancy of one tirne
and one place." Montague points out that each of these event-units
involves self-transcending irriT^licates, pointing to the past (causes),
the contemporaneous but S7:)atially external, and the future ' (^^fects)
,
He proceeds to indicate that every state of conaciousneaa, or brain
event, has a like threefold aelf-transoending character. On the basis of
this analogy, Montague identifies consciousness -vith causality. In
criticism of this posi tion, Love joy urges, in general, that Monta.gue is
guilty of using self-transcending implication ainbiguously to mean
either "the logical relation of cross-reference" or "the iners existence
of * energy-forms * in one place (i_, e_, ,the skull) which do factually
depend upon other exi st ences"
,
and, in particular, that -Montague commits
hlnself un'vittingly to epi steraolo s^l cal duali sm, since "the very notion
of ^self-transcendent reference* implies the real duality of that which
transcends and that which is transcended ( loc . ci_t. , n . 4 1'^ ) . A further
criticism of the general theory is that, on Montague's orincinl es, there
should be perceptions wherever there are im-nlioates of a causal natiire,
•vhereas "in fact we never perceive any save a special and restricted
class of causes and implications of our brain-statea " ^ loo . c i t , , n .
4
) .
Moreover, "Montague has failed to show that all our rierceptions are of

their owii oauoal implioateo ( lo c
»
cit.,p.4lB).
In ;li scuRfiinp 1 llusloriH, hallucinations, and false jud,<yments,
Montague nnaintaina explicitly that not all of our -nerceDtions are of
their o-.vn causal imnlicatea. Rejectinr, the doctrine that self-con-
tradictory qualitic-3 may exist ob.^eotively in an identical tii^e-
cpaCB-compleXjhe is obliged to admit that '^in the case of error,
soTnethinp; ^apDears' in conscioueness which ifl not otherwise real "
(-uOve^oy, r), 4 I'M . This adniisslon forcea upon hin^ the necessity of
showing how jon ^ciousreGS can still be considered merel;/ an external
relation. To meet this difficulty, Montague resorts to the notion of
" sub si stent s. " A subsi stent Montague dofines as "r^ny actual or
Dossible object of thou^^ht, " whether real or unreal. '*Heal sub-
si stents are t>~ose which belonp- to the one coherent s-natio-temporal
and dynamic system of nature and are ce nable of cau.slnt?- by their i'^i-
plications a consciousness of themselves to be Dresent in other sub-
cistents. Unreal subsistents lack causal efficacj^and some of the-^
conTd rot exist in snace without involving our ideas of spatial ex-
istence in contradiction (Love joy, p, 41B > . These two classes of
subsistents are of equal objectivity and are alike non-'^ental.
IVhen consciousness reads off the imnlicates of a brain process in
terms of its really subsiatent objective cause, the conscious r»roc6r;s
is veridical ; when, however , i t points to an unreal subsi stent as the
assumed cause of the brain process, som e form of error is the result.
"The object in this case, as in the case of veridical percention, i
s
subjectively determined only in the sense that it,rat>ier than some
other, is thus selected for attention " (Love joy, r». 41^ ) • This selective
work of consciousness, whic?i determines that the unreal subsi stent
shall be perceived, does not at all affect its subsistence, its status

as unreal, or itf3 '11 Ptlnfruiahln^cr attributes, all of -vhich are quite
objective and non-nontal.
In critlcipm of tM g ins^enioua explanation of error. Love-
joy holds that the difference between thia and traditional accounts
iR rnerely verbal, the giving- of "a new nane to the old fact9";that
the notion of "subsistence'* is devoid of clear and empirical roeaninr;
and that, by ''^ontacf-ue * s own adrni saion, consciousness ''retains, in relation
to false presentati ons, a hi.^hly constitutive r6le " ( loc . ci t
.
,
p » 41C0 »
A mere external relation which is canable of investing "one of these
airy no thin^^s" which Monta.rue dicnifiea with the status of subsistents
with existence in real time and in the context of actual ex^er^ie^^ce is,
by virtue of tbis selective attention, a very miracle of speculation.
" If , then, consciousness can, in the case of error, confer existence
upon the merely subsi stent, i t can do more than a bare external rela-
tion could be suDDOsed to do "
f
loc . ci t
.
,
p
. 410 ) . Lovejoy adds a final
stricture upon Montague's account of the nroblem. to the effect that,
in his explanation of error, 'Montague has repudiated the conception
of consciousness whereby he equated it with causality. "There is
nothing in the concept of causal imnlication which corresponds to the
'misreading* or wrong reference which is, according to Montague, the
essence of error. ....... As soon .... as it is admitted that con-
ociousness can m.ake mistakes and can 'refer' to the unreal , which
causality certainly cannot do, the whole identification of conscious-
ness with causality breaks down. .... ''^ontacnje has . . .
.
, when dealing
with f^-'e nroblem. of error, fallen back upon the ordinary notion of
consciousness " f loc . cl t . . p. 4'"3'^ ^
.
Love joy reduces Pitkln*g method in his essay on "Some
Realistic Implications of Biology" (The New Reali f^m, ?^^-4.'"^ ) to
"a generalization of the conceptions of projective geom.etry and an
( I
( ;
oo
identification of conaciousneas wi t,>i a 'n-'O.^ octi ^n f^yi^ff^m (loc-.
ci t
.
, ri. 4"!^ ^
,
"Just as in a projection systenn of tri -diniens^ional
anace we have a center of projection, a projected complex of points,
and a pro Jec tion-field, so the entire fo-ur-dirnenaional system of
Nature (space p_lug time) rnay be conceived as a projected complex,
the field of cofTiition as the projection-field of -this complex, and
the rea^^ant (the actinf^ organism) as the center of projection "
(Love joy, p. 4'30 ), Moreover, " whil e relations among objects *to 'vhich
the reagent responds with the help of consciousness,' are 'distances,
or directions or magnitudes or durations,' the projective counterparts
of these relations in consciousness are not distances or directions,
etc . : they are 'specifically cognitive relations,'- of which 'implication'
is the best example " (Love joy, p. 4^0 ), Love joy finds in this account
of ^the nature ani potency of consciousness" epi stemological dualism
" som.ewhat circumlocutorily expressed " ( loc « c i t
.
, p . 4 1 ) * The reasons
for this verdict arerpro jection means nothing "if the project-complex
is not othej* than the projected compl ex; Pi tkin represents the projection-
field of consciousness as possessed of dimensions that "do not belong
to, and are not explicable from, the projected complex,l_. e_. , f'^e physical
environment" ; finally, Pi tkin^describes the attributes or dimensions of
the cognitive equiva-lents or projections of objects not merely as more
numerous than, but also as wholly/ different from, those of fhe objects",
all of the latter being spatio-tem.poral, whil e none of the former "can
be reduced to length, breadth, thickness, duration, or any complex of
these " ( loc . ci t . , p» 4'^l) .
Love joy finds Pitkin's attempt to account for error quite
as unsuccessful as his effort to construe consciousness in a manner
consistent with epi stemological monis'^. Interpreting; consciousness on
the analogy of a pro jection-system, Pitkin points out that " any given
r<
(
pro Ject-c^mpl ex is the projection of d.p infinite number of t'eal or
possible projected complexes," Such indeterninate refersnce Is an
inherent characteristic of any projection situation and does not in-
volve iii sapprehension or false ludment. 'Vhen applied to the problem
of consciousness, these principles result in the view that "equivocal
values and misconstructions of every sort^ar^ not less independent of
cognition than true pro-positions are." In erroneous perception "f'-'incrs
different in other conteT^rts are identical in one perception, i_, e, , are
there indi scernibl es, having all one perceptual nro jection,
"
Love joy offers three objections to this attempted solution
of the problem of error. (l)"If the nrinclple of 'projective indiscern-
ibility* "vere an explanation of Arror at all, it could obviously serve
only for the sort of errors which consists in regarding as qualitative-
ly or numerically identical things '.vhich are really different. But
not all errors appear to be of this sort " ( loc . cl t . , p. 4— ) . (?)The
theory advanced by Pitkin, if valid, "would really prove the impossibility
of error, or at least the impossibility of its discovery. For if con-
sciousness is a case of projection m erel y, then, 8,t any given moment
and in any given si tuation, the indi scernibili ty of the projected
counterparts of a project-complex would bo, as Pitkin himself says,
no error, but the only possible and legitimate projective way of represent
ing that complex Or, to reverse the argument, th -"it ^ve have an idea
of error shows that consciousness is not merely a projection-field "
( loc . cl
t
. . p« 423) . ( 3)Finally, since every element of any projection-
system stands- for multiple values and is of ind ^^-^ninate reference,
"if you insist on calling the m.ultiple value of an element in a pro-
jective complex a case of error, you are obliged in consistency to say
y ( loc . cit. , p . 42
that all perceptions and all judgment are equally erroneous * ^ a solution
of the problem of error which obliterates the distinction between false
<
percentions and true -n ere f^nt ions is of very doubtfijl value.
'Ve no'v turn to tbe consideration of Love joy' 8 review of
The New Heall sm, w>iich appeared in Sci ence, N. S. , XXXVIT /8«7-B7o. The
review in question is q;enftral and does not attempt detailed dis-
cussion of the various solutions of the "nroblem of error -vhich we
have considered. The detail of the review need rot, therefore, detain
U8. The points raised which are relevant to our inquiry are the follow-
ing: the doctrines of indenendenco ' and ' im'ranence 'propounded by the
New Realists depend wholly unon their relational theory of conscious-
ness, without further positive argument; the New Realists are fatally
divided inter se, —e.g., Perry versus Hoi t, Pitkin, and Montague,-- on
the question as to whether or not consciousness is wholly and in all
cases non-constitutive of the content which is in consciousness, Perry *
s
concessions on this r^oint cutting "the nerve of t'~e main Toositive ar.cni-
m.ent for both realism and e^i stemological moni sm." ; the attenrnts to prove
that the relational theory in its more rigorous form is not absurd fall
far short of positive demonstration of its truth* the failure of the
authors of the New Realism to reach a consistent and cogent solution
of the -nroblem of error leaves ^he New Realism as a 'vhole "lackin<^ in
logical substructure " ( Iqc cit . ,p.87l)«
There is one further paper of Love^oy's which should be
mentioned before closing the account of his criticism of the New
Realistic discussion of error. The paper in question Si-pnesr ed under
the caption "On Some Novelties of the New Realism" in the Journal of
Phil OEophy, Psychology and Scientific M^ethods, Vol . X, pn,'?9-4?« It is
devoted to a critical analysis of Professor McQilvary*G article on
"The Relation of Consciousness and Object in Sense-Perception",
which apneared in The Philosor>hlcal Revi ew. Vol . XXI
, pp. IP;^- 17?, This
criticism of Love joy's is relevant because it is directed aeainst a
(<
(
fourth Nq'v Realistic solution of the oroblftTn of error. The bodv of
Lovejoy*3 paper falls into four sections. Tn the first of these
sections he defines the meaning of epi stenolo'^^ical monlsin when con-
joined Ti th realisTT'. "It is ..... iniTDlicit in an eoi sternolo cal
TTionisTn based upon the relational theorjr of consciousness that no
0 0 gni zed ob ject whatever owes to its being *in the consciousness-
relation' any of f-ie characteristics which it is there found to
have, or any of its other relations (Jour. Phil Psv. , and Scient.
Meth. , Vol .X, T). ?io ) , xhe doctrine of the externality of the conscious-
ness-relation must assume the forn of a rl n:oroua universal nro-DOsi ti on,
to which there are no exceptions
,
if it is +-0 serve the -nurnose to which
the New Realists put it. "If some things or qualities do exist only
in and by means of consci o-usness, i t becomes an or»en -oroblem how many
^ are of this sort; and one could not arpue from the nature of conscious-
neos to the impossibility that perceived objects should exist only in
consciousness, or should possess there sub jective Vjualities different
from those "/hichjin their independent natures, they actually possess "
(1 PC . ci t . , p« 30 It i s, however, preci sel^'- such a,n argument as this
from the nature of consciousness to a realistic and an eT)i stemolocically
monistic conclusion which distinp:ijl shes the New Realism., A consistent
New Realism must , therefore, affirm the unconditional externality of the
consciousness-relation. .But such an af -f*!* rmation conflicts seriously
with 'he commonDlace observation that "many things ap-near in conscious-
ness neither as they are nor where they are nor when f^ey are, "from
w'oich obser\'-a + i on the conclusion has been reached that " it is only
by refr-arding much of the content of consciousness as subsistinrr solely
in anfi for consciou.sn*»ss, that any mar<Tinal rep-ion of -ourely objective
and indoDendent being can be believed i^^ at all " ( loc » cit.,p.^?)»
Such objections McGilvary attempts to meet.
T( i
(
The second section of 'Lovejoy*3 criticiGm is r'.oncerned
with fhe fiinda'Tiental conoe-ntlong whereby Mc Gil vary would ''olve the
nrohlem vhich confronts him. At the outset, Love joy confesses im-
certainty as to precisely what McGilvary's position is -vi th reo-ard
to the question of epi ste'nol o?-ioal monl sn, since, though the prevail-
ing tenor of McGilvary*s article a.D-nears to be a defense of that
doctrine, there are Dassac^es in it which are clearly lapses into
epi st ecological dualism. The part of the article which is consistent-
ly monistic is concerned with the relation between "'Material" and
" immateri al" ob.^ects and the unity of snace a5_ such . A material ob-
ject is one which is defined as " snace-occu-oviniy and also snace-
monopoli ?;inp-, i . e. , imnenetrable by o + ber ob.lects of its own class.''
An "immaterial object** is defined as one wbich is ** snace-occu-nyingy
but not " snac e-mononoll zing. McGilvary's rnain contention seems to
be that the existence of such im.material" objects m.ay be affirmed
without contradiction, i t being entirely nossible that any conceiv-
able number of such objects should oocuny one and the same space at
one and the same time. So much of "»TcGilvary * s nosition is clear to
Love joy, but the relation between these "material object?" and ''im-
mater'lq.l objects" to the old-fashioned ''real obj«!Cts" -^wi "unreal
objects" — categories which McGilvary has cashiered, — is not clear*
Indeed, and this is the r^oint of Love joy's criticism at this juncture,
MoGilvary ^eems to admit that at least, one class o^ •immaterial object
may be "non-T)hysical or non-exi stent"
,
"having no being outside of , or
independent of , the consciousness-relation " (Love joy
,
p. Surely
rve h«^ve he^e none of^er than the cashiered cat eg-^ o-p +v e "unreal"
mutato nomine, and, consequentl y, a lanse into epi stemolorical dualism.,
or at least sub jectivism in a qualified form. Moreover, when, in thia
connection, McGilvary defines consciousness as "a relation which re-
r( • i
<
lates In just, fhe .specific way tViat brl
n
p-b ahou t the thin q-r that,
we call our exner 1 enc ea, d enyin ? that It is rnerely a snatl o-tenDOral
center, he commitR hinself to a virtual renudia tion of the non-con-
stitutive conception of consciousness which is the sine qua non of
maintaininr^ eplBtemologlcal monisn in connection
-vith realise.
I'he third section of ^ovejoy«8 crltlciam is occupied 'vith
the difficulties which beset McGilvary'a account of the ST)atial
localization of ImTnaterial** objects. McGilvary's account of this
matter reduces to his doctrine of multinle snace-occuDancy by "im-
material" Ob ,]*ects, though the sp^ce in question be ''mono-nol i zed" by
a "material" object at the identical time of such multiple occunancy.
The sole T5roof which is adduced to demonstrate the possibility of
this unique com^'' '-y of relations 1s the instance of f^n imf^c-fi of a
percipient's face in a hand-mirror, which (visual^ perception oc-
cupies the identical apace occupied by the nrecisely sjmchronous
(tactual -nerc '"'pti nn of the wall behind the mirror. Lovejoy raises
^Ive objections to f'-ie conclusion which Mc Gil vary draws from this
very commonplace fact of experience. (])"The possibility of joint
occupancy of the same space holds only for 'objects' or qualities
apprehended by different senses^ (o^"That qualities of the sorts
perceived t.hrouph different senses may be presented as existin.p- in
the same place at once is a fact notorious to com.mon sense, and never
denied by the present critic of the new realism." There is, however,
nothinp; in this to remove our scruple "against admitting that a bodjr
can both be and not be in a "-iven space in a criven instant, for qualities
of one sense, detached from, other qualities, are not what the terras
^bodies' or even 'objects' are commonly understood to mean." (?)
"The fact face-color and wall -hardness in this case appear as
locally coincident proves no more about the possibility of rr^nT + lr^T^
r(
SB.
spaoe-occur>ancy than does the nlm-nle fact that wall-color and wall-
hardness are usually presented ss locally coincident." (4V4cuilvary
does not hold that ** a sinp-le snatial object may have as its real
(1. e.,lts Inder^endent and non-relative) attributes, two dif-f^erent
visual qualities of the sarne order .... or two different tactual
qualities'* as he would have to do if hi a doctrine of Tnultinle
snace-occupancy were to serve the Durpose to which he atterr-ots to
put it. (??)''iVe do, however, find, both in hallucinations and in more
normal experiences, cases in which what passes (with commoh belief
and with Professor McGilvary) for one portion of space is simultan-
Gously perceived, bv different percipl en t s, as having; positive and op-
posed color-quail ties, or tactual qualities,'' The principle of selective
abstraction failin.fT the New Realist as an explanation of such facts, he is
forced either to admit the ^synchronous and coincident exis^tence of
I
such contradictory qualities or else to "abandon the heroic enter-
prise of seekinr room in one real spnce and In one independent world
of objective reality for all the contents of all the simultaneous
perceptions of all percipients." (For these five points, see loc . c 1 t
.
,
pp. 37-39)
.
The fourth and final section of Love joy's criticise deals
with the difficulties which McGilvary encounters in the matter of the
temporal dating of any objects. The problem which faces McGilvary is
the "universal and necessary temporal aberration of perceived objects ^
(The New Realism, p. 4\ McGilvary states it In the form of the question:
"How can we nercelve a star which for auf?ht we know nay have been extinct
for a thousand years?" Though the temporal aberration in the case chosen
is much jrreater than in most cases of perception, the principle involved
is the same and the resultant problem for epi stem.olosrioal monism identical.
The problem for McGilvary is to show how the star as perc-^lved n "snn-
f(
( <
oclousneaa" can hf^ helvi to "be numerically identical with the star
which, ex hypothesjjis aeioarated by a temporal Bpan of a ^illeniuTi
from the late of the perception. He offers two Bolutiona. The
first depends upon the contention that th3 consciousneoa-rel-ition
,
thoup-h not conati tuti ve, i s selective. By virtue of tiiig selective
abstraction, an ob ,iect, vhen enterin- tbe consci our^-n-^ -^ti-relatlon,
need not be co.cnized in all of its qualities and all of i + e r'^^lations.
'.'/hat more likely, then, than that the star should be present in conscious-
ness 'iiinus its temporal relations? Lovejoy objects that this facile
V7ay out of the difficulty "leads nowhiuher" and for the reason that
the arerument in question i ,snores the central fact in the case, "nam el
that the st ar-as--o9rcept does not enter consciousness merely lackins;
a date or temporal locus. It enters consciousness with an entirely
definite temporal locus, and one -vhich is confessedly different, by the
difference of a millenium, from that of the 'real' star " { 1-^c. ci t
.
,
p.
40)* It would seem, then, that the consciousness-relation had performed
a function more nearly constitutive than that of merely ne,p:l eo ting
certain relations of the *real' star. The presence of this alien
temporal locus effectually damns McGilvarys first attempt to make
out his case for the numerical identity of the star-as-percep t and
the 'real' star. The second attempt is no n->re successful* It
consists in drawing a distinction between contemporaneity and simultan-
oity and then pointing out that the *real * star and the perceived star
are contemporaneous but not simultaneous. Contemnoranei t consists in
being "within the same durational unit**, which unit is entirely arbi-
trarily determined as regards its length. oimul tanei ty is a synon-i/m,
annarently, for strict synchronousness. Lo^'-eioy makes short work of t,hi 3
specious bit of verbal juggling. The fact tl-iat,in the sense defined,
all things may be made contemporary by sufficient extension of the
"durational unit** does n'^ -in- ^eans nake them synchronous or warrant
f(
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the asnnrMon that they are nuTierical ly Identical. On McGilvary'e
own principles "the star which I now oeroeive is not, in all of its
actually flven qualities anrl relations, identical -vith the star
'.vhich became extinct a thousand years ago " ( loo » c 1
1
.
, o . 4-0 K Loye-
joy closes his criticism "by pointing out that tnere are scattered
and unclear hints in McGilyary's article of a third attempt to
solve thr^ -oroMem of tetinoral dating. ''The date-transcendence of
consciousness" is the Drincinle here invoked. Loy9.jo3'''s criticism
of this confused portion of* McGilyary^s article is that there is
only one sense in which a realist can consi f?t entj^r sneak of the. "date-
transcendence of consciousness." By such a phrase he can nronerly
mean only " that -Qie dates. of existence of objects given in, or 'meant'
by, perceptual or other consciousness may be different fron'the date
of existence of the consciousness, But this obvlo-js fact is of no
assistance to the New Realist in his attempt to establish the numerical
Identity of percent and obleot •n'-'>-'^celved, for "it will still remain
clear that the time wherl the consciousness of a given object exists
is often not identical with any time in which, in any further sense,
the object canjb-"- a realist, be supoosed to exist." Ap-ain the attemnt
of the New Healist to establish the case for epi steraologlcal monism
breaks down.
Detailed reference should be made to certain additional
critical discussions of the Droblera of error as faced by the New
Realists. The first of these which we select, is nhosen for two
chief reasons, namely, it is pres.ented with unusual ingenuity and
it treats a difficulty not explicitly examined in the reviews
and criticisms already discussed. T^^e paner in question, ''The
Aviary Theory of Truth and Error", by A. ^^oore, appeared in the
Jour, of Phil.
,
Psychol., and ocient. Methods , Vol .X, np. 543-54-6.
f(
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^ The paper begins with a quotation from Jov/ett ' 3 translation of
the passage wherein Socrates
the The*etetug^3uopoao3 the mini of each man to contain an aviary
with all sorts of birds, the birds figuring forms of knowledge and
of ignorance. The conclusion to which Moore arrives 13 that the
New Realist of the 'Montague type is confronted by as great a dif-
ficulty in distinguishing truth from error as Theaetetus confessed.
The gist of 'ioorets argument is as follo.v3:Montagu9, in his ess^iy
in The New Reali sm, inai sts that "true" and false** are attributes
of the objec t of belief, never of the act of belief, that they are
ever attached to the latter resulting from the verbal fallacy
of metonymy "(Montague), "Truth and error are respectively be-
lief in what is real and unreal'' (-Montague, The New Realism, 2f-2),
since "the true and false are respectively the real and unreal
considered as the objects of a possible belief or judgment •»
(Montague, op. clt.,D.^53). Now the plot begins to thicken for
Montague, for he defines belief as "the attitude we take toward
any proposition that appears to be true or real and carries with
it a tendency to act on that proposition " (Montague, op. ci t. ,d.
2.'^5). Moore proceeds to threaten Montague with a philosophical
goring on the relentless horns of a dilemma, —the object of bA-
lief 'Hust be either all truth or all errorJ For, mark, if by "what ap-
pears to be real or true" Montague means "what we bell eve to be
real or true", then "all that we have accomDli shed is a tautology,
and there is still not belief in the unreal in sight (Moore, loc.
cit
.
,
p. '=^44) . If, on the other hand, ''what appears to be real or
true" means "that which has only the anoearanoe of truth or reality
to the believer" , then "it only remains for Mr. Bradley to offer the
right hand of fellowshiD " (Moore, loc. ci_t
. ,
p . .^44 ) . Moore ur^es that
with truth and error defined as Montague has defined them, with the
((
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real and unreal dator-nined <vithout reference to belief or Judprnent,
and with theae latter ready made, aa they are according to the doctrine
that con8oiou3ne33 ia an external relation, no one but an omniscient
bystander could dlatinguish betiween truth and orror. He concludes
hi a paper by aummarizing the fundamental defects of Montague*
a
position. Three auch defects are aoeclfl ed, vi_z. , for the alleged
sub Jec tivi sm" of absolute idealism an equally absolute objectivism
is substituted; from one term of a logical distinction an ontological
absolute is derived to the exclusion of the other term; from an il-
belief
licit partition of/^into a contentlesa " subjective** ''mental" act on
the one hand and an actionlesa content or 'object" on the other
there results an utter falsification of the knowledge situation.
Sheldon haa brouglit hi a critical acu'Tien to bear unon
this difficul ty, 'vhioh haunts the New Realist as persistently as Perry's
egocentric predicament does the huir.an mind universal. 'Ve select
for comment two of Sheldon's discussiona of the problem. In "Pro-
fessor 'iontague As *Neo-Realist ' on Error** (Jour. Phil. , Psychol. , and
Sclent. Meth. ,X, 572-530 ), he passes upon Montague much the same
strictures that Love joy oasaes, adding, ho'/^ever, certain significant
criticisms. He suggests that Montague, by making place for "un-
real aubsi atenta** breaka the New ilealiat'a pledge to accord ** full
ontological status to the things of thought as well as to the
things of sense, to logical entitles aa well as physical entities, or
to subsiatents as '-Tell as exiatents" (loo. cit» ,n, f^7<k) , He finds
the category of the " sub si stent" condemned by its infsrtili ty; i
t
ia merely a "receiDtacle for errors* which so far throws no light
whatever on the nature of error "
(
loc . cit « ,p. 574) « He finds
Montague not a thorouglily orthodox New Realist as regards "psycho-
phobia", that peculiar form of philosophic rabies which has caused so
(
many ferocious attacks by New Ivealiats, '-Then Montasrue aaserta
that '*my awareness of objecta" "is more certainly real than any-
thing else", he makes a dangerous adnisaion. Sheldon finds in
Montagije'3 category of potential! ty, whereby he atte^rirjts "to
guarantee the actual existence of the subjective as an anchor to
which errors may be attached*^ ( loc. cit. ,td. an a'^biguity from
which it results that "this attribute of consciousness, by virtue of
which actuality is vouchsafed to what la, physically speaking, not
actual, remains undefined and mysterious'* ( loc» ci t«
,
p» 5?P ) . The
ambiguity in question is that '*potsntiali ty** , as used by science,
is quite relative to the future or implied object**
,
whereas, in
Montague's application of the conception to consciousness, it means
"something now actual, as concrete present terra" ( lojc. cit_. ,p. P'^^
A somewhat similar remark is made concerning Montague's applica-
tion of his princinle to the specific problem of error: ambiguous
potentiality explains prettily enou^ the possibility of error, but
not the actuality of errors * "The very erroneousnsss of error con-
sists in «... actual presence to, and acceptance by, consciousness**
^ loc« ci t.
,
p. i=S77), and it is precisely such presence and acceptance
which "ambiguous potentiality" fails to explain. Sheldon points
out the futility of Monta,?sue*3 conception of " subsistents" as a
locus for error, remarking that **no matter what we call the field
of error, it contradicts the objective facts'* loic. cit
. ,
p . 578 ) , and
concludes that, at least so far as the problem of error is concerned
the New Realism has not "justified its claims as a ^reform*" (loo,
cit. ,T).579).
The second discussion selected from Sheldon's writings
appears in the chapter devoted to Great Objectivism in "Strife of
Systems and Productive Duality^ In this discussion, Sheldon, as in
((
the paper already reviewed, stresses the fact that Montague*3 oon-
oeption of consciousness is not fertile^ --Montague* a definition of
consciousness in objective terms '*doe3 not guarantee the existence
of the defini turn" , his description of mind "leaves ua with a dualism
as ultimate as any that could be conoeived'*(oD^. cit.. ,pr). 192f ), Great
Objectivism has no solvent for the surd of raind»"it is able to bring
successfully
mind;^under its formula, but not to state why there should be such a
unique being as can confer presence u-oon the absent and reality upon
the unreal" (o T). cit. ,p. IP;^). In discussing the failure of Monta2-ue*s
attempt to account for actual errors, Sheldon becomes more explicit
than he was in the earlier article. "Error involves the selection
of one implicate and the exclusion of the rest. But we are not told
why any one implicate must be chosen and the others rejected. To be
sure, consciousness is selectiverbut that is one of its specific proper
t3 es which the ..*. definition has not accounted for" (op* cit.,p.l94).
Sheldon proceeds to examine Holt's theory of consciousness and his
account of error. Taking Holt*3 definition of consciousness," Any
class that is formed from the members of a given manifold by some
selective principle which is independent of the principles wh^ioh have
organized the manifold may be called a cross -sec tl on . And such a thin
is consciousness or mind" (Holt, Concept of Consciousness, p. 353), Sheldon
insists that "if the objective deduction is to be carried through, it
must be sho^Am that the power of the nervous system to select, to make
specific response, to carve out its objects from the rest, is itself
explicable on quite objective grounds" (od. ci t.
,
p. 300 ) . This Holt
and his fellow New Realists have failed to do. The criticism is es-
sentially the same as the one passed upon Montague *3 conception of
potentiality: in either case, there remains something irreducible about
mini, viz. , the selective principle itself. Passing to Holt's attempt
1-
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to account for error by reference to the analogy of contradiotiona
in the sphere of physical facta, Sheldon points out, as Love joy did,
that Holt uses the term ** contradiction" ambiguoualy, deriving all of
the plausibility of hi a explanation from the ambiguity^ but Sheldon*
a
treatment of the issue is more pointed than Lovejoy*a and takes a
alightly different turn. **In the physical world", so runs the argu-
ment, "tv?o conflicting results cannot hold of the game body**, — op-
posing forces may somehow be working against each other, but their
effects do not exist in contradiction" (op. cit . ,p. 303 "In human
error on the other hand, both members of the contradiction do exist
together; the opposition Dersists without the least hint of solution**
(op. cit»,p.209). The fact that errors are thus extant unresolved,
whereas in the physical field the oioposition of fbrces is resolved
in their effects, renders Holt*3 analogy null and void. "The actuality
of the subjective is again found", as in "the case of Montague, "to be
an unsolved mystery" (oo. oit.,p.90?). Finally, Holt is not helr)evd
any more than Montague was by relegating errors to the realm of**sub-
sistents" , that "limbo of mysteries" , for their contradiction with
actual fact cannot be resolved by jauntily renaming their habitat.
For the Great Objectivism of Holt and Montague, mind and its miscarriages
remain miracles. Further relevant papers by Sheldon are "Error and
Unreality" (Phil.' Rev., XXV, pp. 33.5-364) and "The Demolition of Unreality"
(Jour. Phil. , Psychol, and Scient. Meth. , XIII, pp. 318-531), but their
consideration need not detain us here . Suffice it to say that the
main contention of the former is, as of the latter, that the cate-
«
gory of the "unreal" is meaningless and, hence, that the problem of
error is in no sense solved by assigning error to the realm of the
unreal, under whatever ci^mbersoms terminology that realm may be designated.
TWO typical citations ^11 serve to indicate the point of view taken.
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**The question, whe ther an apnarition is real, is truly the question,
whether it is physical ; whether, that is, it has potencies and con-
nections which affect, or are affected by, the other things we call
physical. We never genuinely raise the question, xvhether anything
is real;but rather, whether it belongs In this or that context"
(Error and Unreal! ty, W.H. Sheldon, Phil . Rev., Vol. XXV, p. 364).
"^iffhen people s-Deak of unreal! ty, they are uttering a paradox and
a misnomer; the alleged unreal thing is not unreal, but ig in the
wrong context, or insignificant, or valueless, etc. The coneequencea
of our result, for the problem of error are, I think, momentous, even
startling, but only one of them need be stated now, viz. , that error
is not, as Professor Montague has said, belief in an unreal object.
For there are no unreal objects'* (The Demolition of Unreality, W.H.
Sheldon, Jour. Phil. , Psychol. , and Soient. Meth.,Vol. XIII, p. 318).
The paper by Thilly entitled "The Relation of Conscious-
ness and Object in Sense-Perception" (Phil. Rev. , Vol. XXI, pp. 416-4-32)
merits brief mention. In this paper Thilly is concerned with the
tenability of the epistemologlcal monism of those New Realists who
maintain that the "real** object is at the moment of its perception
numerically identical with the object as perceived, though, at the
sajae time, wholly independent of consciousness for its existence.
After a preliminary discussion of the epistemologial raonian of sub-
jective idealism and that of realism in relation to epistemologlcal
dualism and metaphysical monism and dualism, Thilly proceeds to ex-
amine Montague* 3 attempt to make out a case for the numerical Identity
of percept and "real" object. Montague's theory of energetics is set
forth at length and then reduced to the following concise summary:
"This simply means that energy flows from the object into the organ-
ism, is transformed into potential energy at the nerve center, becomes
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oonsoioue of Its quality, is connected with other such conacioua
energies into a 8y9teTn,and with these reflected back to its source.
The qualities raaroh into the brain, become conscious, and then march
out again. But is the quality of the perceived object identical
with the quality of the material object?" ( loc » ci_t
.
, d • 420 ) . To
this query Thilly is obliged to reply in the negative for "the
complex of qualities, conscious of themselves, given in perception,
is the result of the interaction of inflowing energies and organic
energies; the result is a real energy that lasts as long as the inter-
action lasts; what the real energies are, apart from their relation to
the perceiving organism, perception cannot tell us. Perceived objects
are true parts of the material world, but they are the intermittent
products of the relation between particular organisms and the world"
( loc. clt. ,p.4'3lK It is obvious that Montague's energistio theory
falls quite as signally to generate a solution of the oroblera of error
as to establish the numerical identity of percept and real** ob.jeot.
Thilly next turns his attention to Woodbridge*s attempt
to demonstrate the numerical identity of perceived object and object
as unperceived. According to Woodbridge, there are specific qualities
or differences in the world,but they depend for their specific effects
upon the reactions of the sense organs. Thilly finds that this view
is a flat repudiation of realistic eplstemological monism, for, assuredl
if ,ve define sensation as the mepe existence of interaction between
the organism and the environnent, " we cannot say that the perceived
object, the patch of blue, is numerically identical with the real ob^
jeot,the physical and physiological events in question, that is, that
the complex of qualities given in perception (the patch of blue) is
of
numerically identical with the complex/vqualities which is a true part
of the material world (ether and eye activity)** ( loc. cit. ,p.455). ''^ore
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over, if the coftneration of organism and enviromient i_s sensation,
it would seem to follow that, even in normal sensation, qualities
are added which disappear with the interaction. Finally, further
additions would seem to be made when the sensations are connected
by means of the nervous system, so that the perceived object would
neither completely agree with the sensory content nor with the
specific differences in the world, from which we started** (1 oc. cit.,
p,423). If the realist urges that we perceive things only in their
mutual interrelations and not as they are in isolation or independent
ly of one another, if he urges, e. g. , that object, ether, and organism in
interaction produce in the object some specific quail
a
, the obvious
reply is that such qualia are thus made relative to the organism
and cease to exist with the passing of the conjunction of organism
and object. In brief, "as soon as we attempt to explain the origin
of perception, to construct a theory of perception, on the basis of an
organism and an environing world, perceiving becomes a relative affair
( loo . Pit .
,
p. 424). 'ife may then properly speak of the real object as
directly given only on condition that we frankly recognize that it
is relative to a more fundamental truly real object, —energies, mole-
cules, ether waves, what not, — which is not given in perception. As
much as this is clearly implicit in the theories of Montague and
Woodbridge, for they represent the sensory content as connected and
ooftrdinated by the nervous system, which latter also makes certain
additions from its personal history to the result. Translating this
essentially biological account of perception into terms of conscious-
ness "this will mean that the object figuring in the conscious per-
ceptual stream is interpreted, apperceived, and that ve get more than
a sensory content, more than an isolated piece of pure experience"
( loo, cit.
,
p. 429 ) . In fact, all of the biological theories of per-
I0
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oeptlon terminate in the view that the object as given in percention
never appears in isolation, never out of relation to an organic being.
Thilly concludes A perceived object cannot be torn entirely out of
its relation to a perceiving subject. Perceiving an object is an in-
divisible activity, which we can afterwards analyze, according to our
purposes, but not with the idea of discovering the object exactly as
it would be apart from any perceiver We may say that in the
perceptual situation an object is revealed, made manifest, its qualities
are brought out, and that this is the work of consciousness. But we
must also say that much that appears belongs to the mental realm, is
read into the object, sometimes truly, sometimes not"(l^c. cit.,pp.430-
432). The bearing of this conclusion of Thilly 's upon the problem of
error is too patent to require cora'-aent.
The basic contention of Thilly 's criticism is set forth in
more general form in a searching analysis by Leighton of the New Real-
istic theory of independence (Truth, Real i ty and Relation, Joseph A.
Leighton, Phil. Rev. , Vol. XXIII, pp. 17-26 ) . The essence of Leighton's
criticism is that it ia sheer nonsense to talk about kno wl edge of ** en-
tities" as they exist independent of the knowledge relation, for the
quite sufficient reason that, all knowledge being fundamentally re-
lational and all knoi/m objects being most palpably in the knowledge
context, there is no assignable ground for affirming what any entity
might conceivably be outside of the knowledge relation. LeigJiton be-
gins by laying down the dictum that every Judgment involves a twofold
relation, viz. ,( 1)" the relation of the object of the judgment to the
mind that holds it to be true", and (2)" the relation of the object of
the judgment to some class of enti ties" , the term "entities" being taken
to include all manner of objects of knowledge ( loc. cit
.
p. , 1?) . The
existence of this complex of related entities is the objective condition
(
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of the validity of the first relation 8r>eclfied. A hallucinatory ob-
j«ct,then,i3 merely a mental content erroneously taken as an element
In an objective system, --it is an entity placed in the wrong context.
Now, since relation is the fundamental category of all knowing, nothing
can exist as a knowable entity outside of all relations. Hence it
follows that to ask if any knowable being can be indenendent of all
relations and still be in the relation of knowledge is innlicitly to
answer one*3 own question in the negative. It further follows that
the "dogma of purely external relations is one that has no meaning in
a world of intelligible exDerience" and that "the neo-reali stic theory
of independence is incapable of defining anything, except in terms of
bare negation"
(
loo , cit .p. , 13 ). "Relation is at once the fundamental
category of knowledge and fundamental to the structure of reality....
All objects of genuine knowledge are terms-in-relations. The one is
meaningless without the other. Absolutely external relations do not
relate anything The internality of relations means that all sig-
nificant relations constitute the individual relata members in a more
ai.gnificant whole or individual system A logical * simple* so-called,
no more subsists on its own feet than a cell, an atom, or an electron, has
significant reality out of relation to the complex in which it is an
element** (loc. cl_t.
, pp. 20-21), In the absence of such relational com-
plexes of entities, the awareness of whose systematic togetherness con-
stitutes truth, there could be no valid distinction between error and
illusion on the one hand and truth and reality on the other. The things
which enter into such complexes are far from Perry^s "simple entities",
innocent of all relations; they are rather more or less conventionalized
groupings of sense qualities as perceived under normal conditions by
normal percipients. Entities out of all relation to other entitles
and themselves devoid of relational structure are pure fictions of
philosophic fancy (^oc. cU.
, pp. 25.26). It is at onee apwent

that thla view, by doing away with the New Realist's fictitious siniple
entities that slip so dexterously into and out of all sorts of non-
constitutive relations, undercuts the whole New Realistic exDlanation
of error, 30 far as it depends upon the theory of independence.
In an article entitled •^Percipients, Sense Data, and Things'*
(Jour. Phil., Psychol, and Scient. Method. , Vol. XIII, rjp. 121-138 ), Lei ghton
applies the characteristic tests of the critical realist to the con-
cepts indicated in the caption of the paper. Bare sensations are
artificial constructions invented by the psychologist to account
for the genesis of perceptions out of simpler elements as well as
to explain their manifold variations. Even in the instance of oer-
ceptions of the vaguest sort, we apprehend immediately complexes of
qualities and we learn to perceive better by discriminating and cor-
relating such objective complexes and thus bring thera out into sharper
definition against the vaguer background of the total external reality
immediately aporehended (loc. cit.
,
pp. 122-1S3). All differences in
perception are due to the fact that the real world is a system of
interacting elements or individua of varying degrees of structural
complexity (p.lS^) and "just as the physical thing is a sensory
complex attended to and discriminated from a^ague background of
apprehended reality, the individual percipient and agent is a felt
Center of reference for all sorts of relations" ( loc. cit. , p. 1'3'7).
The argument of the entire paper is brought to focus in the follow-
ing sentence: "Reali ty is a vastly comnlex and changing system which
engenders at some places and moments in its career feeling and re-
acting centers in which its qualities become consciously focused,
and through which they are under modification and rearrangement,
but are neither created, annihilated, nor radically distorted"
(
loc.
Pit. ,p. 128 ) . Granted the truth of this inter-oretation of thins:hood.
i
Belfhood, and the perc9T)tual act whereby the self becomes aware of
things, the bases upon which the New Realistic accounts of error are
built are cut away*
Exceedingly interesting have been the contributions made
to the discussion of our problem by Pratt, confirmed realist, but not of
the epistemologically monistic type. Five of Pratt's articles are
selected for brief ooranient. The first of these (Professor Perry's
Proofs of Healiarrj, Jour. Phil
., Psychol . and 3cient. 'Jleth. , Vol . IX, pt?.
573-580) is devoted to showing that all of Perry's allep-ed proofs
of independent neutral entities fail to demonstrate the demonstrandum,
the first of the three proofs being merely a negative critique of
subjective idealism and the remaining three being either irrelevant
to the question or illustrative of the hoary fallacy of petitio
principi i, --the best way of securing neutral entities is "by begging
them at the start" ( loc . cit. ,p. r^79 ) , The case for neutral entities
demolished, Perry's characteristic solution of the problem of error
becomes a vagrant in the field of philosophy without visible means
of support. However, the vounds which Pratt inflicts upon ^erry are
the faithful wounds of a friend, for the essay in question, we are
assured, "is intended as a humble contribution toward the new realism"
(j£C. Pit
. ,
p. 580 )
. Indeed, Pratt has throughout endeavored to aid
and abet his erring realist brothers by pointing out to them the error
of their way. He has graciously assured them that, once the grievous
error of this way is amended, the members of the older school of real-
ism stand ready to receive back their "brother realists with open
arms and glad hearts" (Jour. Phil ., etc. , Vol .XV, p. 695 ) . What, in hia
opinion, the fundamental erratum (one can not read the New Realists
without falling into their habit of using underscored or italicised
Latin words, appropriately or otherwise.') of these wanderers from the
*
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realist fold is, Pratt states r^lainly enousfi in his "Confessions of
an Old Realist" (Jour. Phil ., etc Vol . XIII, Dt). 687-«Q3) . It iSjnanie-
ly, their epi stemologioal moniara. Pratt stands unequivocally for an
epi laternologioally duallstlc realism and a "representative" or "cor-
respondence" theory of our knowledge of objects, as opposed to the
peculiar theory of "immediacy" or "immanence" espoused by the repre-
sentatives of the New Realism. In "A Defense of Dualistic Realism**
(Jour. Phil. , etc. , Vol. XIV, pD. 253-361), Pratt gives the reasons for
the faith that is in him concerning the position assumed in the
paper last mentioned in these pages, His theory maintains that
"consciousness and the world of physical objects in space are es-
sentially different from each other in kind"
(
1 )C . cit.,p.253). He
is prompted to take up his position on this ground because no com-
peting theory "can explain so easily the various characteristics of
knov7l edge, TDercepti on, illusion, and error" f loc. cit. , n. . To the
charge that such dualism involves both transcendence and inferential
knowledge, Pratt replies by admitting the indictment and then adding
that "every other form of e-oisteraology which would avoid solipsism
has to make use of both these things"
;
loc . cit« ,p» 855). Having
hurled this tu quoque (almost have they persuaded me to be stylisti-
cally a New Realist.') at his friendly foe, Pratt proceeds to point
out the impossibility of regarding emotions, volitions, meaninsrs and
images, whether of memory or of imagination, as anything other that
subjective and insists that the case is not hel-oed in the least by
drawing a distinction between existence and subsi stence, since this
distinction itself "splits the world into two very separate parts"
(loo. cit. ,p. 253 ). At best the change in terminology merely dis-
guises the situation, leaving it quite unaltered. Some New Realists,
e.^., Perry in his treatment of values, do not, to be sure, deny the
i
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existenco of the sub jective, but even these representatives of the
raovernant stoutly naintain **pan-ob Jectivism" , which voull apnear to
involve a very scandal of contradiction. Nor is this contradiction
the only difficulty vhich the New Realists encounter: they appear
not to have inspected a treatise by one Aristotle on certain Sophistical
fallacies. For exampl e, Perry, sensing the danger that lurks for his
theory in the admission of any peculiar privacy about the content of
consciousness as distinguished frorp the sharable oh2,racter of physical
Ob Jecta, insists that the content of consciousness is no more private
than are physical objects. He is sure that he can open his mind to
his friend quite as readily as he can open his purse for ins-oection.
Pratt is correct in pointing out that Perry here uses knowledge in
two entirely different senses and by this ambiguous use of the term
deludes himself into thinking that he has proved his point. Perry
has confused knowledge by immediate experience with knowledge by
description, only the former of which is relevant to the issue between
epistemological monism and dualism. Pratt illustrates the difficulty
cleverly when he says,*'\Vhen I describe my headache to the doctor I do
not give him my headache" jl oc. cit.,p.359). When, however, Perry dis-
plays his purse to his friend, it is not necessary that he should take
the tine to describe it; the purse i_s there as im'nediate experience to
his friend. Again, the New Realists are hard put to it to bend
Aristotle into compliance with their contention that variant raultinle
images of an object are severally that identical object. It is vain
for the New Realist to urge that a given element may properly have
its locus in different relation systems, for in our case we have not
identical elements, but different elements. A similar clash with the
inflexible law of identity and contradiction occurs when the Mew Real-
ist has the hardihood to assert that a perceptual fact, which lies at
(i
the end of an extended series of physical and phyaiolop:ical Droceeses,
la nuraerically identical with the physical object in external space
which initiated the process-series. Moreover, it quite aside fro*^
the iGsue,at least ao far as their "lain contention is concerned, for
New Realists to set forth long and elabtyrate explanations of the
Gauges of illusion and error, be these causes physical or physiolog-
ical, for no amount of such explanatory comTnent ur^on causes will
serve to prove the numerical identity of effect with cause. In
"Professor Spauldino:'e Non-Existent Illusions'* (Jour. Phil , etc . , Vol
.
XV, T)p. ^^88-68rO,Pratt treats more specifically the precise problem
of error as handled by a representative of the new philosophy. The
publication of Spaul ding s** The New Rational! am" called forth Pratt's
paper. He finds in this book much that realists of the older school
can cordially accept. In fact, there is only one point of importance
in the book u-oon whicli S-oaulding' s views diverge greatly from those
of "other realists who do not care to call theTiselves new'**,the point
being Spaulding's "^retention of 'r>an-ob jectivism. ' and his insistence
that illusion, hallucination, and error must not be classed as mental"
( cit
. ,
p. 688 ) « In scattered passages, Spaul ding offers three sug-
gestions toward a solution of the problem of the status of these very
troublesome entities. The first suggestion is that they have a per-
fectly good causal explanation. This is true enough, but quite irrel-
evant to_ the question whether or no the illusory appearance- can be
numerically equated with its objective cause. The second suggestion
is that these erroneous experiences consist in "taking one entity to
be another which it is not, or in localizing it in the wrong place or
wrong time"
(
loo . cit.
,
p. 689 ) . In this suggestion Spaulding implicit-
ly gives his case away and he Droceeds to give it away very explicitly
when he says, "The final and irreducible subjective element in error is
c4
46.
only the psychological fact of the taking a thine: to be what it Is
not" (The New Rationali am, pi). 377f ) . Strange "pan-ob jectivi bt!" this.*
Pratt centers his attack, however, UDon the third of Spaulding*8 sug-
gections, - -the distinction between exi stents and aubsi stents, together
with the assertion that all sorts of non-veridical exrieriences fall
within the latter category. Pratt a argument may be summarized as
follows : Spaulding denies existence to dreams and illusory and hal-
lucinatory Ob jects, conceding them only subsi atence, then tries to de-
fine existence as occupancy of a space and a time, both, or only one,
then finds that this definition makes his subsi stents, on occasion of
being exoerienced, as existent as any sensation or veridical perception,
and finally dogmatically asserts (New Rationalism, p. 492) that the re-
calcitrant incubi that turn his realistic dream into a nightmare "are
^
existents'J Pratt concludes the critical portion of his paper
by saying "either temporal localization is sufficient to differentiate
the existent from the non-existent, or it is not. If it is, then dreams
and hallucinations, dream objects and hallucinatory ob jec ts, exi st. If
not, then no psychological entities exist Professor Spaulding, with
all the ponderous machinery of modern logic at his disposal, has been
quite unable to propose or manufacture a definition of existence ac-
cording to which normal mental entities shall be exi stents and hal-
lucinatory ones non-exi stents" (lo-o. cit.,p.692). He adds a shrewd
conjecture that Spaulding is moved to make the heroic but futile at-
tempt to defend "pan-ob.jectivism" by fear lest its repudiation would
force him to accept the substance view of consciousness as a container
of the purely sub jective, whereas, if he were only aware of the fact, there
^ is nothing in his own view of consciousness inconsistent with the type
of dualism for which Pratt argues, since Spaulding clearly repudiates
(The New RationaliBra,i5, 48 1) the characteristic New Realistic relational
(€
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theory of conBciousness. In the last of Pratt's five articles
selected for coraTnent (Realism and Perception, Jour. Phil ., etc. , Vol
.
XVI,pp. 596-P03),our critic traces the chief difficulties of his-
toric realisms to their common root in mistaken interpretations
of perception. Naive realisn solves its difficulties only hy ig-
norlnp; them. Both Lockian dualietic realism and the New Realir-^ra
have interpreted perception in such a manner as to leave no ground
for distinguishing veridical perception from illusion and error.
Thus '*both Locke's sailing craft and the migjity modern steamship
of neo-reallsm with all of its scientific apparatus have somehow
managed to outdo every ship of classical antiquity in getting
wrecked on both Scylla and Charybdis** ( l->c . cijb. ,p. 596 ) . The root
difficulty for both of these realisms is their confusion of content
of perception with object of perception. Pratt compresses his central
contention into the following words:"If my object is just ray content
it is inconceivable that I should ever be mistaken about it** ( loc . clt .
,
p» 60 2), whereas if the percept is regarded as only a symbol of the ob-
ject which we mean and to which we intend to react, ample room is left
for erroneous symbol! zation, for mis-pointed meanings.
Two articles by Drake, wri tten in the same spirit of fraternal
correction which prompted Pratt, deserve mention. In the first of
these papers (The Inadequacy of 'Natural' Realism, Jcur. Phil., etc..
Vol. VIII, pp. 365-372), Drake defines his own position as that of "crit-
ical" realism, which he distinguishes from the "natural" realism which
holds that **the very data which we have in experience slip out of ex-
perience and continue to exist, with the same qualities, though no one»B
experience includes them" 0- oc . ci t.
^
p. 5^6 ) . or. as expressed elsewhere
on the same page from which the foregoing quotation is taken, that
''the 'this' which the idealist calls 'content of esperienco' io the
(
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very 'object' which the physicist speaka of as 'out there', as the
cause of our exDerience." By "critical" realism Drake means that
theory which holds that the "this" of experi ence, the object as per-
ceived,"ia numerically and qualitatively different from ajid exists
later in time than, the thing-ln-i teelf 'out there' which causes
the experience" (loc_. ci t.
,
p. 566 )« We live, to be sure, in a, common
world, but each one of us is walled in from that world, is imprisoned
within the intramural limits of consciousness, having access to the
outer world only through the medium of visual and tactile experiences,
which represent the objective order beyond. Consciousness is the
peculiar relation of "felt togetherness" which exists among the data
which occupy your individual field or mine at any given moment. My
field and yours are mutually exclusive, though elements in them may
represent identical external objects. Drake insists that this differ-
ence is "ultimate and indisputable" and one which is verifiable by
any simple act of introspection. He concludes that,oncje this dis-
tinction is granted, "natural realism is definitely refuted, by the
logical canon of identity" (loc. cit.,p.368). If there were no
delimiting boundaries about your field and mine, they would coalesce
and we should become, ipso fact o, one person. The necessity of affirm-
ing the nimerical disparity of the data in my field and those in
yours becomes even more clearly api^arent when v/e consider their
qualitative divergences. If we affirn? that each "this** of imr^iediate
experience is a permanent existence, we have a "world reduplicated ad
infinitum^ whereas if we accept the theory of "critical" realism we
have but one orderly world of external objects, the niomberless disparate
•^thises" existing merely as "transient bits of our human experience"
(^oc. cit.,p.370). Drake closes his account of the inadequacy of
"natural" realism as an explanation of our knowledge of physical ob-
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iects with a restatement of the rnuch-discussed difficulty involved in the
universal and necessary temporal aberration in perception. He then pro-
coeds to show that this type of realism is at its best when trying to
explain precisely this matter of the status of physical objects, for
the theory was obviously constructed with .:"ust this end in view. Its
utter inadequacy becomes strikingly apparent when it is applied to
the explanation of the 'subjective" factors in experience, --"wishes,
hOD68, intentions, dreams, ideas, memories, and the rest" (l^c. cit.,p.57l).
Some New Realists have attempted to provide a locus for these elements
in a non-spatial world which exists simultaneously with the spatio-
tem.poral order of physical things, but it remains an opaque mystery ho^
the elements fro-^ these so different worlds are brought together to
constitute experience. It is quite as dark a mystery how, in a world
^ of spatial and temporal relations, this peculiar relation of together-
ness-in-field which is consciousness takes its rise.
Drake's second article, A Cul-de-Sac for Realism (Jour. Phil.,
etc. , Vol.XIV,pp. 3S5-373),i8 characterized by its author as "an intimate
talk with my fellow reali sts" ( loc. ci t.
,
p. S'^R ) , It is a fervent appeal
to brother realists to avoid the blind alley of epi stemological monism,
which doctrine Drake regards as "the greatest obstacle in the way of
the spread of a sound realistic philosophy"
(
^oc. cit»,p.373),—"there
is here no thoroughfare"* Our critic is quite ready to acc9r)t an onto-
logical monism and to class the m.ental as a subclass of the physical or
as a specific relation am.ong certain physical entities, since he can find
no sign of anything in the "existing universe but qual i
a
in relation"
( loc. cit* ,p. 365), but epistemologioal monism is to hin an entire-
ly indefensible doctrine.. He will accept "Dan-objectivi sn"
,
philological
impropriety and all, but he will none of New Realiarnts peculiar form of
"immanence." In his criticism of this latter theory, he starts from
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the proposition that ^ the character of our sense qualiti es i& a func tion
^ of the nature of our sense-organa and brains
,
and of our position in
space" (loo. cit. ,p« 36^ ) and draws the conclusion that therefore all
perceived qualities are of necessity relative to the iDercipient * s
organism. He then proceeds to set forth the four possible accounts
of the natui^e and locus of perceived qualities which are open to an
ontologically monistic realist, who must " find a ^^£inite^ position in
the time- space order for ever^r Q^istin^ qual e** {lOO. cit« ,p. 567), These
four possibilities are:{l)"an infinite number of qualities" may "exist
in the object, each revealed by the proper perception mechanism" , (2)
"a new quality" may*replace the old in the object whenever any change
in the position or nature of a perceiving organism is effeoted" , (3
)
"the sense qualities which exist in my experience when I look at an
object** may not be "numerically, the very same qualities that exist
in the object, but (are) effects of those qualities produced in me,
representative of the qualities which exist in the object" , (4)"my
sense qualities" may "exist neither in me nor in the object which I
am facing,but in some other place'' (loc. cit. ,rt. 367). The third of
the foregoing possibilities represents Drake's own view;no one of
them, --and the enumeration of possibilities is assuredly exhaustive,—
by
provides for the unique type of immanence demanded ^epi stemologically
monistic New Realism. Drake next rejects Montague's class of sub-
oistents" on the ground that "pan-objectivism" , being ontologically
raoni Stic, must insist that all existing entities belong to the one
coherent physical world order,and that, since no entities more patent-
ly exist that our sense quali ti es, they must necessarily be included
within that order. The critical attack closes with a summary state-
ment of the three chief reasons which influence Drake to reject
epiatemological monism. These reasons aret" Contravlictory qualities
2^ 1121 coexi st at the same point in spaee at, the same tine" (loc. cit.
,

p. 369), (5)" There la no apr)arent Tnechanl sm for the projec tion of sense -
qualitie s Into ob jects" , the apparatus of percentlon being a one-way
mechanism (loc « _cit. ,p. 370 ), (?)"Our sense qualities exist at a time
later than that of the events in the objects that cause them" (loc. clt.,
pp.370f)« In connection with the first of these ob ,'Sections, Drake
charges the New Realists -Afith "multiplying world stuff praeter necessita-
tera" when they draw out their distinctions between "material" and "im-
material'* entities," subsi stents" and " existent s" , with the result that
"the world becomes blurred into an indistinguishable welter of qualities"
in which "all the illusory and hallucinatory qualities of objects are
as truly 'out there* as their *real» qualities" (1 :>c. cit.,p.369). It
would appear, so Drake concludes, that the New Realists had first decided
that epi stemological monism must be true and then "set to work as best
they could to answer the objections to it"
,
loc . cit.,p.373^«
GritlGlsm of the New Realists' treatment of error from a
view-point different from any of those already discussed is found in
Adams' article on"The Mind's Knowledge of Reality" (Jour. Phil., etc..
Vol. XIII, pp. 57-C6). Our oritic»s position la a transformed Kantian
a priori sm . He begins his attack with the incontestable assertion
that, were immediate experience the direct point of contact between
the mind and real things, there would be no such thing as a problem
of knowledge. That there is such a problem, more than two milleniuras
of discussion bear irrefragable witness. In his attempt to untie
the worse than Gordian knot of knowledge, Adams makes use of the prin-
ciple that "wherever a qualitative distinction la made within a given
class of ob jects, there is ImDlied a reference to somethins: outside
that class as a standard" (loc. cit.,p.^59). Since, therefore, both hal-
lucinatory and veridical perceptions fall into the single class of
perceptions, the criterion whereby they may be distinguished can not
itself be a perception. Indeed, no qualitative distinctions would be
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poaaible strictly within the limits of a one-dimensional perceptual
order. Not only does the possibility of such distinctions presuppose
the existence of a standard of reference other than the class of ob-
jects among which qualitative variations are discerned, but "knowledge
of that outside standard is loresupposed by any Jud^ent which asserts
the existence of such qualitative distinctions" (loc^. cit « ,p» 65). Viewed
in the one dimension of experience-fact, illusory smd hallucinatory ob-
jects stand on anjexistentlal par with veridical perceptions. When,
however, we test experience-facts with regard to their truth value, our
one-dimensional order fails us. From this failure result the "dis-
crepancy and incommensurability of the order of experienced facts and
the world of real being" (loc. cit.,p.64). Epistemological monism, which
consists in the denial of this discrepancy and incommensurabili ty,raust
I
eventuate "either in an Eleaticism in which there are no events because
there are only meanings and truth values, or in a sheer, cha.otic factual-
ism in which there is nothing but incidents which occur, possessing
neither truth nor meaning" ( loc. cit.,p.S4)« An analysis of the dual-
ism of subject and predicate in the judgment, further corroborates the
distinction drawn between the order of experience-facts and the order
of real being. (I must confess that I dislike Adams' use of the term
"real" in this antithesis. However, I report him faithfully.) The point
of this contention is that, if there were not forever the possibility
and risk that our experiences might not be of the real, the judgment
would become meaningless, since it always asserts that something exper-
ienced is **real,or valid,or 'of the real***(loc. cit.,p.6f^). Adams
finds the necessary standard of reference to which he has referred,
» in an underived, unacquired knowledge of what reality means which is
a "function of the mind itself" ( ^oc. cit.,p.65). The present 'AO^iter
has been unable to discover any reply from the New Realists to this
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particular argument ag^ainet their doctrine, but he preeumee that, were
they to deign to reply to eo Kantian an arguTnent, they would content
themselves with remarking that, if explanatory princioles may be freely
assumed, they beg leave to make their own choice. For a criticism of
Adams* article from the view-point of Avenarianiara, see "Professor
Adams and the Knot of Knowledge'^by George Clarke Cox, Jour. Phil
«
, etc
.
,
Vol. XII, pD. 869-070,
Dewey's instrumentalist attack upon our much-attacked New
Realists requires consideration. As early as 190fi-,in the lean and
hungry days before war had developed a class-consciousness among
the venturesome realistic free-lances, Dewey published a paper en-
titled Realism and Pra^atism^' (Jour. Phil.
,
et£. , Vol. II, pt5. 324-327)
in which he stated unequivocally the realistic implications of his
instrumental type of pragmatism. States of consciousness, sensations
and ideas as cognitive, exist as tools, bridges, cues, functions —what-
ever one pleases — to a(e?)ffect a realistic presentation of things,
in which there are no intervening states of consciousness as veils, or
representatives. Known things, as kno'vn,are direct presentations in
the most diaphanous medium conceivable. And if getting knowledge,
as distinct from having it, involves representatives, pragmati era carries
with it a reinterpretation, and a realistic interpretation, of 'states
of consciousness' as representations^' ( loc . cit.,p.326). The sustained
polemic of the New Realists and in particular their treatment of per-
ception in the theory of knowledge elicited from him in 1^11 two 'Brief
Studies in Realism" (Jour. Phil.
,
et.c. , Vol. VIII, pp. 393-400 and 54«-554).
In the former of these papers, he attacks the view that perception is
essentially a case of knowledge;in the latter article, he proceeds upon
the basis laid do'>vn in the former one to attack the view that the know-
ledge relation is ubiquitous.
((
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The argument of these two papers, in brief, ia as follows.
When perceptions are regarded as in their essential nature cases
of knowledge, ideali sin follows logically, in spite of the frantic ef-
forts of realists to avert the catastrophic consequence. Dewey
designates as naive realism the view which conceives perceptions
as simply natural events inter alia ,on which view the physical
interpretation of the world is nossible. From this tyne of realism
"presentatl ve" realism should be sharply di stingui s^hed. "Presenta-
tive" realism views perceptions as cases of knowledge. For naive
realism, astronomical star and visible light are both '^real" objects
found, when knowledge supervenes, to be related in a continuous process.
One is no more, no less, real than the other. For '*presentative'* realism.,
on the other hand, since the perception as knowledge must be knowledge
of the object, the knowledge relation is such as to change the object
into a content. Thus the ** presentative" realist **lets the nose of the
idealist camel into the tent" and it follows that "he has then no great
cause for surprise when the camel comes in — and devours the tent" ( loc .
ci t. , p. 39f7 ) . The seriousness of this situation is fully apparent when
we observe that " the very things (i.e., all manner of physical conditions
of perception) that
,
from the^ standpoint of perception as a natural event
,
are condit i ons that account for its happening are
,
from the standpoint of
perception as a case of knowledge, part of the object that ought to be
known but is not" ( loo. cit.,p.397). It is clear from the foregoing
that when the" presentative" realist appeals to the "plain raan'^jhe is
careful first to sophisticate the umpire and then appeal. Another
v6ry grave difficulty for the" presentative" realist is found in the fact
that, granted that perception is a case pf knowledge, it suffers sadly by
comparison with the logical type of knowledge obtained indirectly by
Inference. All of these difficulties di aappear, however, when we conceive

perceptions instrumental! y, i . e. , not as cases of knowledge, but as
the means by which we come to have knowledge, — as "the only ultimate
evidence of the existence and nature of the objects which we infer"
and "the sole ultimate checks and tests of the inferences" ( loc. cit »
.
p. 398 ).
In the second of the two papers, De-vey exhibits the idealist
camel in the act of devouring the realist tent, or, in more prosaic
phrase, exhibits the consequences which ensue if perception be taken
as a case of adequate knowledge of its own object-matter* The in-
evitable result of 80 conceiving perception is that the knowledge
relation beoorne "absolutely ubiqui tous'* , " an all-inclusive net", --'then
"the *ego-centrio predicament* is inevitable" ( loc*. cit« ,p«400 ).
Dewey proceeds to show that this predicament results of necessity
only in case the conception of perception which he is criticising
be accepted, for then, and then only, does the knowledge relation of
things to a self become the exhaustive and inclusive relation. Once
the "ego-centric" predicament, in Perrys phrase, or the "ubiquity of
the knowledge relation", in Dewey's phrase, is granted, Dewey is unable
to find any intelligible meaning in the much-bruited point at issue
between idealism (subjectivism) and realism (objectivism). Each attempts
to define one of a pair of things exhaustively and exclusively in terms
of its relation to the other member of the pair, but, since the relation
is reciprocal, one definition is as adequate, and as insignificant, as the
other. Dewey concludes, "if one who is knower is, in relation to objects,
something else and more than their knower, and if objects are,iri relation
to the one who knows them, something else and other than things in a
knowledge relation, there is something to define and discuss" (lo©. cit
«
,
p. 552). The bearing of considerations of this sort upon our specific
problem is readily apparent upon a moment's reflections on Dewey's
X
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principles there is no necesnity of flying into a frenzy of fallacies
\ in order to convince the unwary that something is what it manifestly
ia not. Dewey's po si tion, which he denominates "empirical pluralism",
avoids the pitfalls of epiateraological moniBm;nor will its author
admit that it is subject to the difficulties which beset epistemolog-
ical dualism. Both of these knowledge theori es, together with the
peculiar difficulties which inhere in them respectively , arise from
•* failing to note that representation is an evidential func tion which
supervenes upon an occurrence, and from treating it as an inherent
part of the structure of the organic events found in sensings** C* Dual-
ity and Dualism", by John Dewey, Jour. Phil. , etc. , Vol. XIV, p. 493), 'Ve
are not here concerned with the validity of Dewey's position; our
interest centers in his atteract to obviate the difficulties of the
New Realists by going back of their principles. Dewey's insistence
upon the unintelligibility of the issue between subjectivism and ob-
jectivism is reiterated by Creigbton ("The Determination of the Real",
Phil. Rev. , Vol. XXI, pp. 303-321, especially p. 310) and by Tawney ("Method-
ological Realism" , Phil. Rev., Vol. XXII, pp. 284-303, especially p. 301).
Account should be taken of a controversy betv/een Lovejoy
and Cohen which grew out of a chance remark in the former's review
of Perry's "Present Philosophical Tendencies." The review in question
appeared in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods,
Vol.IX,pp. f527-C40 and 673-C84. The remark to which Cohen took excep-
tion was to the effect that "the relativity of secondary qualities is
an
taken by science as/^evidence of their subjectivity." It appeared in
the second section of Lovejoy*s review, p. 6715. Cohen stated his ob-
jections to Lovejoy's position in a letter which came oiit in the journal
in which the review had appeared (Vol. X, pp. 27f). Lovejoy replied in
an extended article ( ibid
. ,
pr>. 314-218 ) on "Secondary Qualities and
Subjectivity." Cohen, in turn, retorted with a paoer on "The Supposed
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Contradiction in the Diveraity of Secondary equalities'* (ibid .,pp«
510-51?^). Thie paoer opened up a basic difference between the two
diaputanta,a difference quite removed from the issue over which the
controversy began and one which is of fundamental importance for the
problem of our inquiry. The remaining two contributions to the dis-
cusBion,Love joy *s "Relativity, Reality, and Contradiction" ( ibld_.Vol.XI,
pp. 431-450) and Cohen*s "(.Qualities, Relations, and Thinp-s" ( ibid . , pp. P 17-
627), were devoted to this deeper issue. This deeper issue ia the problem
of the objective status of qualities. Love joy, in common with the New
Realists whom he has been criticising, takes the ground that "every
real thing has a ^nature* or character or set of qualities of its
own" iibid. ,p. 422). Cohen stands as the exponent of a most rigorous
relativism,—"all qualities are essentially relational" (ibid.
,
p. eS5)
.
Love joy insists that "a thinker of the true realistic temperament
craves a world of objects which have some intrinsic and solid char-
acter, which do not endlessly deliquesce into mere relations to other
things, themselves equally characterless and elusive" (ibid.
,
p. 421)
.
Cohen replies, "The world of existence is .... a network of relations
whose intersections are called terms. These termi ni may be complex
or simple, but the simplicity is always relative to the system in which
they enter" (ibid.
,
p. 622). Lovejoy charges Cohen, always tenderly sym-
pathetic with the "notable six" —witness his eulogistic review of
"The New Realism" , Jour. Phil. , etc. , Vol. X, pp. 197-214 — ,with putting this
new logical device into the hands of the partisans of "pan-objectivism"
"to aid them in averting the most embarrassing implications of their
doctrine" (ibid. ,p, 423) . Cohen replies that, far from, being an argument
exclusively in behalf of neo-reali8m.,hi s principle is not "primarily
an attempt to prove anything, but rather a challenge to Professor Love-
joy to prove" (ibid.
,
p. 619 )his assertion that logical contradiction
(i
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is involved in saying, for example," that the same object can *really*
or objectively be red in relation to one screen and blue in relation
to another, hot to one thermometer and cold to another, square from
one point of view and oblong from another"
(
1 bid * ,p> 619 ) « Granted
that Cohen is correct in his account of the relational nature of
things and qualities, —for he unequivocally makes relatione his
primary category— ,hi8 attack upon Love joy is entirely successful,
but, as Cohen himself seems vaguely to surmise, it leaves untouched
Love joy* 8 strictures upon the New Realism, for the New Realists have
not seen fit to adopt Cohen ts peculiar relativism. In fact, for thera
to adopt it would involve as drastic an alteration of their position
as they would have to make in order to silence Love joy *s reverberating
guns. To be sure, Cohen is right in noting that neo-realists "are
inclined to recognize the reality of relations or universal s" , but
he will have to look long and zealously in the writings of contemporary
American New Realists to find indications of any consensus of opinion
in favor of erecting relations into a primary metaphysical category
generative of things and qualities. We cordially agree with Cohen when
he suggests that the neo-realists would profit greatly were they to
"develop a complete theory of the categories or types of existence"
( ibid. , p. 6*38 ), and we as readily grant that Love joy's attack upon the
New Realists would be aside from the point, if their premises were those
of Cohen, but we must insist that Cohen appears to possess an extremely
large and unusually insensitive blind spot in each of his intellectual
eyes for the peculiar embarrassments in the New Realists* polemic to
which Love joy has called attention. in this connection, though a dis-
cussion of Cohen *s relativism is not germane to our problem and would,
in fact, be an unpardonable impertinence, the writer is constrained to
suggest that he finds himself much more in accord with the essentially
((
59,
pra^atic account of the status of "things" as set forth by such
thinkers as Bode (of. Jour. Phil
.
, et£. , Vol . IX, pp. 5-14 ) and Hartraann
( cf . Jour. Phil. , etc. ,Vol.XI,pp.600-n07) than with the radical relativ
ism of Cohen. "The only key we have to reality is what reality must
be taken as in the progressive realization of the purposes of human
nature" (Bode, loc. cit.
,
p. 14). **A thing i£ what it reveals itself to
be in any given situation, or, by a process of construction, i_s what it
was found to be in a series of si tuations" (Hartinann, loc . cit.,p.ROP).
We shall bring to a close this survey of the work of other
invaatigatora of the problem of error in American New Realism by r>re-
senting summary sketches of a number of articles by different con-
tributors. The first of these articles appeared in plenty of time
to have saved the New Realists all of the merciless logomachy through
vvhich their espousal of epi s temological monism has caused them to
nass. The paper in question came from the pen of Bode ("Realism
and Ob jectivity", Jour. Phil. , et£. , Vol . IV. pp. 35^-203) . It proposed
two questions for realists of the new persuasion to oonder, vi z. , ( 1
)
How are ,ve to conceive those objects which are ordinarily regarded
as sub jective?, and (2)l3 the quality cognized in sense perception
numerically identical jvith the quality pertaining to the physical
object? The follov/ing excerpts give the gist of Bode's paper. "How-
ever much ve may insist UDon the proposed extension of the terra object
it must be conceded that objects fall into two classes, those of which
the conditions coincide with the conditions of consciousness and those
which exist whether there is an awareness of them or not"
(
3oc
. ci t.
,
p»2^0)4 "If the distinction is denied, the conception of objectivity
becomes meaningless; while if it is affirmed, we are apparently forced
back after all into the subjectivism from which it is the fane ti on of
panob jeotivi;3tic realism to provide deliverance" (loc. cl t. ,p. g^^l).
I
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•^Aa our point of departure (that is, for the consideration of the
difficulties presented to nascent New Realiam by the problem of
objectivity) we may take the divergence of experiences which occurs
whenever different percipients find themselves in the presence of
the Same physical object* If there Ib numerical identity between
the quality of the object and the quality perceived, -.ve are oblig3d
to say that the object possesses simultaneously all the qualities
revealed in the different perceptions An object that possesses
this incomprehensible fullness of character vhereby it is enabled
to be all things to all men is merely a name for the fact that ex-
perience takes place** ( loc. cit.,p.26l). And finally, '* when error
ceases to be possible (as Bode had urged that it did on the basis
of the "immanence" theory ) an appeal from the deliverance of exper-
ience is never in order, and the object loses forthwith its title
to exi stence" ( loc . cit.,p.363). Had a certain sextette ( the metaphor
i 3, to be sure, unhapr)y, --a sextette is supposed to perform in harmony)
read, marked, learned, and inwardly digested these reflections of Bode's
and then remembered them judiciously while writing The New Realism
et al
.
, Love joy and others might have been spared a deal of controversy
and the six themselves much vexation of spirit. Better yet, there
would have been no occasion to provoke the present inquify.
Sellars has, notably in two articles, attempted to point the
way for the New Realists to join forces with his own camp, the "critical"
realists. In "Is There a Cognitive Relation" (Jour. Phil ., etc. , Vol . IX,
pp. 225-332), he attacks the view that consciousness is a relation, pre-
ferring to designate it an atti tude towards objects considered as
real", and pleads for epistemological dualism based on a thsory of
mediatiam. He appears to be convinced that his change in terminology
-sufficiently modifies the relational theory of consciousness to render
i(
(
it compatible vith a dualiatic epistemology. In "A Thing; and Its Prop-
erties" (J. P. P. & o.M. , Vol.XH
,
pp. 310-3:38 ), the sarae writer insists that
the thinker must recocnize '*the necessity of di stin^i shing between the
thing-Gxperience and the physical thing'* ( loo . cit *,p.rs^p) if he would
have a coherent interpretation of things, and he closes with another
statement of the claims of a non-presentative view of knowledge as apninst
a presentative or intuitional view. 'Vith him, as with so many others, the
ineluctable obstacle in the path of the presentative theory is its ef-
fectual stODuage of the way to any distinction betv/een truth and error.
III. The Writer's Criticisms.
^Vith the precedinp- reference, -^e brinp- to its too-long deferred
term our examination of the treatment which has been accorded our problem
by other investi fc'ators. There have been numerous contributors to the
investigation whose names do not appear in the foref^oin!? review, --not-
ably Strong, Fite, Rogers, Kremer, and, less notably, 'Vri ght and Bliss--,
but extreme care has been taken to omit no typical and significant
criticisms from the account. 'Ve now proceed to formulate the results
of our own analysis of the deliverances of certain American New Real-
ists in so far as the problem of error is concerned.
We select for examination the works of nine American realists
who delight to call themselves new. These objects of our respectful
inquiry are Fullerton, '.Voodbridge,McGilvary, Montague, Holt, Pitkin, Marvin,
Perry, and Spaulding. The plan of procedure will be to educe from the
relevant published writings of each of these thinkers in turn his ac-
count of error and solution or solutions, explicit or implicit, of the
problem which it generates for him, and to estimate the adequacy of
the several solutions in relation to the avowed principles of their
respective authors. The inquiry will close with certain observations
concerning the bearing of our problem on the New Realistic movement
4
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a 8 a whole.
Several considerations combine to render Fullerton*
a
work apDropriate material for our Initial inquiry. He is an un-
oompromiaing realist who haa for a score of years supported the
realistic polemicjhe stands, avovxedly, closer to the position of
naive realism than does any other important renresentative of
the realistic movement which is callei neArjhis principles differ
by the
sufficiently from those enunciated^Platform Realists to require
that his speculations be accorded separate treatment; the develop-
ment of his thought presents a singularly interesting illustra-
tion of the ever-increasing divergences in point of view which
have latterly precipitated all but fratricidal strife among real-
istic brethren; the definition of his not unequivocal relation to
>
other Idealists who are called new should serve as a fitting intro-
duction to the investigation of their peculiar problems.
The fourth and fifth of the for;jgoing considerations merit
further comment at this Juncture. That Fullerton long overestimated
the agreements and greatly underestimated the basic diaagreemonta
among contemporary American realists becomes clearly apparent woon
an examination of his utterances touohincr the New Realism. In 1908
he could unhesitatingly contribute to the Rssays Philosophical and
Psychological in Honor of William James a forty-oix page article
on The New Realism and could confidently declare the specific differ-
entia of "any realism which claims the right to recognition at the
present day** (op. cit,.,p.35). Needless to say, he considered himself
to be a representative in good and regular standing of such a realism.
) In 1912 he was equally unheal tan t about speaking ex cathedra for the
New Realism. Witness the chapters in The World We Live In under the not
insignificant cantions of "The World of the New Realism" and "The
{
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New Realiam ani HIverybody'a World" (chapters IX and XI, respective-
ly), in the former of which he olasaea as New Realists all ivho hold
that "the 'iVorld is Phenomenon" ( of p. 127 and also chapter X, pp. 129
and 131) and in the latter of which he specifies the features of
Everybody's -Vorld which are "accepted without reservation by the
New Reali st"
(
ibid.
,
p. 148 ) . Reference has already been made herein-
before to his expression of sympathy with certain kindred spirits
of realistic convictions (cf. supra, pp. lOf). Early in 19 13, however,
the
he becan to grow conscious of depth of difference which separates
him from these fraternal souls. In an article on "Percept and Ob-
ject in Common Sense and Philosophy" (Jour, of Phil ., etc. , Vol .X,
pp. 57-64, and 149-irT0),he challenges the propriety of emphasizing
any one proposition entertained by common sense to the exclusion
i of other propositions dear to the plain ^an's heart. He character-
izes the thoroughgoing objectivism of "rather an aggressive band of
realists" who have "arisen to champion the object"
(
jbid. ,p« 155) as
"the extreme reaction" against subjectivism. The underscoring is
mine. He raises the question as to whether or not it is "permissible
for a philosophy to emphasize"
(
ibid.
. p. 154) the objective factors in
experience at the expense of the subjective order. Later in the
Same year, he issued the following proclamation of secession from
the de facto confederation of the New Realism:"! have just been re-
viewing the literature of the last decade on realism, and have been
so much impressed with the very significant divergences of opinion
among realists keen enough to have an independent opinion, that I de-
plore any form of expression which might create the delusive impres-
sion that a 'school' of new realists has the right to existence and
to recognition as a school There are at least a score of real-
ists writing at the present day, of whom, I think, no one has a better
c
fi4.
rletit t-o be called 'new' than any other one, thourfi ao'na un-loubteill
y
bring for'.vard ^lore novelties than do some others I, for my
part, do not viah to be made responsible for any debts save those oo'^-
traoted by myself (Jour, of Phil. ,etc_. , Vol. X,r). 450 ). It is somewhat
surprising that so keen a thinker as Fullerton should have labored
30 long under the delusive imrDression that the New Realists have
the right to existence and reco.gnition as a school; that a certain com-
munity of interest should have concealed from hira so much disagreement.
The relation of Fullerton's thougJit to that of other con-
temporary realists can be made clear only by setting forth his main
principles against the background of the tenets which characterize
his philosophical confreres. This may perhaps be best done by
indicating Pullerton^s atti t ude toward the three di s tin gui shiner
doctrines of the New Reali sm, vi z . , (iHhat objects exist indeT5endently
of their being known, (^)that objects are slven, immediately and un-
altered, in perception, and (3)that consciousness is an external , non-
constitutive relation. The first of these doctrines, it will be
recalled, is designated by Love joy ** realism as such.** On this point
ii'ullerton is unequivocally in agreement with the Platform Realists,
though when he attempts to specify precisely what the obiects are
which exist abstracted from the cognitive relation, diver a-e^ce of
view appears at once. His typical , though, as will appear later, not
by any means his invariabl e, noai tion with regard to this point is
that the independently existent objects are constructs of touch-
sensations, whereas the rigorous er)i stemological monism of the Plat-
form Realists commits them to affirming that the indeoendently ex-
istent object is identically all that is datum in a siven nercentual
experience or conceptual construction. It was, indeed, their devotion
to "the unmistakably real world given in experience** which led, or
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misled,FulI erton into supposing that there was substantial com-
munity of cause between himself and the other realists in question.
The extent of his divergence from the thougJit of these philosophers
becomes apparent when examination is made of the two remaining
cardinal doctrines specified above.
IVhile Fullerton will none of the theory of representative
perception in its usual frankly epistemologically dualistic form and
is forever insisting that we experience objects themselves as direct-
ly as »ve experience perceptions or any other subjective content, still
he stops short of the rigorous episteraological monism which distinguishes
—and distresses— the men who fomulatei the Prograr^ and First Platform
of oix Realists. As typical of his utterances touching the inadmissibil-
ity of the theory of representative perception, the following, e plur -
ibus, will serve:** There is, however, only one way of annihilating skep-
tical doubt and dognatic denial. That way lies in maintaining that
the external world is as immediately experienced as are our mental
states; that things are as directly known as are ideas, and are not
obtained as the result of an inference from ideas" (The World '^Ve Live
In,p.80). "Hypothetical** or ** infer en tial** realism, he summarily dis-
cards as obviously insufficient. Such an utterance as the one just
quoted would seem to classify its author unconditionally with the
unqualified epistemologioal moni3ts,for he does not hold that in
experience there is some mysterious doubling process whereby both
a perception and an object are directly given, but rather that one
and the same experience viewed in one context is the object and viewed
in another context is the perception. However, it is not Fullerton'a
intention to commit himsel f, without si.gnificant reservations, to the
doctrine of epistemological monism. He is concerned to discover a
way '*to find our world in the appearances in which it is evident that
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^ men really do soraehov/ lay hold of it** (The iVorld We Live In, p. 31).
In order to do thi 3 he propounds a doctrine which is deal pried to
avoid the difficulties of both the representative and the presonta-
tive epi stemological theories, —a doctrine which, he beli eves, guar-
antees a direct knowledge of things as the rsDresentati ve theory
cannot do and, at the same time, is free from the perplexing iTiplica-
tions which inhere in the assertion of the numerical identity of oer-
cept and object. This mediating doctrine Pullerton seeks to derive
from an analysis of the nature of symbolic knowledge. ** Symbols must
truly represent things, or some aspect of things, and the sole founda-
tion upon which they rest, the sole source from which they obtain
their meaning and worth, is the intuitive knowledge which furnishes
us with a direct experience of things'* (System of Metaphysics, p. 50 )
.
• Thus the aspects of things directly given are certain touch-sensation
complexes which symbolize the whole tactual ob ject, sensory data ot'ier
than those of a tactual nature being merely "signs" pointing to the
touoh-oansation- thing. Fullerton does not hold to this doctrine
f
consistently, evidently feeling the need of it only when his atten-
tion is focused on the two-fold problem of providing for a direct
experience of things and accounting for erroneous judgments about
things. For some quite unaccountable reason, he seems to opine that
on his principles errors may be explained by reference to defective
symbols and "signs" that mispoint. If symbols may be defective and
"signs" may lead astray, it is an opaque mystery how,in any intelli crible
sense, one can affirm that we have a direct experiencsjof the external
world and that that experience is as, direct as is our experience
of mental states. We must pronounce quite unsuccessful our author's
attempt so to modify the doctrine of representative perception as to
make it possible to find things in appearances, for his admission
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that error is possible leaves ua with no touchstone for determining
what experiences are veridical and what are not. Puller ton is as
hard put to it to account for truth as the Platform Realists are to
explain the fact of error. It is not unlikely that he was deceived
by their repeated asseverations that objects are known immediately
into assuming that it was meant that this knowledge of objects was
immediate in the same sense in which he himself conceives it to be
so. He was long in discovering that beneath this superficial verbal
agreement there lay a very abyss of disagreement. Before dismissing
Fullerton's doctrine of symbolic knowledge, attention should be called
to a difficulty which he seems to have quite overlooked. He raain-
tainsCSystera of Metaphysics, p. 150 ) that the symbol of any given ob-
ject is a core of tactual sensations, and, as has already been remarked,
that visual arlcl other sensations are signs representative of this
tactual core, but he insists that "we can know through a representative
.....only those things which contain identical elements with it, and
in 30 far as they contain identical elements with it" ( ibid. , p. 52).
It is obvious that, on his avowed principles, Pull erton has no warrant
for considering visual, audi tory, gustatory, or olfactory sensations,
all of which he distinguishes toto caelo from tactual sensations, as
signs of the latter. It is instructive to note that Pull erton him-
self eventually abandoned this position and declared (The 'Vorld I7e
Live In, p. 149) "secondary" qualities to be quite as objective as
"primary" qualities.
It is, however, in his theory of consciousness that Pull erton
differs most radically from the Platform Realists. It is, moreover,
in this same connection that his thought is most confused and clouded
with inconsistencies. He quite agrees with the other realists in
question in re-oudiating the "substratum" conception of consciousness.
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rounily rs jo 3 ting the Kantian oelf as nounenon anl the neo-Kantian
self-ictivi ty. Both of t>^enp co>^csri* 1 one of the nature of t^e
conscious self Fullerton discards on t --i e dual ^ound of unintel-
llgihllity and insufficiency to explain the phenomena for which
they are desi,c:ned to account. "He (Kant) doei not 'Tiake clear -v'^at
this rational self is, and he gives no indiCiation whate-zer of *-h e -/ay
in which it brings about the results attributed to its activity"
(oystem of Metaphysics, p.35). "Even if we suDpose it Dossible
for an activity to be all that he (.-^reen) asks it to be, even to
be ti'^elesaly present at all times, how are ve to conceive of such
a thinp; as uniting the elements of any possible experience?" (op. cit.
p. 87). So far as the problem of consclo-jsness is concerned, the e"i-
pirical self is -Dronounced to be t'-^e only ''proner subject of investi
gation for the psycholo o-i st and the metaphysician" ( Or)_. oit
.
, d .
.
The rejection of the Kantian and neo-Kantian conceoti ons, '.ve are as-
sured, does not involve denying to consf^iousness "a certain kind of
unity", for "it is one thing to find in consciousness a unity and to
endeavor to deter'^ine -vith definiteness -irhat is meant by the unity
of consciousness ; and it is another thins? to attemot to exnlain ho;?
the unity of consciousness is brought about, by the assuraiDtion of
hypothetical entities not to be found in consciousness, or by ascrib-
ing inconceivable virtues to hypostatized spiritual activities" (op.
cil..,o.93). It is, so our author ar.gues, qui te gratuitous to invoke
any synthetic activity or principle to account for the unity of
consciousness, t-:e assumption of a synthetic activity to hold mental
phenomena together being quite as unjustified by anything in our ex-
perience as would be the assumption of a separate activity operating
to force mental elements into a state of isolation( oo. cit . , p. 4.33 )
.
A consGiousness, then, i s an experienced -vhole of mental phenomena in
rI
all of its ooncrrtte detail. It ia 'vhen Ful''erton specifies the
relation of consciouaneas so conceived to the external vvorld that
the full distance which ae-^aratea him from the Platform Realists
becomes apparent. Fullerton ia a dualist of the paralleli atic
variety. Though* to be sure, he is not always consistent in his af-
firmation of this faith, it undoubtedly represents his deepmost con-
viction. Jcoi-es of passages might be cited, all illustrating equally
»vell his poaition touching thia matter. The following are typical:
.Ve recognize in our experience two diatinct orders, the ob jective
or ier , the ayiLorn of pherjomena -vhioh constitutes the rnattirial world,
and V.-'B subjecti ve order , tha order things mental, to which belong
aensat-ions and 'ideas (Introduction to Philosophy, o. F ^ ):'* It seeraa
sufficiently plain that the parall eli at, in insisting uoon the coraolete
separation of sensations and things, has laid hold of a truth" (Syatem
of Metaphysics, p. 377 ) , It would be difficult to find a. raorfe un-
equivocal rejection of the pan-ob j c;ctivi atic relat.ional theory of
consciouaneas of the New Realiats tiian ia implied in thia thorough-
going dualism for which Fullerton atanda aponaor. The corjfuaion and
inoonai 3 Lency of iiullerton's position will appear as .ve proceed to
examine his further treatment of aj-i'or againat the background of
his charac b 3j.'1 i> Lie doctrines as sketched in the preceding pages.
Our philoaopher, t,houj?h he is at all times keenly aware of
the embarrassment which the problem of error occasions for those
who hold positions differing frcr. hi a am 'e.g.
,
System of Metaphysics,
r)p.ol-3?^ an! though his deliberate ourpose in ivriting ia nost ob-
viously to set forth a body of doctrine which shall not be productive
or lil<;e embarrasament, 'juifoi- tun i tol y faila anywhere exhaustively to
indicate the precise manner in Thich hia principles obviate the
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difficulties which he seeks to avoid. In every one ot his several
brief di ocusaions of the point at i asue, Full er ton either lo-ives
out of consivderation certain of his most tenaciously held principles,
which, if introduced, vould nullify the -oroffered solution of the
problem of error, or invokes so^e nev principle -.vhich cannot bo made
to harmonize 7/ith principles which he promulgates in other connections.
In neither case, therefore, i 3 ha logically consistent. In this portion
Oi jii s vor'k,aL least, he seems to have forgotten whose pen it ha,s that,
discudtjin^ the metaphysician, wrote, "He must observe the or.iinary logical
rulasjiio must not contradict himself* (Syste^Ti of Metaphysics, n. 96 )
.
It will be convenient to separate in our discussion two
strata oV our author's thou/^t. In the former of these, represent ed
by the oystem of T^etaphyslcs, the Introduction to Philosophy, a,nd the
paper in the volume of Essay-'^ ir. I'onor of 7111ia,m Jam. 5 s. Full er ton
holds the so-called "secondary" qualities to be purely subjective,
conceiving the independently existing external oblecta as construots
of toucii-m.ovement sensa tions.; in thy latter stratum, represented by The
World .Ve Live In, the objectivity of all sensory qualities is unreserved-
ly asserted.
In the earlier vorks above men ti oned, Fuller ton lays down as
one of his basic contentions that the objecti^'e order, the order of
physical existents,is given as directly in consciousness as is the
subjective order. This basic contention he never tires of reiterating.
Attention has already be called in the present criticism to the unsatis-
factory cluiracler of the account which Fullerton gives in his doctrine
of symbols of the manner in which the physical order is "directly" given
in oonsciovisnass. It is a trifle di saprjointing, after one has been as-
sured that Independent external objects are given as directly in hJL a ex-
perience as are any most in Lin.a to suLj active elem.ents in that experi erjCo,

to be told that, after all, our sober realint -ii^. no* T^san precisely
ivbat b^ i, that, in f^ict, vhat he ^leunt to nay -vas that t^'-^ -^xt-^rr^^l
ob1--»ct io >iot iTivftn diroo tl v in experlonco at all, but ia there repre-
S'^^nted by a n-smbol vhiob is conf '^3^'^;il v niin»='ri c-il 1 v .iifltinot from the
objtiot 3VTnboli20i j^ni h1 ^o r;onf es:?0;"il y "norfl simole than that ob.lect.
ourely Fullerton doaa not. int<-ind that hi a readf^r should conclude that
gergatlona and me^ory-iraapes and percer>tion3 and "notiong,et hoc genu g
OTnnc
,
are not sensations ani memory-iTia.q^s and oaroeotionG ^^.'l e-^otlons
as they are in themselves, but merely symbols of such real experiences,
anvi partirttl and defective symbols at that*' In Fullertonian phrase,
such an assumption is palpably absurd, yet it is one .vhich must be made
if -ve are to take seriously the oft-roDOat ed assertion that the author
under consideration sees fit to place as the chief corner stone in his
3pi stemologioal structure. Clearly, then, i f Fullerton is to be taken
in sober earnest, the result of this attempt to shovv t'nat our kno.vled,p-e
of the objective order is direct and certain is the demonstration that
it, and i-he knbv7led;te of the subjective orier as .veil, is indirect and
hi,Phi y uncertain. Instead of being brought into immediate ra-oport
with the external physical ^vorld, ire forced to a position at one
remove from the only jvorld immediate access to which it has never
occurred to anyone to deny.
There are further difficulties quite as grave as the one
to vvhich attention has just been called. A second serious difficulty
appears upon examination of Fullerton's discussion of the relation of
"the external world a3 it is** and ''the external world as it is perceived
by me". ^ typical treatment of this issue occurs in the rilystcm of 'Meta-
physics, r.r . -iclf. Ve are told,** 'The external /;orld as perceived by us'
is by no means a thing to be confounded with -our impressions of an
t^rnxl world*". "It i s" , however a mi saoprehension to suopose that 'the
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external vorli it ia' can bs anything else t':an Hhe external
world as it is perceived by me, ' or the external ivorl-l as it is
perceived by some other creature,'' The vliffioulty consist.s in find-
ing a criterion vhereby we may be certain that we have passed beyond
mere impressions of the external world and have attained a valid per-
ceptual construe tio'i t'-ereof. 'Ve are told thc^ ^ Lho external ^vorld a£
i'^'LS. iii ^ tsel r is a construct of toucli-raoven en t sensations and yet
ve are not paven a principle by the a^^plication of which we may dis-
cover precisely '.vhat Loucli-raovemen t sensations re^^oal this in V^r^rident
external world in all of' its exclusive aseity. Fullerton is careful
to guard a,^;ainst asserting that this construct is simply the heaned up
ag.gregate of all of our toucfi-^'ove'^nent se'-^sations. It is confessedly
a highly refined abstraction from the heap. How, then, since no t vo
individuals rcjaoh identical construe ts, can Fullerton expect us to
acquiesce ^vhen he asserts that these constructs are, each and several,
identi-'a-lly the one external 'Vorld as it is? He himself has vanned
us that vords must not be used vi thout a meaning. Unless he lias her©
fall an under his o-vn censure, '^3 has asked us to credit the incredible.
Nowhere in all of his repeated attempts to indicate the sense in vhich
t ,^0 individuals may be prODerly said to perceive the same world does
he resolve the inconsistency here insisted unon. !To wondor iirod
therefore be occasioned by the fact that duller ton is so IILlIo
disturbed by the problem of error. 'Ve should emphatically arree with
him in his assertion that, on his Drinci-ol es, error is D0ssible;but ve
should insist upon adding that error is all that i^3_ possiblejh<3 ha^o
provided no bell to ring when reality is reached.
oimilar confusion marks B'ull er ton ' s treatment of the sub.iectiv
order as non-spatial and non-temooral . No mental phenomenon Ccin ''oc-
cupy any portion of space or even have a location in space. It is

equally true> t'lat no serir:*^ of mcr.Lal chan,^^bti Li-Ari cccupy a^y portion
of tiT>e,r3al ti-^fjOr even rill a, single Tnoment in Ihe streaTr of tine"
(An Iri tro iuc tion to Puilosophy
,
pp. I26i ) . Those plionomana, to be cui-o,
deem to "be apatial and temporal, but ve nee," vhen ve refleco upon +hfe
matter, that mefitcil phenornenri, cannot, s trie tl v 303aking,be aaii to have
a time and place their physical conco'il tan ts Iiave a ti^io y,nd
place, and myr/oal phenomena can be ordered by a reference to trieBe**
'Aii Introduction to FhilosQphy, p . 128 ) . Yet these aame delusive
viuDjective phenomena, vhen vie.vod ad elements in the objective order,
are spatial and temporal.' At this June ture, Ful 1 er ton is either af-
firming that all elements of the subjective order may be assigned
their aporopriate places in the objective order, and- ia thereb^/ re-
pudiating his doctrine concerning the exclusive subjectivity of
secondary qualities and rendering error impossibl e, or else he is in-
dulging in scieer, unreli eved incoherence. Here at-ain our author's
attempt to find the external world directly given in an order v/liich
is incoraraensurabl 6 ivi th it breaks do^vn in logical contradiction.
The most serious enbarrassrav^i 1 1 .vhich confronts Fullerton
at this earlier stage of his discussion rosul ts, ho vever, from the
inconsistency miioh exists between his particular type of r^arallelism
and his treatment of the subjective order. He triuraDhantly assures
us that he has accounted for error vvhen he has pointed out that
secondary qualities are purely sub jective, serving at best merely as
signs indicative of touch-movement constructs w"'- i ch , i n turn, are sym-
bols of extern=t,l objects, but sometiiies having not even this round-
about external reference. In these latter cases they, together with
3uc>i other sensory elements as may be associated -.vi th them, are the
stufr of vhich illusions and hallucirifcutlons are ""ade. Herein re
undoubtedly have a most facile account of the origin of error, but, as
n»
0
rnental facf^ is ''without its correaponding physical facf^it would
seen t>^at he should either repudiate his uaral 1 el i sm, thereby retain-
inp; error enoueli and to spare, or else repudiate his doctrine that
the subiective order in nart r>oints toward the objective order and
in Dart has no trace of objective reference, thereby surrendering his
characteristic explanation of the fona et origo of error. Be the
relation between mental nhenonena and brain processes never so
unique, it is clearly contradictory to assert that that relation
is "fixed and absolutely denendable" and existinp betvveen every
particular fact in either order and some other particular fact in
the other order, and yet to insist most emphatically that there are
portions of the subjective order which have nothing wha+ever to do
with anything in the objective order.
In concluding our examination of Fullerton's thought, we now
turn to the stratum rertresented by "The 'Vorld We Live In." This work-
is important matter for consideration in connection with our Droblem
for two reasons: ( l)it contains (ciages 1.'^'^^-1'='pO Fullerton's most ex-
tended attempt explicitly to account for error, and (?)it contains an
unconditional affirmation (r>a(?es 13?- 137, 14'^) of the objectivity of
secondary sensory qualities. The relation between f'lese two -nortions
of the work is exceedingly significant for our purDOse.
The discussion of the problem of error is devoted to ar at-
tempt to answer the question, "How can one maintain that thing's are
directly revealed, immediately jriven in experience, and yet that we may
be in error about them?" (op. ci t . , p. 1^6 ) . Fullertor: is convinced
that the question presents no real difficulty to one who ^^as followed
his discussion with care. Nowhere in that discussion has it been in-
sisted upon that "external things, to be known at all, must be known ex-
haustively and accurately , nor that all that is external is known im-
(
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we have already indicated, the 8,cooimL is unforturately -t.oo facile,
in that it leavcc U3 forev-ji- Iv. doubt as to 'vhcit Gort of h:"'-"! v;g
ha,Vc!,in a given instance, drawn from our epidteraological aviary,
ii'urtherraore, the over-plus of facility ^vhich mars the account is
more than matched by the grave inoonai a Ger.c;/ ^aggested ^ji, pro-
ceding page. Fullerton tries heroically Lo avoid involving him-
self in this inconsistency. He is at great pains to make clear
tiie fact t^at he does not intend Lo be considered a paj^allellst
in any cradal}/ literal sense of the terra. Mental phenomena are
not parallel to physi c a -t all',i physiological processes in Lhe sense
of being spread out spatially oi o,,. d-long temporally. '^Yrj rs-
lation which exists between the tvvo orders cani'Ot properly be
described as causal;it is unique, utterly sui generi s . Parallelism
at.d concomitance are sPatial and temporal terms vhich are used in
pui"bly fi ii'ux'aLi ve fashion to suggest ri relation vhich is in no
sense eif'^er spatial or temporal. 3o far, no ser-ious problem con-
fronts us, but when v7G take the riext step and assert concerning the
relation between mental and physical phenomena that "it is a fixed
and absolutely dependable relation. It is impossible that there
should be a particular mental fact without its corresponding physical
fact; and it is impossible that this physical fact should occur without
its corresponding mental fact" (An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 171)
,
vve find ourselves unable to accept Fullerton's former account of
the capricious partly raenlacious and partly ^ ^r-.tdlcal n-.* t^re of
mental phenomeiia. 3ar yl y, exponerit of common sense and science that
he is, Fullerton would not deny that the physiolo t^ical processes, which
i^abijr ncw^ i^enUil concomitants
, are products of the external causal
,
are, ^.e., the results of the play of external stimuli upon the
organism. Inasmuch as Fullerton expresslv stoa tea that no "particular
r
mediately, 9ven vhen kno vn" ( op « ci_t_.
, p , 1 ^6 ) . Three considerationtj, ve
are .varne 1, ^houi^i t>e borne in min i in order to answer t?ia question
vith i*hlch fi'ullerton ia here concerned. These conaivierationa are:
''(l)that a single experience of the external does not by itself oon-
atitute what men call a thing; (2) that aorne such experiences ,crive
very inadequate information about things; and (3) that aome are ac-
tually misleading to men at a certain stao-e of the development of
their ex-oerienoe of the ,7orld" (2E.' cit . ,p. 1^0 ) « Thus ne are assured
that ve may properly lay claim to im-rieiiate knoy^ledse of thines, ac-
counting for all sorts of errors about thintrs by nointlnpr out that
''our knowledge of thin-s has small hep:innlnci-3,must increase crradually,
and should be held 3ub-)ect to possible correct ion" {£1).. cit « ,t^. 1'=^?^.
It should bo clear vithout discussion t'-^a^, vhat 've ha^^e here is not
the doctrine that the external thing is given imniediat.ely, >^ut rather
the doctrine that cues are so given from which cues 've construct the
thing. In short, the doctrine presented turns out to be that of infer-
ential or representative realism, somewhat obscurely and equlvooally
expressed. It aprjears, therefore, that in order to account for error
Full, erton is obliged so to qualify and limit his doctrine of the
iimediacy of our experience of external objects as virtually to
abandon it.
The difficulties .^hich beset our author by reason of his
assertion that secondary qualities are objective are quite as o-rave
as is the one to -.vhich attention has just been called. Two quotations
will serve to make clear the precise positions which Pullerton assiimes
touching this matter. In "The 'Vorld le Live In"
, o. 13^, he writes, " There
sseroa, then, no reason j/hy vve should not distinguish bet-.veen inner and
outer
, sub Jecti ve and objective, V-ien we are dealing with colors, sounds,
odors, and tastes.
" On pages 145f of the same work he writes, "If, then,
anything is external, the very things that I perceive about me are ex-
m(
fx
77.
^
ternal. Their qualities are physical quali ties, not aenaations; tVi ey
may properly be said to belono- to thincra an'i to b^ve t^eir place in
the external .vorl'l. There ia no reason to discriminate a^^ainst colors,
30unia, oiiora, tastes . If ve applv to auch prienonena the toata by Thich
,ve in any instance iiatinpoiirth bet.veen That is in thino-a and vhat ia
in ua, ^re Tin! that it ia quite possible to dlatin,(mi8h between ob-
jective and 3ub jec tl ve, ffhat should be attributed to thint'-a and vhat
should be attributed to aome change in the sense or to aome chan.ire
in the relation of the aenae to the things in question The
30-called secondary qualities of bodies do belong to the bodies, as
they seem to.**
This Ob .Rectification of the secondary qualities leads to
serious consequenoes for its author. Not to mention the fact t^'B. t
I, it stands in atarlr contradiction to the position which he set forth
it
in hia earlier works, vre are obliged to observe that ^conducts to in-
consistency even within the linita oc* the voluTie in 'vb*ich it appears.
In the passage cited immediately above, i*'ul 1 erton is careful to point
out that regard must be had to the principle of the relativity of
sensory qualities to the percelvinp- organism -.vhen the attempt is
made to distingiaish the subjective aspects of secondary qualities
from their objective aspects. In passin^-, it should be remarked f-iat
he nowhere indicates just vhat the certain criteria are for determin-
ing vhat the objective aspects of these qualities are. This, howe '^^e r,
is not the most serio'js embarrassment in -vhich he finds himaelf. Ap-
parently forgetful of having accorded so important a r3le to relativity
to the perceiving oriranism and of having Insisted upon the fragmentary
^ and mialeadi'ig character of -^uch of our kno-vledcre of things (p.l'^O),
Ful'erton proceeds to affirm that '* ve may vi th a clear conscience ac-
cept as external the things we actually percei •'•e, with just the qualities
p
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an.'i rr3lation3 which no Darceive them to have. 'Ve are not oonpsllel
to scrane them or their qualities heTore we accept them" (on^. ci t .
,
p.
149). The fact that he had written the foregoing sentence did not
Drevent hira from observing seventeen pages further on in the same
vork that dverybo ly ' s 'Vorld ?nu3t have its face washed, 1 f its features
are to s^and out untnistakably. '* No "lore did the fact that he had writ+en
this latter sentence deter him from writing ( on . cit . ^'^'^)/' If we know
thin.era at all, we know them directly, and we know foem just as they are
under the particular conditions under which they are known.** If external^
things exist **with just the qualities and relations which we nercelve
them to have" —presumably, all of such qualities and relations— ani if
we know things directly and "just as they are under the oarticular
conditions under which they are known", what shall we say concerning
Fullerton's attempted explanation of error in which it was pointed
out that many of our exDerisnces give inadequate information, very in-
adequate Information, to quote exactly, about thinp-s and that some of
our experiences are actually misleading? In his enthusiasm over the
Ob jec ti rication of all sensory quail ti es, Full erton has inadvertently
denied the -Dossibility of error after having been to such nains to
give an account of its nature and origin, for we submit that the assertion
that we know external thinprs to exist "with just the qualities and re-
lations which we perceive them to have" means either that we cannot be
in error concerning these thin,e:3 so immediately -oerceived or e^se
^plain-
ly, that the writer of the assertion was iniulsino: in words having
some cryptic meaning not apnarent to the uninitiated when he so ex-
pressed himself.
Having threaded our way througli this •'fri.ghtful thicket of
inconsistent exoeriences" (2P» ci t . , p. fil ) , we pause before passinc- to
the next subject of our inquiry to observe that the root of Fullerton's
f0
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raany and grievouB difficulties '^ith the problem of error spririfrs
from the fertile 30ll of his desire to mediate betjyeen an out-and-
out preaontative theory of perception and an out-and-out rer,reaenta-
tive theory, between eni stemolo,laical noniam and epi stemolo^^ical dual-
iam. Hia obvious predilection ia in the direction of the former,
but hia reapect for intractable error prevents him from following
that predilection to ita appropriate iaaue. The result is that
he becomes eni atemolo,0;iGally a double-minded man, unstable in all
hia waya. However, -vher eas he has hifniself assured us that reflective
thought is "a reo-lon in which all results ourht to be held tentative-
ly and with s "^me diffidence'* (James Volume, p. 1^), we s>iould perhana
ignore frequent vacillations and reversal! in bis thoup-ht and refrain
from hurling the cynic 'a ban when we come upon manifest incober'ance
he
and inconais tency in hia pages. Can it be posaible that ^^was penning
a bit of philoaophical autobiography when he wrote, '*The scholar whose
thought ia as vaiiue and inconsistent as that of the plain man has
little profit in the fact that the apparatus of his learning has
made it possible for him to be ponderously and unintelli e;ibly va<?u9
and inconsistent?" (Introduction to Philosophy, p. 175 ) . Can a candid
perusal of any of hia o-vn writings have convinced him that "one may
burn one's finger's at the lamp held aloft by the philo3opher,a nd
that its precious little flame sometimes smokes abominably, .living
off clouds of .vords that thicken the air and interfere with clear
vision?" (The forld Ve Live In, p. 1^5).
In proceeding to consider the work of Woodbridjze, wo turn
our attention to another thinker whose services to realistic philos-
onhy have been long and signal. For twenty years he has been a
frequent contributor to various philosophical journals in the interest
of realism of the newer sort. Through his editorship of the Journal
Mi
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of Phi loaoDhy, Psychology, and ooientiflc Methods he has sponaored
the chiefeat organ for the dissemination of +h9 vie-vs of that
"rather agpressive band of realists'* mentioned by Fullerton, His
relation to the Platform Realists, the most a'-'^gresai ve of all the
agffiresslva band,-vhile in many resoects exceedingly close,is never-
theless such as to require that his thought be considered anart
from theirs. The fact that he ap-nrojcimates their point of view
^nuch more closely than does Fullerton has determined the point
in our discussion at which consideration is accorded to his writ-
ingo. The fact that, as Kremer has pointed out ("De tou;? les real-
i stes independants
,
'T. Mc Gil vary est c elui qui se ra-oproche le plus
des si gnatairaa du programme. II a cherche, oomme eux,a concilier
1 e real! sme et le monisme episteraologique" Rene Kremer, Le N^o-Real-
i_3me Americain, p. 230 ) ,McGilvary has still further approximated the
position of the six ^ho were si.aiatories to the program and platform
has definitely fixed the placement of 'Voodbridge In our plan of treat
ment, the discussion of McG-ilvary properly follo vinp- that of "Vood-
brid^ie and preceding that of the si gnatairea du programme .
At the outset, it should be said that the ''VOrk of lVoodbrlds;e
is not marred by the incoher snoe, inconsi stency, and equivocation «vhiGh
have been remarked in that of Fullerton. The Arritin^s of the former
are singularly clear, explici t, and homoo-eneous in ooint of view. His
work must be criticised rather on the Ground of the adequacy of his
principles to bear the burdens which he irapoaea upon them than on the
ground of coherence in t
e
r se. He has, on the ?/hole, guarded exceeding-
ly well against inadvertently committing himself to mutually con-
tradictory principles, thouffh the criticism by Thilly ( ££.• supra, ot>.
37-39) evidences the fact that he has not been entirely free from
error in this re.crard. It will , moreover, later appear that Thilly^s
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critioiatTi neeleots aerious diffioulties in 'Voodbridge ' a Dosition.
T-^.e difjGussion of thia position pronerly befrina with
the consideration of ita author'a "realiam aa such, i . e. , wi th the
form tvhich he gives to the doctrine that objects of perception or
cognition exist independently of their being perceived or copmized.
There is no conte?nporary realist more unreserved than Voodbridge in
affirming: such inden^lM^. existence of the object. In an early paner^he
holds that the very fact that judgment is possible "means decidedly
and unequivocally that in reali ty, apart from the judging procef^s,
things exist and operate Just as the Judgment declares" (The Field of
Loffic, :Science,N. S. ,Yol.XX,p. F94) . He passes this remark in order
to controvert the contention that judfrment reveals nothing?: independent
of the Judging process, that it is an adjustment only, --a means of
control. In one of his most recent articl es, he, after havins defined
"mind in the transcendental sense** as "the total universe of discourse
or "the sum total and mere fact of existence" , writes concerning mind
in this sense that "like raeohani sm, chemistry, and what in general we
call the laws of nature, it indicates a tyne of structure or a system
of connections, a logical structure it might be called or a system of
loe-ical connections. To this structure livinc- beings conform in much
the same way as they conform to other structural facts. As by conform
ing to the mechanical structure of things they maintain their equilib-
rium, so by conforming to the logical structure of thincs they think in
proposi tlons, they make distinctions and so finally come to discover
themselves as distinct from their world" (Mind Discerned, Jour, of Phil.
Vol. XVIII, p. 347 ) , These citations are typical of our author's con-
ception of reality as a system of things standing in various sorts of
reciprocal relations, of which that of logical implication is most im-
portant for the eni stemologi St.
mm
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The thinp-3 -vhich stand in these various relations are all
" Ob J ective" physical empirical'* , --?7hatever you like, so lon^ as
you mean that they can all "be identified by anyone who wishes to
identify them, and that vhatever is said about these things can be
tested by anyone vho vill refer to the thinc^s in question" (Perception
and Spistemoloey, James Volume, p. 147 ) . These thin<y3 have specific
and distinctive qualities -vhich differentiate them from one another
and which inhere in the very structure of the thin<?:s. Special sense
organs are necessary that t>ese specific objective differences may
be perceived by livin.e organisms, —-"It would appear t/oat there are
specific differences in the surrounding world with which the or^iariism
would not be in interaction unless there were organs by means of which
this interaction is brouglit about" (Gonaciousness, the Sense Organs, and
the Nervous System, Jour, of Phil ., Psychol and Scient. Meth. , Vol. VI,
p. 451). The relations which inteo-rate these thin.o-s into the structure
which is reality are quite external to the things related, are in no
sense constitutive of the things, and are quite as objective as are
the things.
Consciousness is one such relation, --and it is nothing more.
"Consciousness should.... be defined as the same e-eneral type of eaist-
onoe as space, time or species. Its nature is alj:in to theirs" (The
Nature of Consciousness, Jour, of Phil-.
,
Psychol
., and Scient. •^eth.,Vol.
I^I,p.l~^0). Again, "when thinsrs etist together, that which constitutes
their being together is some sort of continuum. Consciousness may be
defined, therefore, as a kind of continuum of objects" ( loc. cit . ,p. I'^l)
.
From this conception of the nature of consciousne ss ,taken in conjunction
with the unqualified "objectivism'* sketched in the preceding paragraph,
it is at once apparent that most significant results follow touching
the theory of knowledge. Indeed, it is the conviction of the present
^1
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writer that these results are so seriously si «Tiifleant Tor *Voodbrid?r5 * s
theory of knowledge that that theory breaks dovTn 'vhen defined within
the strict limits fixed by the concentions in question. V/oodbridge
is quite unable to acoo^^t for the fact of error without making
certain very grave modifications in these his basic principles. It
is at the points at which he makes such modifications that the all
but uniform consistency of his thought is marred by the introduction
of logical surds. By way of anticipation of our criticism of his
work, ¥e may remark that in so far as he remains consistent with his
avowed fundamental principles, '.Voodb ridge fails to show how error is
possible, and, conversely, in so far as he offers a plausible account of
the oossibility of error, he does so ,principl es to the contrary not-
wi th standing.
The justice of this anticiT)atory stricture, it is honed, will
be borne out in the succeeding nases. The justification of the as-
sertion that 'Voodbrilge ' 3 primary princinles are incapable of account-
ing for the fact of error depends upon the fact that 'iVoodbridge defines
the consciousness relation ,in terms the most unequivocal Dossible ,as
purely external, utterly non-constitutive. That we may not be charp:9d
with misinterpretation or exaggeration concerning this crucial point,
the following excerpts from his ipsi s sima verba are submi tted:'* ?^e do
not ask if space and time affect their objects causally. '^e should
not raise the question of the causal efficiency of consciousness" (The
Nature of Consciousness, Jour, of Phil ., Psychol . and ocient. Meth.,Vol.
II, p. 1^0). The statement just quoted is pre'^eded in the text of 'Vood-
bridge*s article by these words '."The relation of the world of which
there is consciousness to consciousness involves the same kind of
problems as the relation of objects in space to space, or the events in
time to time** (Idc. cit . .p. 1*30 ). "Knowledge is wholly determined in
c
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its content by the ralationa of fine objects in conaciousnoBB to one
another, not by the relation of conaciouanesa to the objects" (loo* cit ,
,
p.lS3). "Juat as conaoiousneaa determines in no 'vay what we discover,
it deterrainea in no way the limits of what we can di acov.qr" f ^og. ci
t
.
^
p. 133). "Things, or a part of theTn,raay be in oo nsciousnesa, but they
are in it aa thinea are in spaoe '.Ve have no ri^ht to conclude
that conaciousnesa conatitutes a aeries of existences parallel to other
exi atences, no ri^t to conclude that the objects in consciouaneaa are
ideaa of thinga outside, and no right to conclude that the objects in
do, axjparently,
conaoiousneaa are atatea of conaciousnesa. But we^yhave abundant right
to conclude that, when conaoiousneaa exi3t3,a vorld hitherto unknown
haa becoTTie known" ( loc. cit.,p.l25). It would seem that words such
aa the foregoing could be interpre-ed to mean only that objects, un-
altered, enter directly the consciousness relation and thereby become,
through no process of aymbolization, mediation, representation, dunlication
or what not, but in the strictest sense immediately the content of know-
ledge. If , however, the conaciousness relation is "the same general tyDe
of existence aa 3Dace,time or apecies**
,
then, plainly, knowledcre of objects
must be in all cases true, the very object itself, and no uncertain and
slUf3ive proxy, must be apprehended, --or else there is an end of rational
discussion. Surely our realist would not have us believe that snatial
and temr)oral relations of objects and the relations of objects to th^ir
genera or soacies are equivocal, ambiguous, indeter-ninate. It would seem,
however, that he must ex-oect ua to believe this, or that he would have us
believe error to be impossible, —or perchance that he did not mean pre-
cisely what he said when he placed consciousness, space, time, and species
in "the same general type of existences,"
There is a further serious difficulty which confronts him who
affirma the externality of relations and then proceeds to identify
('
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consoiousness •.lith a relation so conceived. The precise type of
relation selected by Woodbridp-e for identification with conecio-ue-
no33, namely space, time, qneci ea, renders the difficulty neculiarly
acute. The point in question is thi s: consciousness is asserted
to be the same general type of existence as are those relational
categories narnedjbut consciousness is held to be such that objects
pass into it and out of it, maintaining unaltered their specific
differences before, during, and after their conjunction in the rela-
tion of belncr known vhich constitutes consciousness. Be it noted
that objects are represented as passincr comple tely out o_f this
relation , as standing in severest aloofness from any and everv con-
sciousness, but as being, nevertheless, the identical objects which,
under appropriate condi tion8,mi ght become known. Are v?e to under-
atand that objects are canable of passing miraculously, by some sort
of cosmic black art, compl etely out of all snace relations, all time
relations, all relations to their genera and species, and, nevertheless, of
remaining the identical objects .vhich they vvould be ^rere they to slip
dexterously back into the abandoned relations? It would seem, that
ne are expected to understand all of this if IVoodbridge* s account of
consciousness is correct, i . e. , if it is an adventitious external rela-
tion ^hich objects may assume or abandon in to to without suffering es-
sential alteration and if it is, in any Intelligible sense, the same
sort of existence as snace, time, and snecies.
It is not necessary to attack the doctrine of the externality
of all relations in order to establish the criticism contained in the
foregoing paragraph. Be the fate of that general doctrine what it
may, the fact remains that Voodbridge has on his hands in consciousness
an existence of a radically different sort from those with which he has
so facilely classified it. Asf3uredlv every object in consciousness
stands also in some or all of these specified relations. If objects
(c
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when .wholly outside the consciousnesa context •nreserve,a3 we are
enrohatioally assure! that the" do, the identical character which
they manifest Jthen within that context, then obviously objects as
they are vvhen unknown stand in those same relations which or/ranize
them vhen known. .Voodbridge makes consciousness sui generis by af-
firming foat ob Jects, unaltered, can slip out of it com-nletely, as t'oey
can not sIId Prom any of the other relations with which he classifies
consoiousn'^ss. At best, they can only shift from one s-nace relation
to another sr^ace relation, or from one temporal Dlaceraent to another.
Once they slip entirely out of all s-oace and time relations or fall
from their locus in an^. ^''^d every species, they reduce to th. e sheerest
of nonentities and to say that they have maintained their self-identical
character with its full quota of original specific differences becomes,
to say the least, a stupendous metaphysical hyperbole. In fine, if IVood-
bridge really means that consciousness is the same general kind of ex-
istence as those kinds specified, he is in all good consci ence, or at any
rate in all good logic, bound to maintain that the most that known ob-
jects can do in the matter of escaping from the net of knowledge is
to change nets, --to become caught in different consciousness continuums-
there being no possibility that they should break throu^Th the net and
disport themselves, al 1 unknown, in unplumbed depths of external relations
Not only, therefore, do l¥oodbridge * s principles fail to provide for the
fact of error; they further embarrass their author by conducting straight
to the doctrine of the "ubiquity of the knowledge relation.**
It now remains to examine certain modifications which '^ood-
bridge makes in his princioles in order to circumvent such difficulties
as we have discovered in his thought. The first of these modifications
which we shall consider is implicit in Woodhridge's attempts to state
the specific differentia of consciousness as distinguished from the
(€
other relations which, we are told, consti tute coordinate snecies witvi
i t» Two citations will servo to make clear what it is that so dis-
tinguishes con3Ciou3ness:"7/hen objects are in consciousness they
become grouped and systematized in a manner qiii te different from
their grouping in any other form. They become reDresentative of
each other. Note /mat it is of £acli o ther that they become repre-
sentative, but not of anything else. They are not ideas which repre-
sent thins-s,or phenomena which represent noumena,or things in a body
which represent thinr^s outside, or states of consciousness which repre-
sent an external world. It is each other that the^ represent, as bread
represents nourishment" ( loc . cit_. , pn . 121f ) ; I have taken the fact of
meanino: to be the fact of consciousness, and urired, consequently, t-ia t
consciousness is just the existence of logical relations" {Conscious-
ness, the Sense Organs, and the Nervous System, Jour, of Phil ., Psychol
.
,
and Sclent. Meth. , Vol . VI
, p. 44^ ) . 'Then writing the former of these
pas3a,6:es, can iVoodbridge have forgotten that he is authority for the
assertion that when passing into the relation of beinc known thinc-s
are in no essential manner altered*? It would seem that the acquisition
of such a representative/oharacter as that specified would constitute
a most essential alteration in things as known as distinguished from
things as unknown. '"^oreover, the use to which '7oodbrido:e puts this
representative character is quite illicit, for he surreptitiously
smug'Tles in with it the possibility of misrepresentation, of erroneous
implication, on the part of objects as known. If he means that the
nature of consciousness is such that it can misread the implications
of its objects as well as read t>em ari,ght,why does he not say so in-
genpusly without more ado instead of denying- explicitly that su.ch is
the case while affirming imnlicitly that it nevertheless is so? 'Tien
writing the latter of the two passages last cited, can Voodbridge have
*'r
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foreseen that he voul i later asaertf vide aurora, o.Ol) t^-'at the -vorli
,
incienenient of conacious livinfr; oro-anisTia, 1 3 "a lop-ical structure'*
or "system of logical connections"? consciousness is " ,]U8t the
existence of logical relations'* and i f , neverthel ess , a "logical
structure" or "system of logical connections" exists in comnlete
isolation from conscious living or c-ani sns, then manifestly 'Voodbri Ige,
in our second passage, is equating consciousness with "mind in the
transcendental sense" Logical implication, meaning, representation,
then, turn out to be grounded in the very structure of external things
and in no sense adried to them when they become content of knowledge
for human consciousness. If such is the case, consciousness humanly
conceived can assuredly do no more than to discover the already present
unambiguous logical connections 'vhich inhere in the ob.iective structure
of thino-s and if things enter unaltered into the relation of being
known in consciousness it is a dark mystery how the immediately given
logical imolications of thinera could be mi sapprehended, --in brief,
error la impossible unless consciousness be interpreted as bein?
very different from the innocuous thing which it has been represented
as being.
A second si cmifleant modification of vVoodbridge * s princiules
concerns the sense in which physical things are affirmed to be present
in consciousness. Again, fai thful representation requires that we
quote at length. "The world which we perceive, "so writes our author
in his paper on Perceotion and Epi stemology, James Volume, Dp. 1^^> If," turns
out' thus to be of Ih e same general kind as the world in which the
processes of perception occur. Even if the two worlds are numerically
di stinct, they are essentially alike , If the processes of oer-
c9T)tion about which physiology and psycholotry inform us are the Droc-
easea by means of which we perceive our world, then, i f the perceived
world is not continuous with these processes, it is none the less. homo-
ii
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geneous with the world where they occur, and might contain Voem if
they are ever given 'in representation'. If the processes belong
to a world entirely, the 'representations' belonfc to a world at least
partly physical. In other words, if there is a physical world external
to consciousness, there is also a physical world within consciousness.
The physical thin,o:s we perceive may not be the Physical things which
cause our perceptions, they may be only representations or reduplications
of them, but they are physical thiners none the less." The statement made
to the effect that perceptual representations belong to a world which
is "at least partly physical" , the admission that the physical things
perceived may not be the physical things which cause them, the refer-
ence to "representations or reduplications" , the suggestion that the
world of perceived physical things and that of the producing physical
causal processes may be numerically distinct, together with the explicit
statement, which occurs on page 166 of the article quoted, to the effect
that a perceived world is not the same as an unperceived world attest
cumulatively that Woodbridge was disposed to nodify his doctrine con-
cerning the direct presence, altogether unaltered, in consciousness of
external physical things precisely as they are when unperceived. It
is such admissions as these which Thilly neglects to consider in his
criticism of 'ffoodbridge (vide supra
,
pp. 37-39 ,80-8 1 ) . fhile Thilly*8
criticism is well taken, it would have been greatly strengthened by
the citation of such admissions as the foregoing from Voodbr idge '
s
own pen. Woodbridge admits explicitly the epistemologically dualistic
implications which Thilly charges against his theory of perception.
The most serious modifications which Woodbridge has made in
his principles appear in connection with the biological theory of con-
sciousness criticised by Thilly. The consequences of these modifica-
tions are, however, even more serious than the latter made them out to
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be. True, they make it quite impossible to affirm tbat the object as
R;iven in consciousness is nuraeric^illy identical with the object as it
exists indeoendently of being knoTO;they also, --and this is the more
serious consequence--, ^ake it impossible ever to assert with assurance
whether the objective reference of perception or judgement is veridical
or otherwise. Briefly stated, the biological theory of consciousness
is as follows:" An organism so situated that it should be in differ-
entiated interaction with the specific difrerences in the world
about it, but which should, none the less, react in a unified and
coordinated manner no matter how it might be stimulated, mi ;?Jit be
defined as a conscious organism. Its consciousness would be a re-
lational system integrating and unifying its differentiated inter-
action with its surroundings" (Consciousness, the Sense Organs, and the
Nervous System, Jour, of Phil ., Psychol and Scient. '^eth. , Vol . VI , pp.
4'^Of), The specialized sense organs make possible the differentiated
reactions to the specific differences in the envir*oning world: the
nervous system effects the inteerratinp- and unifvinp- of these divers
reactions. The difficulties which arise from t^^is account to haunt
our realistic philosopher bep^in to appear when we examine the precise
manner in which the sense organs function. 'Ve are told that special
structures in the various end orpans serve to make possible the pro-
duction of the specific effects of specific differences i^ the sur-
rounding world. /Ve are given to understand that these specific ef-
fects introduce the very identical qualities of the external object
into the integrating and unifying relational system which is con-
sciouaness. Assuming that external objects possess specific differ-
ences such as are posited in '"oodbrid^e * s theory and assuiT^inf^ like-
wise that they act so as to cause their appropriate specific effec ts
through the medium of properly differentiated sensory organs, we have
€i
no great difficulty in understanding, how objects ni^t conceivatly
be ,Q;iven directly in conaciousnesa, provided that th£ aenaory organ b
a; ere perfect intrumen ta for Jl^^j st erin^; their reapec tive apecific ef-
fects and provided
,
further, that the nervous system were a perfec t in-
strument for cottrdinating the di fferen tiated effects ariaj-i^^. in, the
various senae organs. "/hen, however, 'Voodbri dge wri tea: " 'iThat ever may
be the causes of dreams and illusions and of 'yvhatever stuff thev nay
be made, they exist apparently only because the sensory mechanism is
inoperative or out of order. Our greatest obstacle in the way of
having illusions is an unclog.qed sensory mechanism" (The Belief in
Sena&tions, Jour, of Phil
.,
Psychol and Sclent. Meth. , Vol .X, p. ^,0.^ ),
the confession is manifestly made that the sensory or^ians and the
nervous system are no auch perfect instruments. Just how may we be
quite sure that, at any given moment, we possess "an unclog<red sensory
mechanism"? How, in sum, are we to be certain whether the qualities
which we refer to objects or the relations which we ascribe to them
are, on 'Yoodbridge ' s principles, properly so referred and ascribed or
erroneously imputed to objects by reason of acme unhappy clogging of
the sensory mechanism? iVe conclude our discussion of the work of "Yood-
bridge with the observation that his admission t>^at specific effects
and the co6rdinations of those effec ts are relative to a hi d^ily variable
organism dooms him to be content to diacuHs objects as kno^vn and for-
ever prevents him from having any warrant for making assertions con-
cerning the character of objects in their stark objectivity. ^Voodbrid.pp
has plainly failed to make good his contention that "in knowledge we
have actually given, as content, realj ty as it is in independence of the
act of knowing" (The Field of Lo!?ic, ocience, N. 3. , Vol . XX, p. P08 )
.
Turning to -^cGilvary ' s writings, we find another stout defense
of the realistic world-view, or rather of a realistic Ve1 1an schauun g
«
c1
The 'vritinp-s which have co^^^^ fron McGilvary'3 very versatile and
facile pen are full of confessionB of i th in the indepen lently
existent " ob jective" real" physical" , "material" world. In an
article entitled "Pure Experience and Reality", he charges Deivey
with having effected a "daring de-realization of the tireexDerienti al
Dasf'and scouts the conception, whic h he finds in-nlicit in De vey's
doctrine, to the effect that "the object as it existed before it
vas experienced, was not reality, but only a condition of reality,
and the condition is not sufficient to produce reality. Only w^e n
the condition is suppl emented by an exnerience which realizes the
object does the object become real" (Phil. Rev.
,
Vol.XVI,r). '^70 ). He
ur.ces that Oe^/ey confuses "to realize" rneanino: "to becor^.e a^vare of
as real" with "to realize" raeaninp- "to make real", with the result
that he wins an easy, but purely verbal , victory ove^ all strictly
Ob jectivistic realisms. McCrilvary's position is clearly that the
"oreexperiential past" is every whit as real, and in precisely the
same sense real, as any object that has been favored with "realiza-
tion" in the first sense above indicated. To be sure, objects are
" t err.DOrally independent"
,
not "absolutely indepen dent" ^of conscious-
ness, for "by an 'independent object* the realist means an object
that exists when there is no awareness of i t. ... vVh en, therefore, the
realist speaks of beinr aware of independent objects, he means that
he is aware of objects whose existence extends eifher backivard or
forward in time beyond the span durino; which they are immediately
present to consciousness** (Reality and the Physical '7orld, J. ^. P. and
o. V. , Vol . IV, p. SS*^ ) , This statem.fnt that consciousness and objects
are not absolutely independent entities ap"nears to mean only that
they are factual elements in the same system and can, therefore, uDon
occasion stand in some sort of conjunction. The probleri of Dosslble
€
cauBal interdsDendence is not here contemplated. The objects .vhich
poaaeas this temporally independent reality are not invariably con-
ceived in identical fashion by ^-IcGilvary, At times he writes as if
he understood them to be the precise com-olexes of qualities and relations
which are popularly meant when reference is made to " things'* or "objects'!
His long and controversial discussion of the classic case of t he -oer-
ceT)tion of a distant, and Dossibly extinct , star (Phil . Rev. ,Vol .XXI,dto.
167-171) is a case in Doint. Throughout this discussion/'cullvar y
treats the concrete perceived star, in its totali ty as perceived , as
numerically identical with the "real" star, the "object", as existe rt
independently. Curiously enoup:h,in the opening pasres of the very
article from which this instance of usage is taken, ive are told that
"by object is meant any quality or any relation, however abstractly
taken" ( loo_. cit.,p.l53). This latter usage is undoubtedly the one
which McGilvary intended to represent his position. The discuBsion
of the star, in which the term is employed in a sense which its user
has recently rejected most expresslvjis m.erely "a slin of 1h e master's
hand" and to be overlooked. "^e are therefore Justified in assertine-
that for McGilvary •he world as it exists independent of consciousness
is a complex of perceivable qualities intes-rated by perceivable rela-
tions.
The next moment in ^^cGilvary*s thought which we must fixate
in order to estimate the success of his effort to account for error is
his peculiar conception of consciousness. He unhesitatingly accepts,
in principl e, the relational theory of consciousness, though he finds it
impossible to assent to that theory in any one of the specific forms
f:iven it by other contemporary thinkers. He finds that, for Jarre s,
"consciousness is nothing but the felt relation of the later experience
with one that has preceded it" (J. P. P. and o.M. , Vol . VIII, n. •'Ul ) . .This
(I
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view, while it certainly is pronerly descriptive of an undoubted
aspect of experience, fail s adequately to describe the situation
involved in the "togetherness of objects in a field of view" which
constitutes consciousness, i t leaves out of account the Zusam^ense ln
or Zu3are''n enhan.o- of the temporally si^nul taneous objects which occunv
the conscious field in the specious present. Woodbridge is quite as
unsuccessful in his attempt to do justice to the consciousness rela-
tion. McGilvary criticises 'Vooibri ige s equation of consciousne s
with meaning on three counts, viz . ; ( 1 )Tneaning, far from constituting
that which, consti tuting exneri encs, is what we desigaate as consciousness,
is one of the relations obtaining within consciousness among the ob-
jects of consciousness; {9)if 'Voodbridge were correct, individual con-
sciousnesses would inevitably mierge into each other, there being no
provision made for a princinle of individuation; (?)should Woodbridge
succeed in so altering: his account as to provide for the isolation of
individual consciousnesses while retaining his characterization of
consciousness as m6anins',he would have on his hands the utterly em-
barrassing problem of having demonstrated the incc^municabili ty of
knowledge^ vide J. P. P. and 3. , Vol . VIII , dp. 5:32f ^ . McGilvary concludes:
"There is a unique way of togetherness which obtains among all the ob-
jects of an experience, a way of being felt together, of bein? exper-
ienced together, which is neither the way of meaning nor the way of
appropriation of past experier-ce, but a way which 'must be taken at
its face value, neither less nor more '" ( 3oc. ci t. , p. '^24) . To this
conception of consciousness, McGilvary gives frequent expression: it
represents his last word concerning the problem in cjuestion. 'Vitness
the following additional citations :" /'/hen anything i3_ experi enced it
In S: uni que kind of togetherness with certain other things" (J. P. P.
and 3. M., Vol. VI , p . 327 ); experience is duplex in character, disclosing
-4
upon analysia contents and their peculiar mode of experiential
intee;ration. This latter factor is called by various names. It
is * exoeriencinc:'
,
'feeling*, ' consciousness and 'awareness'" (loc..
ci t.
,
p. 231 consciousness is a unique and not further analyzaMe
relation of tog:e therness ' which obtains among all the objects given
in the momentary, individuated, and limited field of any particular
oerception" (Phil . Rev,
,
Vol.XXI, p. ; " the uniqueness of the con-
sciousness relation in general enters into its individualized in-
stances, so that we have in any individualized consciousness an in-
dividuality generically different from any other individualized re-
lation. The individuality of consciousness is to be taken just as
it is, and not to be '.vashed out till it is indi s tin g:ui8Vi able from an
equally ;vashed-out individuality of some other relation" ( loc» cit
.
,
p. 165).
The unique quality of this relation which is consciousness
is conceived as quite unaffected by any changes .vhich may occur in
the content of any given conscious champ momentane : " Consciousness
does not change its character from what it is when a sense quality
is its object, to become another kind of consciousness when later there
is an emotional reaction upon this sense quality. It remains the same
qualitatively similar consciousness throughout the time within which
qualitatively different objects are Dresented to it. ''/hat is us-'jally
called a state of consciousness is either an object of co nscious^:ess
or a state of such ob ject" ( J. P. P. and o.^T. , Vol . IV,p. ) . Moreover,
though this relation is unique, and consistently so, it shares -vith
generically distinguishable relations such as tims, snace, etc . , the
character of externality to the objects which it relates. As will
be shown in detail later, it is nrecisely at this r>oint that "-TcGilvary
is m.ost equivocal, with the result that his realism stands on unsteady
r
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feet in ijrecariously slippery T)laces;however, such staternente as
"
'vhen the real red is in conaciousness, i t is in consolousness; and
when it is out of consciouaness, i t is out of it. Its indenendence
of the mind only means that it is not necessary for it to be in the
mind in order to be at all, and also that while it is in one mind it
may also be in another" (J. P. P. and
,
Vol . IV, n.4F^6 ) and "the real
object and the nerceived object are at the moment of peroention numer-
ically one" (Phil. Rev. , Vol. XXI, p. 153), when taken ir connection -.vith
the express declaration that by real object is meant an object pre -
cisely as it ia '.vhen in complete isolation from any and every con-
sciousness complex, can assuredly mean, if they mean anything intell i ^'ibl e,
only that the sunervention of the consciousness relation uoon objects
in no way alters the essential character of the objects brought into
the neiv relation, -they can mean only f^at consciousness is conceived
rigorously as an external, non-constitutive relation. If such was not
McGilvary's neaninf?, 've submit that he should not have expressed himself
in terms giving these -nendacious reports of his intended meanin.e;.
Ve are no'^ ready to follow the fortunes which befall our
philosopher when he attempts to fit into the forep-oing tri-^-lim.ned
scheme of things our notoriously fra.fmien tary and uncertain kno'vledge
of this world which, we have been assured, has a sportive way of becom-
ing immediately known every once in a while and t>^en anon retirinp-,
•.vithout so much aa a chan.p-e of outer garments, into the dark ni^cht of
oblivion. First of all, wo are infoiTned that consciousness, while
not a constitutive relation, is a selec tive relation. ""/hen it cooes
to the making of experience," we are told, "some things are taken and
others are left** (Phil. Rev. , Vol. XXI, p. 163 ). .Vith t^-ia conception of
consciousness "'ust be associated '^cGilvary's peculiar definition of
an object ( vide supra^ p.'^g) as "any quality or relation, however ab-
stractly taken/* Consciousness is thus miraculously endowed with
10
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ability to pick and choose the qualities and relations which shall
constitute the terra within its momentary field of view. It follows
that "relations may even obtain between qualities that are in e>€Der-
ience and yet not be themselves in that exDerience" (J.P.P. and 3.M.,
Vol. VI, T). 231). By the same token, it also follows that qualities
are
t>)at /VjuxtaDOsed in the "independently real" order map well be omitted
from the relational complex of qualities which constitutes a ,criven
perceptual field, that is, perceptual complexes may contain only the
merest skeletons of the concrete complement of qualities inherent
in what is popularly meant by an "object" or a "thing*" 3o far, con-
sciousness tells the truth, but not the whole truth, about thinf^s. i^,
is still possible for a realist who holds that an object is a single
quality or relation abstractly taken to maintain that objects are
known immediately in experierce as they are w'^en outside the unique
togetherness which is experience, or, more preci sely, conscious ness.
Even this is possibl e, however, only upon condition that consciousness
is conceived as a mysteriously selective relation. So characterized,
consciousness is, most erapha ticall y, a unique relation. In the case
of no other relation discussed by McGilvary is there capricious tak-
ing and leaving! with them there is no respectine- of objects. There
lurks within the?!e considerations the suspicion that the uniqueness
of consciousness is such as to render it gen eri call
y
distinct from
all relations.
Even more serious considerations confront our realist
he
by reason of certain additional factors which/^frankl y admits find-
ing mixed with "real" qualities in experience complexes. These
factors are objects of consciousness and are, so far forth, " real"
,
but they are not "independently real" , i_. e_. , they exist only within
consciousness and may, therefore, properly be called subjective.'*
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Gonaciousness does not, be It remenbereci,have any part in producine;
these its "subjective" ob.1ect8,for "consciousness arises as the
correlate of physiolo gical functioninp;, and when it arisen it does
not produce its object. fhat object shall be nresent to it depends
on the total situation within which the awareness occurs" (J. P. ^. and
3.M. , Vol . IV, p. 59? ) . These subjective factors of experience fall in-
such
to two main classes. The first of these classes comprises ^^objec ts
of consciousness as pleasures, pains, hopes, fears, ambitions, what not,
which are quite dissimilar to any objects which can exist both in
out of consciousness. iVhen they appear in consciousnese, the y
come,lili'e baby dear in the nursery rhyme, "out of the nowhere into the
here." This, it '^ust be confessed, is not precisely the manner in which
MoGilvary states the matter, but it comports with his meaning. The
second of the classes referred to comprises objects which are often
qualitatively indistinguishable from those which are "independently
real" and which are always similar enous-h to such objects to render
confusion of this type of "subjective" .objects with the corresponding:
"objective" objects altogether possible. Nowhere does McGilvary at-
tempt to indicate the conditions of the appearance in consciousne ss
of either class of these "subjective" factors. Such objects "come
and go; they come nowhenoe and go nowhither. They have their antecedents,
but they are not their antecedents" (Phil . Rev. , Vol. XXI, r). 167), Such
an object "was not before it was perceived, although its causes were;it
ceases, it is annihilated, when it ceases to be percei ved;but its effects
endure, changing as they go" ( 1 oc . cit, .
,
d . 1^8 ) , After prolonp-ed reflec-
tion, the present writer confesses his inability to construe such state-
ments intelligibly within the context of McCrilvary's declared princinles.
These objects, ve are told, have causal antecedents and UDOn dissolution
in the void leave behind them discoverable effects. Presumably,
these
L
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causes and effects are physlolop:ical DrocesaeSjfor we have McGllvary*s
unconditional word that consciousness "arises as a correlate of nhysio-
lop;ical procesaer." ( vide supra , d» 98 ), from which it would seem to follow
as the ni^'ht the day that that which can exist only in conscioi^sne as
must, if it has factual causal antecedents and consequents, have them
in physiological processes, — the non-constitutive character of con-
sciousness "being assumed. How can 'ifcGilvary consistently maintain this
,
however, and at the same time ascribe, as he does, to the physiological
processes of which consciousness is the correlate the function of
bringing immediately into consciousness the "independently real" in
propria persona? Put bluntly, the question is this: If the result of
the stimulation of the organism is the introduction into consciousness
of the very "independently real" objects which are the source of the
stimulation, how shall we account for the appearance in consciousness
of •* subjective objects"? Certainly their antecedents could not be
physiological processes resulting from the stimulation of the organism
by an independently existent real object, and yet, have we not been as-
sured that only such objects do stimulate organisms?
Though these "subjective" objects should each and all bear
the bar sinister in McGilvary's philosophical household, they neverthe-
less play important roles as legitimate members of that spiritual fam-
ily. Their presence, however, eventuates in a house divided aeainst it-
self, in which much confusion and turmoil reism. The nature of this
difficulty becomes readily apparent upon the perusal of such words as
the following:"A realist, using the term, object abstractly, may be dis-
posed to say that some specified perceived object is nuinericall y one
with the real object and that some other specified perceived object
is not numerically one with the real object. Such a realist must say,
when both these abstractly taken perceived objects are regarded as enter-
ing into the constitution of a concrete perceived object, that this object
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is not nuTnerically one with the concrete real object. There a re
numericallj^ two objects, each with its coraDlement of qualities and
relations, although each shares with the other some identical qualities
and relations. If then by perceived object be meant" the concrete per-
ceived object, and by real object be meant the concrete real object,!
should have to class myself with the eDistemological dualists If
however by perceived object be meant any quality or relation that is
perceived, then I class myself in the conjrenial co^^ipany of epistemolog-
ical monists" (Phil. Rev. , Vol .XXI ,pp. lf->^f ^
We are no?/ face to face with the central difficulty which
McGilvary encounters in his attempt to prove his thesis that we have
immediate knowledge of the independently real , vi z. , the difficulty of
distinguishing between "subjective" objects and "objective** objects
of consciousness. His ingenious distinctions between "contemporaneity
and "simultaneity" and between "space occupancy" and "space monopoliza
tion" are incidental and of secondary, or even tertiary, im-portance in
comparison with this basic issue. Inasmuch as these matters }-ave
been adequately treated by o theirs ( vide supra, pp. 24-50 ) , we shall omit
further discussion of thera and center our attention upon the more
fundamental problem of McGilvary *3 attempt to find criteria whereby,
consistently with his realism and his relational theory of conscious-
ness, he may distinguish "subjective" from "objective" qualities. On
these two and their definitive discrimination hangs the fate of this
particular realist's epiateraologioal monism.
Fortunately, McGilvary has seriously addressed himself to
the solution of this crucial problem. Admitting that the realist
who holds, as he does, that " some of the*qualities perceived' are
numerically identical with and some numerically different from the
'actual qualities'" may with entire reasonableness be "called upon
to furnish a criterion for distinguishing between the two classes
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of qualitien perceived" ( J. P» and 3. M. , Vol . IV, pp. f;84f ) , he responds
to this perfectly reasonable sunnons and endeavors to furnish the
required means of di acriniinati on. The necessary criterion can not,
he frankly adrnita^be found "^in the qualia as they inrriediately present
themselves to awareness" ( loc, ci t. , p . . Prlna f^cie ,all objects
of consciousness, --the stuff of dreams, illusions, hallucinations,
pleasures, pains, hopes, fears, relations, real stars, re Iness, rouerhness,
rats etc . ad lihi turn- -, " stand on th e same footing** ( loc . ci t» ,p. ,
The makeshift criteria to which McGilvary resorts in default of this
solo criterion that could possibly be adequate for his purpose make
all of his brave asseverations about certain and immediate apprehension
of independently real objects sound a bit like t'^© vhistlini? of a
boy whose courage needs vocal confirmation. There are four such
criteria specified, all of which are purely prapT^atic and all of which
share the uncertainty of that most shiftin.c- and uncertain term..
These criteria, we are assured, are none other thar: those of
which any sane man makes use in attemptin.p- to discover the real nature
of his environing world. The first test which such a man applies in
attemptinp: to establish the independent reality of anything is that of
assuring himself that the sensa in question are "not the m.onopoly of
any single empirical awareness" ( loc. cit_. , p . 687 ) . f^cGilvary hare seems to
assume that the sensa may be directly compared . In short, he is guilty
of a sly peti tio principii in that he assumes the realistic position
as granted at the outset, for, so far as the present writer is aware, only
Perry has had the hardihood to declare explicitly that men may inspect
indifferently the contents of each other*3 minds and purses. Ve must
insist that Mc Gilvary 's first criterion can not guarantee even so much
immediate knowledge of the independently real as its sponsor suspects
it can until there has been found some further criterion for discover-
inp: when sensa, in all of their specific particularity, are and when they
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are not "the monopoly of any single emnirical awareness."
The fact that even the verdicts of co-consciou3nes8 may
be cliallenged, since comTnon hallucinations and conmon illusions are
not infrequent, leads McGilvary to su^rfest his second criterion. This
is the ti'^e-honored test of coherence. The hallucinated voice of a
friend, for examDle,i3 distinguished from the "normal" experience of
the same by the fact that the former "is not related to a visual
3 ensum of that friend as voice is related to vision ordinarily** ( 3oo.
cit . »p. 688 ) . Similarly "an hallucinated visual sen sum is not relate^
to tactual sensa as is ordinarily the case" (loc . cit . ^p. '^'^8 ). This
test is an-olicahle to all sorts of "immaterial oh jeots" , 'v^ich, though
existent in real time and space .vhen perceived, are nevertheless not
"space-monopolizing." It is at once apparent that the limitation
pointed out in McGilvary 's first criterion renders this second one
defective as a means for infallibly detecting the presence of inde-
pendently real objects in consciousness, for, even though the reports
of the several senses concerning a driven object in a given empirical
awareness" should be entirely coherent and mutually confirmatory, what
means would there be of showing that this complex of sensa was not
the monopoly of that sin gle empirical a^^aren e ss? Until McGilvary
has discovered to us such a means ^he "Has no lop-ical ripht to count
himself to have demonstrated that we are able immediately +o appre-
hend independently existent ob^'ecta.
The thirvd and the fourth criteria do not relieve the dis-
tressing situation. The third criterion is merely a justification
on the basis of the second of the inductive procedure whereby we
pass inferentially from the experience of certain objects to the
affirmation that certain other objects existed prior to the time of
their existence. Thus an experience of charred ruins suge^ests the
antecedent existence of a fire. By means of jU3t such inductions
cr
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irve builci ud our whole syster of a Dre^xneriential world. It should
hardly bs necessary to call attention to the fact that •TcGilvarv has
world
no lo^-ical warrant for assertinp; thai that nre^xperi entlal ^Dosseas ed
the precise qualities which he attributes to it until he has furnished
some criterion for the certain detection of inde-oendently real ob.iects
within the experiential situation. A like remark is in order con-
cerning his fourth criterion, which he states as follows: Differan ces
in one class of sensa point to independent differences in another
class, vhen there is question as to the independent reality of the
latter, and when the question is based on the fact that the latter
sensa are eiven in different qualities to different awarenesses"
(
1 oc »
ci
t
.
, p. 690 ) , If one man sees two crlasses as gray while another man
sees one of them as ?ray and the other as red, we are justified in
asserting that the experience of the second man contains the real
independently existing objects if we find that photoqranhic develop-
ing, may be done behind one of the glasses whereas it cannot be done
behind the other. But is there not here rat^^er unseemly haste in
Jumping to an unwarranted conclusion? To be sure, we mi s-ht prOD.erly
conclude from, such empirical evidence that the two glasses differ in
some significant fashion, but such evidence is obviously insufficient
to employ as the ground for asserting that the independently real
qualities of the resnective glasses have been apprehended. Not until
McGilvary has remedied the fatal defect of his first criterion can he
pro-nerly avail himself of the other three, --in which happy case he
would have scant reed of them.
Ve are now not unprepared for certain statements ft* om
McGilvary which sound 3U3piciot;6ly like retractationes re.Tarding
both his resolute realism and his relational theory of conscious-
ness. Kis realism, which he has so often stoutly affirmed, becomes
highly tentative : hi 3 denatured consciousness "becomes a hi.<?hly orig-
c€
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inal and energetic sort of "togetherness of objects. "In any case,"
30 runs the first retractatio , ** the belief in 'objectivity' is merely
a tentative belief, a working hypo thesis** (lo£. oi_t . , p. 690 ) . mien the
same philosopher who wrote these words was discussing with riuch assur-
ance independently real stars and indeoenlently real patches of red,
we were not given to understand that these were in any sense rnerely
hypothetically independent objects. Ve understood the staternents
about their independent reality to be unqualifiedly categorical, but
we are thoroughly disillusioned upon reading, "We .... combine iramed-
iatiara with pragmatiam by maintaining that immediate experience furn-
ishes us with all sorts of qualia , and that of these qualia only some
may be properly assumed to have independent reality. Realism then
postulates that everything is or was or will be what it is ever im-
mediately experi enced as being ©r going to be, when this experience
la pragTiatically confirm ed, and when all such immediate experi encee
have been so adjusted to each other that the independent realities
we assume on the basis of these exueri ences shall not have at the same
time con
t
radi o tory qualities . The immediately experienced qual 1
a
which
are ruled out by the pragnatic criteria are then not regarded as in-
dependently real, and are called subjective"
(
loc . ci
t
. , p. The ex-
ceedingly tentative nature of this pragmatic confirmation has been
made sufficiently clear.
Equally significant is the second retractatio
,
Afhich concerns
the relational theory of consciousness. In a comparatively recent
article, McGilvary expresses the conviction that "a favorite realistic
enterprise of these days is very umpromi sing" ( J. P. P.& S.M. , Vol .XV,May,
1918, p. '267). This enterprise is none other than that of attempting
to demonstrate that "there is nothing in consciousness that iri any
way owes its being to its being in consciousness" ( loc . cijb.
,
p. 267 ).
McGilvary has at last become very susnicious of the doctrine that
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"everything that la has its ovm Hndepencient * being, is a *neutral
entity*" ( loo . cit » ,p, 8ff7). He finfis that the greatest -iifficulty in
the way of accepting this doctrine is that of "Droviding a place for
error" ( loc . ci_t
.
, p. 867 ) . Thus the problem of error has forced McGilvary
greatly to qualify his rigorous epistemological monism and to call into
question his theory of consciousness as a mere togetherness of ob,ject3.
In addressing ourselves to the work of Montague, we front
exceedingly difficult and complicated problems* He has developed
in great detail and with extraordinary ingenuity a set of distinctive
doctrines vhich require the most critical analysis and exacting ex-
position, if his conclusions are to be accurately represented or ade-
quately evaluated. It should be remarked, in passing, that the work
of each of the six Platform Realists bears the stamn of individual-
ity so cleared impressed upon it that an ensemble treatment of their
joint philosophical product would be in the highest decrree unprofit-
able. Such a treatment Kremer attempts in the work referred to earlier
in these pages (cf.p-SO ), with the result that hia critical portion is
throughout vitiated by generality and an unseemly ironing-out of
significant differences in point of view. Only by persisting in
believing that the New Realists have not meant much that they have
most explicitly said about consciousness
(
vide 0£. cit . ,p. 847) and by
preferring to accord them unconscionable latitude in interT:)reting
their " principe trop rigide" of epistemological moni sm
(
vide op. cit .,
pp.S48f) is this author able to subject the work of American New
Realists to a sort of blanket criticism. The result of such a
procedure is necessarily twofold:in the first place, the strictures
which Kremer' 3 discussion contains are so general that they are at)-
plicable in widely varying des-rees to the writings of the several
authors whom he considers; in the second place, his discussion leaves
c4
all unconsidered a wealth of auggeative material and most oripinal
arqxment. Such considerations aa ^h9 foregoing have dictated the
choic'^ of form for our own treatment. To be sure, .ve are aivised
that the introductory essay in "The New Realism" voices ouinions
common to all six of the contributors to that volu'ne f ^^lde "The Ne'v
Realism, D. V) and we are further assured that the lists of opinions
constituting the renO'Amed Program and First Platform are similarly
representative doctrines concerning which the six conferees to the
discussions which led to their formulation are in agreement. In
so far as the material just indicated is concerned, an ensemble
treatment of its joint authors is entirely in order. However, the
large admixture of distinctive opinions in the work of individual
members of the group requires that each member's thought be accord-
ed a separate consideration. It is altogether proper that each of
the mem.bers should be held, and rigidly held, accountable for deoartures
from the body of common opinions upon which the collective seal of
the grouD has been set. Surely a band of philosonhical pro-ohets who
insist upon "fastidiousness and nicety in the use of words"
(
ylde op.
ci_t.
, p. 21) , upon clear definition an.i "the unequivocal and conventional
reference of words" (od. cit . ,d-d. '^Sf ),UTgon the avoidance of unlimited
upon
assertions ( op. cit. , p. 27^ employment of only such theories as meet
the tests of consistency and simplici ty ( op_. ci t . , po. 2-f ) , unon systematic
criticism inter se of phraseology, methods, and hypotheses, and, finally,
upon the use of exact terms which they are "willing should stand as'
final" {Op_. cit .
.
p. 472 and p. 29) deserve at the hands of their reviewers
ani critics no such harmonizing interpretation as that whereby Kre'^er
attempts to dissipate their differences. If they are willing that
their formulations should stand as final, why should Kremer or any
other critic presume to say them nay? ^''e proceed, therefore, to con-
rc
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aider the several treatments of the oroblern of e'^ror which have
oome from the hands of the six American Nev Realists sans pareil
a
and to estimate than severally as rep'ards their adequacy and their
consistency with the doctrines of their respective authors and with
the further doctrines concerning which these authors confess to hav-
ing reached a consensus of opinion.
The first oC several prerequisites to an understanding of
Montague's discussion of error is a statement of his conceotion of the
natui'^e of the independently real .vorld. Kis most summary statement
of this conception is as folio.v3 ; " The real ]ini.ver3e_ con si sts of the
s-Q ace - tim e system of exi s tents
,
together 'vi th all that 1_3 pre supposed
tha t i3T/ s t em" ( g^.. oi t
.
« p . 2-^ ) , Such a formula, ^vi thout supplementary
comment, is as cryptic as any utterance of a Delphian Pythia. Its
meaning begins to becom.e clear upon examination of ^'ontacrue's con-
ception of '•subsistence." A "subsistent" is for him "any one of the
actual and possible objects of thou;?ht" ( op « ci t
»
, p « :3.'^5 ) « Every sub-
sistent, i . e. , everyjactual or possible ob ject of thought, ei ther is or
involves a proposition and is therefore a term-complex or involves
such a complex ( op. cit. , p. 353) . The space-ti-^e system of exi stents
is a great group of subsistents -irhich has for its elements, its ulti-
mate particular 3, " events" , by vhich is meant " groups of qualities
standing in the ul timate relati on of occupancy to one time and one
place" (o£.cit_.
,
pp. 2r)3f) . In addition to the spatial and temporal
relations which bind these elem.ents and groups of elements into a
system about which existential propositions which shall be expressive
of the essential nature of the system may be formulated there is another
class of identity relations to be found in the spatial -temporal system.
These relations, consti tuting our universal, nonexiatential , "merel y valid"
propositions, are presupposed or implied by the spatio-temporal system
of existents. These existential and universal propositions constitute
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the real world, but they do not exhauat the category of aub3i8tent3.
Inaarauch as every reality may be regarded as a true identi ty-conpl ex
or prOD03ition and inasmuch as each propoaition has a contradictory,
ne may affirm that there is a remainder of the real"^ of sub si stents
which remainder consists of the false propositions or unrealities,
particular and universal , which contradict the true pro-nosi tions which
consti tute reali ty ( 22.. cj t« , n. 955) •
Llontague's most explicit and emphatic statement concerning
the nature of these unreal subsi stents occurs in The PhilosoDhical
i.ieview,Vol.XXIII,pp.48~64. In the central portion of the article
which occupies the pages indicated, Montague discusses "The Menace
of Relativism" , centering his attack upon the theory that the objects
of illusory experience enjoy a relativistic existence in space. It
vill be recalled that McGilvary's doctrine of multiole snace-occupancy
vas desipned to provide for just such relative spatial existence for
unreal qualities. Montaerue -vould prefer the devil of a familiar sub-
jectivism to the deep sea of this ne v confusion
(
loo, ci t. , p. 54) . He"
is convinced that the "realists' ficcht for an independent worl i of
objects existing in real space will not have been worth winning unless
they can keep that real space clean and orderly, and clear of the con-
tents of error and hallucination" ( loc . c i t . , p . 5 ) . * He states his
position positively in the following words;" Any one place at any one
time must contain but one non-
c
on trad
i
c tory set of qualities. Such
a set of qualities is what we mean by any object, and its occupancy of
one space at one time is what we mean by its existence. Any object
may have as rich and numerous aspects as you pi ease; but they are never
ambiguous or relative" ( loo. cit_.,p.55). 'jlontaprue is convinced that
the realist must choose between relativism and "the doctrine of a realr:
of subsi stent objects independent of consciousness but composed of
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events that are unreal as well as of those that are real" (lOc,. cl t^
.
^
p. 56). His reason for holding this ia that any ar^runent that rai^t
be used to prove that the false and non-existent is dependent UDOn
consciousness miglit also be used to orove the dependence unon con-
c3jiousne33 of the true and real. The realists must OD-oose the esse
est percipi doc trine ; they must also oppose the less familiar but equal-
ly insidious non esse est non percipi doctrine. In fine, Montage con-
cludes, "I believe that our only hone of carrying, the realistic enter-
prise to a success lies in maintaining unsvvervin;? loyalty to the category
of objective non-existence, and in hardenin,<?; our hearts to all relativ-
istic counsels which would accord an existential status to the objects
of illusions and dreams. If the serpent of relativism is once al-
lowed to enter the neo-reali stic Eden it will be but a short time be-
fore we are all driven forth into the wilderness" (loc. cl
t
. , p. ) , The
axiom of uniplicity must lie at the basis of any realistic philosophy.
From what has been said in the preceding paragraph, it is
readily apparent that Montague accepts in principle the relational
theory of consciousness. He form.ulates that theory as follows: '' 'Ve
must think of Consciousness neither as a transcendent substance nor
as 'a unique series of qualities but rather as a peculiar nexus of rela-
tions between its objects which, under certain circumstances, supervenes
upon the permanent and merely physical relations of space and time. A
physical system without ceasing to be physical becomes a psychical
system whenever its members sustain to one another those relations
which make possible an individual consciousness of them" (A Neglected
Point in Hume's Philosophy , Phil . Rev. ,701. XIV, p. 37). The foregoing
formulation was published in 190 F'. In "The New Reali sm"
,
p.4'7F^, there
appears ,reprinted from, the Jour, of Phil etc.
,
1910, the following
formulation of the doctrine:" Cogni tion is a peculiar type of relation
which may subsist between a living being and any entity. Cosnition
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belongs to the aame vvorli as that of its objects. It has its nlace
In the order of nature. There is nothing; transcendental or super-
natural about it." oo far there is nothing distinctive about T^ontae-ue ' a
conception of consciousness, --nothing to distinguish his view from that
of any one of a dozen or more upholders of some sort of relational
theory. It is vhen 'Montague specifies the precise tyne of relation
which he conceives consciousness to be that his divergence from other
realists apoears. It is by means of this unique conception of con-
sciousness, coupled with the category of unreal subsi stents, that Monta-
pxie seeks to solve the problem of error. A clear statement of this
conception is, therefore, necessary to an understanding of his treat^^ient
of our probleTn.
Rogers has pointed out the coimplication of Monta<me*s con-
ception of consciousness ivith his discussion of error (Essays in Critical
Reali sm, p. l.'^l) and has confessed that there is risk of iiisinterpreta-
tion involved in any attempt to simplify Monta/me^s very intricate dis-
cussion. The gist of that discussion would appear to be as follows.
Consciousness is a form of energy. This conclusion is reached by
means of a series of analogies between the intensive phase of enerp;y
--potential energy-- and what from the point of view of introspection
may be defined as the psychical (James Volume, pp. 125f ) . The first of
these resemblances is the invisibility or privacy which characterizes
both energy in its intensive phase and the non-physical elements of
consciousness. The second resemblance is that both intensive energy
and consciousness appear to pervade the space of the things which they
influence, thus rese'^bling matter, but since, in thus extending- in space,
they forfeit none of their respective peculiar unity and indivisibility,
they both likewise differ from matter. A third resemblance is found in
the fact that whereas the elements in a psychical system tend to con-
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fortn to the structural order of the aystera as a whole, thus manifeatine;
the teleological nature of psyohioal processes, Dhysical elements sinilar-
ly conforra to the invisible and indivisible lines of raafmetic stress in
a magnetic field. A fourth resemblance is found In that" the condi tions
under whl,ch a s tijiiulus i s fo.l.i,ow.ed by a seneation hapnen also to be
condi tions under vhich
^^ZSIL i^^tsses fro^ a kin etic i n t
o
an intensive
phase " ( Op . cit . ,r). l?o ) , Percentions arise unon the redirection in the
central nervous syste'n of afferent neural currents into efferent nerve
tracts. In like manner, motion -oasses into stress upon encountering
some obstacle Afhereby it is redirected. A fifth and final resemblance
Monta,(^e discovers bet'veen the fact that, vhereas any given psychosis
contains only a small fraction of the totality of ohysical events, the
psychical in general has the capacity not only for all perceptible ob-
jects but also for all possible thoughts and feeling's about those ob-
jects and a sweeping assumption of his to the effect that a given energy
quantum may pass into any or all of an infinite number of phases of in-
tensive energy or stress (op. ci_t. , pp. 131f ) . On the basis of the first
four of these resembl anrres, th e fifth having been added to controvert an
Ob jection,'^onta,e^ie proposes the followine: theory! 'Vhat 5., fro,m 'vi thin,
would call mjr sensations are neither more nor less than what you, from
without , would describe as the forms of potential enerfry to vhich the
kinetic energies of neural s t imul i would neoessari ly gi^ve ri se in pass -
ing through ?ny brain" (o p. cit., p. 129). This energistic conception of
consciousness is criven its most finished expression and most explicit
definition in Montague's essay in "The New Realism.'' Consciousness is
there identified with causation; the cause-effect potentiality, which
from the objective point of viev can be defined only indirectly as a
possibility of other events, is held to be in itself and actually the
CONSCIOUSNESS of those other events (The New Reali sra, p. ^^^Q ) . This is
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Montague's "hylopaychiam*' , vhich he formulates definitively as follows:
The potentiali ty of the phyaical i_s the ac tual i ty of the Tpsychical
and the potentiality of the payohical is the actuali ty of the nhyaical**
(oD» oit.,p.^B81). Expressed in th 3 form of a definition of conscious-
ness, this m ean 3
;
0on s c i ousn ej^s is the po tenti^al or inpli cative presence
of a thing at a space or time in vhich that thing is not ac tually pres -
ent" (Op. cit » ,p» 281)« That Montague is vaguely aware that he is
identifying incommensurabl es in equating consciousness with physical
causation is clear from his admission that it is necessary for him
artificially to narrov the sense of "implication** and artificially
to broaden the sense of "potentiality" in order to make either a
proper equivalent for the cognitive function as he conceives it (op.
oitji,p.?83). "Implication" must be narrov/ed so as to apply only to
the cause-effect relation; " potentiali ty" m.ust be broadened to denote
the backward reference of an event to its cause as well as the forward
reference of a cause to its effect. An identification which depends
upon such an arbitrary disregard of essential differences can hardly
be pronounced successful.
Much of the criticism of Montague's treatment of error has
been directed against his conception of consciousness as set forth
in the preceding paragraph. Such a critical attack is logically quite
,juatifiable, for Montague bases his attempt to account for error upon
his theory of consciousness. The discrediting of the latter, f-^er e-
fore, logically involves the discrediting of the former. It is entire-
ly possible, however, to attack the theory of error di rectly, waiving
the criticism of the theory of consciousness. Such,i"^ the main, shall
be our procedure.
For Montague the most difficult problem in the whole theory
of knowledge concerns the relation of the perceived object to the real
object. He frankly admits (Jour. Phil ., Psychol ., etc. , Vol . IV, p. 378 ) th at
cf
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epi staraolo piically monistic realian has not succeeded in solvinc: this
problem. His o vn sugp-este l solution runs as follows. Physical ob.lects
are centers of inflowin,'' and outflowinp: enercdes and of qualities cor-
related with these energies. Certain of the outflowing: enerp:ies, after
having? undergone more or less modification in the course of their
passage throu^ intervening media, imoinge upon the sense organs of
living beinp^s and then,havine undergone further modification by reason
of their passage from the physical inedia of air or ether into the
physiological aedium of nerve fiber and havine reached the higher
centers in the nervous system, undergo a redirection which results in
their Dassins: from the kinetic to the potential or intensive phase of
being, in which phase energy is identical with sensation. These energy-
sensations, connected into a system, induce a center of stress or an ee:o
whence their respecti\re energy currents are renrojected as a field of
Dercer)tual objects back and out into the same real snace and time in
which their physical causes have their locus. Since the -nerceived ob-
ject and the real object are comnosed of the sa^ie enero:y,it follows
that the perceived object is identical in substance with at least a
part of the real object. The matter of qualitative identity will be
discussed later. The forep:oin^: account of the relation of the object
of perceDtion to the real object anrsears in an article entitled **Con-
temxjorary Realism and the Problems of Perception" (Jo^J^* of Phil ., Psychol
.
etc. , Vol. IV, pp. 574-383). In the essay in "The New Realism" the account
is reduced to the following brief statement Physical objects send forth
waves of enerc^y in various directions and of various kinds, but all in
some measure characteristic of the objects from which they proceed.
These enerories i'^pin.ge uPon the organism, and the sensory end-oreians
and the nerve fibers then transmit to the brain the kinds of enerc^y to
which they are severally adjusted or attuned. The final effe<5t is the
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resultant of these sensory enerries modified by the reaction of the
brain The cerebral state, whether initiated from within the organ-
ism, as in spontaneous thought and in hallucination, or whether initiated
from without as in perception, will be conscious of such objects as it
implies or of which it is the potentiality** (The New Realism, p. 28^ ).
Now enter truth and error* It would seen to the uninitiated
that, on Montague's principles, only truth could enter. Surely the un-
initiated might,not improperly ,be pardoned for concluding that if con-
scio'jsness is causality, if the imnlication or potentiality of the
psychical is the actuality of the physical ,consciousness would point
unequivocally to its physical implicate. Such, however, Montague asaires
us, is not necessarily the case. These implicates or objects of any
given brain state " will consi at of the events which would most sinnly
have caused the cerabral state and of the events whi ch the latter would
produce as ef fec ts if it acted' alone and laninterfered wi th** ( op, ci t.
, pp
.
38.3f). Now 'the simplest cause or the simplest effect of an event is
another event having the same qualities but differing in spatio-temporal
location. It is only when distorted by a second co?)perating factor
that the effect of a thing is quali tatively , as well as numerically,
different from the thing i tself" (Phil . Rev. , Vol .XXIII, p. F?) . Error is
thus accounted for by invokinp: the concerjtion of "the pluralitv of
causes" and a cause is held to be, not that which necessarily produces
its effect, but rat^-er that which t ends to produce and if unhindered
would produce its effect. Then the implicate or conscious object of
referable to
a brain state happens to be ^ts simplest cause, i . e. , happens to duplicate
its caus^,there is consciousness of a reali ty, which consciousness con-
stitutes true knowledge or truth. -Then, on the contrary, the actual
cause is other than the imnlied or simplest cause, the result is the
ap-orehension of what is unreal, which apprehension constitutes error.
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Truth may be of two kiniB with respect to tho conditions of its
origin,aa may also error. In case the medium through which the
enerp,y has passed from the external object to the brain has not
altered the character of the energy^ the cerebral event will be of
the same quality as the external ob.lect and the local and tei^rjoral
si.pjis of the former will imnly the real ti^e and place of the latter.
These conditions being sati sfled, true knowledge ensues. In case the
medium between the external object and the brain has distorted qual-
itatively, temporally, and BDatially the energy proceeding from the ex-
ternal object, true knowledge may yet ensue if the brain, by means of
inherited capacities or memory traces, correct the distortion in such
manner as to render the resultant brain state spatio-temporally and
qualitatively implicative of the external object^cf. The New Realism,
pT:».?89f). In like fashion, error may result from two sorts of dis-
tortion of the energies emitted by the external object, —"the dis-
tortion may be(l)physical or peripherally phy siological, in which
case we have the so-called sensory illusions, or ( •?)it may be central,
due to the cerebral apperception mass, in which case we have the error
of inference^ ( op. cit
.
,p. 291)
.
This, then, is the solution of the problem of error nroDOunded
by one who subscribed to the statement that "that which lies in or
before the mind when knowledge takes place is numerically identical
with the thing knoTO"(02_. cit.., p. 34); To be sure, Montague has ex-
pressly denied that he UDholds the doctrine of the numerical identity
of the content of consciousness and the object of consciousness ( cf. Phil.
Rev. , Vol. XXIII, p. 80 ), but he has also quite as expressly committed him-
self to that doctrine (of. The New Real! sm, pp . 288 f and compare Phil. Rev.,
Vol.XXIIX,pp,54f ). Our conclusion is that the doctrine of epistemolocrical
monism is, on the whole, inconsistent with Montague's position. He cannot
maintain this doctrine without repudiating his whole theory of perception,

whether veri ileal or otherwise.
Montage's atteTota to nreserve the sub stance of thia doc trine
while denying its form, and thus escaping the charge o? inconsistency re-
ferred to on the preceding page .result in even rnore disastrous oon-
i^equences for his theory as a whole. The major difficulty at this
point is discovered in Montague*3 endeavor to establish the qualitative
identity of perceived object and real object(vide supra, d. 113 ) . Thouerh
rejecting the notion of the numerical identity of these twain, he insists
upon their identity of substance, as has been already said ,and unon
their specific qualitative identity, thus endeavoring to defend the es-
sential contention of epi 3temolo frical moni stti, vi z. , that external objects
are directly given in consciousness, wi thout involving himself in the
tangle of difficulties incident to affirming the nmierical identity of
Dercept and object. Havine: admitted that the difference between the
physiolo f?ical and physical mediums is so e:reat as to render it "orobable
that the quality of a given stream of energy is radically changed in
passing from the one into the other, he proceeds to make the following
•astounding series of statements The real stuff of which an object is
made is nothing but the energies which are flowing into that object from
all other objects Consequently our own percetjtual activity when
directed to an object contributes to the nature of that object just as
truly, thougJi, of course, not so largely, as the sun's shining upon it. The
attributes which we ascribe to it do forthwith belong to it" (J. P. P. and 3
M, ,yol
. IV,r>p. 339f ) . it possible that the same nan who wrote the fore
going words also wrote that "things may pass in and out of the cotmitive
relation without prejudice to their reality" and that "the existence of
a thing is not correlated with or dependent upon the fact that anybody
experiences it, perceives it, conceives it, or is in any way aware of it*^
(The New Realism, p. 474)? Obviously Montague is forced to reject his non-
cc
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consti tutive-oxternal-relation theory of consciousness in order to
make out the qualitative identity of perception and ob.ject.
Apparently aware of the disastrous consequences of such a
doctrine for the total theory of the externality of relations, Montaprue
does not uniformly attempt to maintain it. Indeed, his prevailinjfr
tendency is to deny that perceived object and real ob.lect are qual-
itatively identical. Thus, he holds that the specificallv qualified
enerp-ies ^vhich stream through the nervous system "resemble more or
less closely (according; to the transparent or distortin"? properties
of the media throusli -^irhich they have passed) the specific qualities
of the extra-organic objects from .vhich they have proceeded" (The New
ileal! sm, p. 378 ) and admits that, while we may perceive a thint^ in Ih e
right place and time, the qualities which we perceive it to have may
be such as are only correlated with or produced by ener^^ies peculiar
to our nervous systems and in no sense resident in the object(Cf. op .
ci t
«
,
pp» I^Sf). At best the energies that proceed from the external
object are "characteristic" of the ob i ect, though not necessarily
qualitatively identical with that object. These ener??-ie3 are "more
or less" distorted by the physical media throu^ which they pass on
their way from the object to the percipient organism. T'Hese ^'-^re or
less distorted energies are aPiain more or less distorted in their
passage throug;h the afferent nerve tracts to the brain and this doubly
distorted stream of enerc:ie3 which were ori finally "characteristic" of
the object is again distorted by the specific reaction of the brain it-
self before being reprojected back into the real time and space of the
external object. In Montague's own words," the physical medium and the
brain itself is always partly responsible for the cerebral state. And
the aberration thus effected is probably never entirely corrected" (Qn.
cit. ,p.298). 5J7hen Montague finds the real , existent object thus slipping
1€
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tbrou.Pih his realistio finp;er3,all reluctant to I039 their treasure,
he attetipts to tighten hia ^c^ast) by assertin^^ that the totality of
a thing's effects, though not, indeed, irientical :vith it,'vould neverthe-
less be "exactly and adequately iTiplioative of it"(2l2.« oi t . .P'^'^B )
.
DoQ3 not all of this amount to saying, in somewhat recondite and obsc^jre
fashion, to be sure, that kno vledge is representative and mediate rather
than presentative and immediate? If so, 'vhy did not Monatgue say so franklyl
One further remark and our discussion of Montague is at
an end. The most serious difficulty which confronts our author in
regard to his theory of truth and error is that he provides no dis-
coverable means of ii stingui shing the one from the ot?ier. As Moore has
pointed out ( vide supr^j PP« 3 If ), I'.Tontaccue fails to tell ua how to be sure
what sort of a bird we have drawn forth at any given time from our
epistem.ological aviary. It Is all very well to assure us that if ener^-ies
qualitatively identical with the object from which they proceed pass un-
di storted into the brain and are reorojected undistorted back a.eain into
the real time and space of the object or that if such enero-ies, distorted
by the media through which they pass in reaching the brain, are renro-
jected back, their distortion having been corrected by the brain, into
the real time and space of the object, then there ensues true knowledge*
Vhen, however, we are expressly told that the aberration caused by dis-
torting media is probably never entirely corrected, we begin to despair
of ever attaining true knowledge. ''Thereas, m.oreover , we are not told how
to be sure that the conditions upon which true knowledge ensues are
satisfied, we are forced to conclude that even if the aberration re-
ferred to were in any given instance entirely corrected, ve should still
not know that we had attained truth. Gould Democritua have had a pro-
phet's foreglirapse of Montague's predicament when he said, '* Veril v we
know nothing. Truth is buried deep"? Certainly the outcome of Montague's
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discusaion of the nroblem of error juatlfiea Dewey's remark that
** there is somethin^o; huTioroua about the liacuaaion of the Droble^
of error aa if it were a rare or excer^tional thin.e; — an anomaly —
when the bareat glance at human history shows that mi stakes have
been the rule and that truth lies at the bottom of a veil" (Essays
in Experimental Logic , p. 4??^ ) . It ^ould seem that the well in which,
for .'.!ontaprue, truth lies buried is a bottomless on'e;at least, should
and
'•lontaEfue fall into i tA©ventually strike bottom, he "/ould be quite
unaware of having arrived. Surely this is a sorry -nlieht for a
philosopher who is certain that objects all unaltered sli^ in ard out
of the cognitive relation and that our knowledge is "real as far aa
it goes"i The unreal aubsi stent forever haunts Montap-ue and challenp-es
him to distinguish between it and the existential object, —and the
mocking challenge goea unanswered.
One hesitates to address himself to the criticisTri of Holt,
even on paper, unless he advance to the attack armed cap-a-pie, --so
militant a realist is he fronting. Fortuma tely, howe^'erjmuch of Holt's
retaliating fire has been brought down upon the heads of other pre-
oumptuous reviewers and critics. Fortunately, moreover, the thoroughi-
ness with which the work of these critics has been done and the fact
that tT-eir strictures have been rsDO'.-+-ed in considerable detail ( vide
supra, pp. IP- 10, 51-, 34-35 ^ make it possible for us to leave to one side
the consideration of many objections which may properly be raised
agaifist -iolt'a theory of err-or to the end that our attention iRay be
concentrated upon certain aspects of his doctrine which have been dis-
cussed inadequately heretofore, --or not discussed at all.
As has been the case with the ot>ier authors whose writings
we have considered, it will be necessary to sketch Holt's s-eneral view
of the constitution of the world and of the nature of consciousness
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and its place in the ^3;eneral scheme of fhin^-a hefors '^e shall he ready
to remark upon his discussion of error. First and ""ost emphatically,
Holt is an objectivist. His objectivisn receives the follo-vinc; formu-
lation: "The picture which I wit3h to leave is of a general universe of
being in which all things ohysioal , mental, and logical
,
propoBitione and
terras, 6xi stent and non-existent, false and true, good and evil, real and
unreal subsi 8t« The entities of this universe have no substance, but
if the spirit is weak to understand this, then let the flesh, for a season,
here predicate a neutral substance. These entities are related by ex-
ternal relations, and nan has as yet no just ground for doubting that
the analytical method of eTipirical science can proceed without limit
in its investigation of this universe. The dimensions of this universe
are more than the f'-ree dimensions of snace and the one of t imethow
many more is not known" (The New Realism, pp. 37?f) . The notion of "neutral
entities" is develor^ed at great length in Holt's work on "The Concept of
Consciousness," Two quotations will suffice to indicate the doctrine
there set forth. ".Vhile the contents of our minds are not*mentalHn
their nature," we are told, "these contents are all neutral entities, are
all of such stuff as logical and mathematical mianifolds are made of.
Complex aggregates are of the substance of their simpler components;
and not the reverse" {The Concept of Consciousness, p. 114), Again, anent
"the substance of matter", we are assured that '*the elements to which
the physicist has at length reduced matter are neutral entities. They
are the products of such minute analysis, are so strikingly remote ft'om
concrete wood and stone, that nearly everyone will grant that they are
m.etaphysically quite of one piece with Euclidean srsace and the integral
calculus, wi th which they are so intimately bound up" (o n. _cit
. , np . llBf
.
The relation which these neutral entities sustain to conscious-
ness can be made clear only by a statement of Holt's peculiar relational
c
theory of the nature of the latter. This theory is first definitively
formulated in the essay in "The New Realism" , in which work it, together
with the novel notion of neutral entities, i a e'^ployed to account for
error. The t'.vo doctrines 'vere later (1^14) emDloyed as the basic prin-
ciDles of "The Concept of Consciousness''''^ On pacres 5P3f of the forner
work, there appears tbe followincr definition:" Any class tha+ is fcmed
from the members of a given manifold by some selective principle which
is independent of the princinles which have organized the manifold may
be called a cros3 - sec tion« And such a thing is consciousness or mind,
--a cross-section of the universe, selected by the nervous syste"". The
elements or parts of the universe selected, and thus included in the
class mind, are all elements or parts to which the nervous system makes
^ specific respons e* " The various formulations of this definition which
appear in the later work differ only verbally from the one quoted(©. g..
Concept of Consciousness, p. 19 1, p. 208 ) . The position in both works with
reference to the relation of these neutral entities to consciousness is
identical : their bein»; injconsciousness in no sense alters them; conscious
-
ness is merely a cross-section of them. Thus "the beinp and nature of
these entities are in no sense conditioned by their beinp- known" (The
New Healism,p. 4r'75^) and "neutral entities are either terms or else re-
lations and propositions, and one salient fact about the'^,in so far as
they enter into individual experiences (though this is really a fact
about experience ), i 8 that 'their being experienced makes no difference
to them,' they remain what they are" (The Concept of Consciousness , r). 10? \
Holt's problem is to dicover the place of illusory exDerience
in a realistic world, as the title of his essay in "The New Realism"
phrases the issue. He sets himself the task of meeting the challenge
that illusion, hallucination, and erroneous experience in general can
have no place in a universe in which everything is non-mental or real,
jr- (Later, that is, in point of date of publication.)
<)
122.
He assures hi 9 reader at, the outset of the discussion that the terns
used in the disnute need not, ini tially, be nore closely defined, since
they "are offered and may be accer)ted as the current names for fairly
unambifoious r)henomena" (The Ne-v Realism,!). i'-OZ) . In five hasty pap-es,
errors in spatial and temooral perception are disposed of to the en-
tire satisfaction of our author. Holt's point in this portion of
his work is that the distortion of objects in spatial perception
and their misplacement temporally occasioned by the lae: of perception
may be matched by similar distorted duplication and misplacement in
physical nature and that, therefore, one may not argue from, the il-
lusory character of spatial and tem.poral experience to the subjectivity
of the aame. Two remarks are in order concerning his procedure at this
point. In the first place, it is obvious enough that his argument begs
the question flagrantly J in order to extrioate himself from the ee-o-
centric predicament , he assumes himself to be out of it and then tri-
umphantly declares that he has never been in it. Granting? t^at he
has so'^e magical means of direct access to physical objects so that
he may compare them directly ivith perceptual illusions, his case is
secure enough. If so much be not grante'% however, there is material
for more argument than could be conveniently compressed within the
supplementation of
Units of five paeres. The second remark is by vay of ALove joy's
criticism to the effect that Holt's discussion at this juncture in-
volves him in a denial of epistemological monism. On Holt's principles,
there is no possible ground for asserting that the perceived object is
in any sense a duplicate, vhether accurate or distorted, of some other and
"real" object. For him there i_s only one ob ject , viz . , the object per-
ceived. He ivrites," Vith the establishment of the first specific response,
out of the integration of refl exes, there is of course content (of an atom.-
ic, elem.entary order, very possibly). But this content could never be
identified with brain,nor with cerebration: for it is that
object or
r
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aspect of the environ^ient, to which the "brain reflexes are adjusted,
of which they are no-v constant functions'* ( J. P. P. and 3. , Vol .XII, 10 15,
p. 399). Is it not quite inadmissible for an author who writes thus
regarding the nature of the content of consciousness to speak of Der-
ceDtions as in any sense duplicating objects other than themselves?
The moment he allows such dunlication,he assi p-ns one locus to th e
content of consciousness and another locus to the object to which
that content refers, with the result that he is advocating an un-
equivocal epi atemological dualism. Hoi t'^-diffi cult y here arises from
the fact that he uses the tern illusion in its accented sense as a
"current name" for a "fairly unambiguous phenomenon." Had he at the
outset of his discussion essayed a "closer definition of the terms
used in the dispute" (The New Realism, p. 302), he would have found h im-
th e
self obliged so to redefine illusion as to empty the term of /^i pnifi cance
which is currently attached to it. In sum, Holt employs the term il-
lusion in its commonly accepted sense as signifying a perce-otual ex-
perience ,vhich incorrectly represents its object and in so doing coti-
m.its himself a denial, not necessarily of objectivism in some form,
but of eplstemolot^ioal monisra;had he conducted his discussion of il-
lusions of sense in a manner consistent vif-i his main position, he
would have been forced to say frankly at the outset that there is no
such thing as an illusion in the usual sense of the word. The brilliant
net result of the first five pages of the essay unler discussion amounts
to an assertion that it is quite as possible for a thoroughly objective
world to contain multiple and dissimilar objects as it is for a thoroufdi-
ly subjective world to contain such objects. The problem of illusion,
to be brutally frank, is not even broached^for though in two places (pp.
306 and 308) the suggestion is dropped that the real problem is to be
raised, its raising is deferred until the closing pages of the essay,
—
with what results we shall presently discover.
c
Forty-ei^rht "oapies are devot-3i to the discussion of "Errors
In oecondary Quali ti ss, More specifioally, the proble^i in t!^ ese
pages ( 308-3.^6 ) is to answer the question, Ho ,v ca^ purely hallucinatory
secondary qualities have, even in the"i3elve3 alone, any sort of being-
other than a subjective or mental being? Holt admits the propriety
of the question, it beinp- the first concerning which he has found it
possible to meet his adversary ivith "either aTniability or patience"
( op» cit» .p» 513) . Holt's ansiver to the question lies at the end of
a very prolix and highly hypothetical discussion in vhich the Ml!ill9r-
ian theory of specific energies is rejected in favor of the view that
the nerve impulse is made up of periodic fluctuations whose periods
correspond to the vibration rate of the impinging stimulus. The fact
that the positive evidence in support of this theory is derived wholly
from the phenomena of sight and audition and that its extension to
other sensory forms is purely conjectural does not deter Holt from
basing upon it his whole account of the nature of secondary qualities
and in particular his explanation of the genesis of hallucinatory
secondary qualities. In order to demonstrate how any ^?;iven secondary
quality might be conceived to arise fron qualitatively neutral vibratory
phases of nerve impulse, Holt takes as a typical instance the experience
of roughness, tactual roughness, ,vhich may be produced by tappine the
skin at varying rate3 of speed. The conclusion at which Holt arrives
is stated as fol lows 'That is interesting about roughness is that its
quality varies so immediately with the number of stimuli given in a
time-unit that it show3 conclusively that the nerve is able to carry
an impulse of this same frequency number, and that the roughness qual-
ity i_3 precisely this frequency mapnitude and with the time element
specifically omitted from consciousnesB" (ojd. cit . , p« 348 ) . The general-
ized conclusion which Holt derives fr':>m this instance is that "it is

the density of the aeriea of some relatively primitive sensation which
is the secondary quali ty" ( 22_* ci t. , r)» 3^3) « or, otherwise stated, "the
secondary quali ties, instead of being unanalyzable risycholo^rical elements
are all form-qualities of which the time-sense is inadequate to perceiv-
ing the form, while the density is perceived for very hi^^h frequencies by
a nrocess which is perhaps related to physiological summation" ( otp* ci t ,
Holt is now ready with his answer to the question as to how
hallucinatory secondary qualities can have any being; which is not sub-
jective or mental. Grantin.q; that the nervous impulse at larcre is oscil-
latory and that the oscillations do at times, wi thout external stimula-
tion of any sort or with inadequate external stimulation, become very
rapid, hallucinatory seconiary qualities mav be explained quite as "ob-
jectivoly" as can veridical secondary quali ti 93( of « op. ci t. ,pp. 55'3f )
.
Our first comment concerning this solution of the problem of
secondary qualities in general is little more than a reiteration of Love-
joy*3 charge that Holt fails to equate secondary qualities with serial
densities of hiprh frequency nerve impulses ( vide, supra pp. 17-18 ) . The
point is raised again at this juncture only because Lovejoy failed to
indicate that the units from whose fusion Holt attempts to derive the
secondary qualities are not oscillations ©f nerve im-pul 8e ,but some sort
'^L^ij^^V'l®-^ P^iral tive simple sensation , " 'Vhether the?^e units be con-
ceived after the fashion of Holt's "still small voice" (2L* op . , PP • 3;T) f
,
and 3P)1) or Spencer's Drimitive "ner^rous shock'' ( ide-". "Pp. 5^of ) . they are
sensed as (^uali ties , however elementary they may be, and not as neural
oscillations. When Holt has not equated these elements with vibratory
nhases of the nerve impulse, it is a bit hasty for him to equate complexes
of them with such phases v/hose density i8|too great for the time-sense to
perceive with formal correctness. That Holt was vaguely aware of the un-
t.enability of his position in this connection appears to be suggested by
C2fT??S
his statement that roughness "i_8 to introspection a quality, and iB_
at the same tine nothing else than the density of a succession of
of
conscious shocks, shich seem individually to be/^quite infra -modal
primitiveness" (Op.* ci_t.
,
pp. 551f ) . This statement would seem to be
an entirely frank assertion that the sensed quality of roughness is
the resultant in experience of certain neural processes, but is never-
theless quite distinguishable from those procfessea and in no sense to
be equated with them. Thus it turns out that Holt*s elaborate at-
tempt to ob.lectify the secondary qualities fails because he smuggles
into his diacuHsion a specifically psychic factor, a specific sensory
quale , luider the innocent-appearing guise of a conscious shock. Fail-
ing to objectify the secondary qualities in p:eneral,it is obvious
that Holt has similarly failed to give an objective account of hal-
lucinatory secondary qualities.
A second criticism of this portion of Holt's arQ-Liment is
that, in spite of his almost frantic assertions to the contrary, it in-
volves him, as his discussion of illusions of sense did, in epistemolo c;;-
ical dualism. If, as we are repeatedly told nit etwas^ andern vVorten,
the secondary quality is_ precisely the density of a series of hip:h
frequency nerve oscillations ( or. op_. cit_. ,pp. 34?', Z'48, 349, ?F1, 3r2), then
the locus of the secondary qualities is undeniably identical with the
locus of the said series of high frequency nerve oscillations^ viz
.
, in
the nervous system: somewhere. If such is not the case, then the asser-
tion of the identity of secondary qualities and. series of nerve oscil-
lations ceases to be intelligible and becomes a mere incoherent assem-
blaee of verbal symbols. If,?iO'vever, the locus of the secondary qualities
is som.ewhere in the nervous system, presumably in some or c^anizing area in
the cerebral region, it becomes quite futile for Holt vehemently to as-
severate that "consciousness i3,thyn,out there wherever the things
specifically responded to are"(02.. oit,. , p. 3F4 ) . Holt's identification
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of secondary qualities -vith the densities of series of high frequency
nerve oscillations locates the secondary qualities fairly and square-
ly in the central nervous system. The fact that the fluctuation periods
of the iTiDulse propa^yated within the nerve rminrht ',7ell be quantitatively
identical 'vith the oscillatory periodicity of the impinpinp: sti'Tiulus
does not at all prove that the neural impulse is numerically identical
with the stimulus, much less that the former is spatiall y 'coincident
with the external object from which the stimulus ori.einally proceeded.
All of this, however, Holt must prove in order to demonstrate that con-
sciousness of secondary qualities is "ou.t there," The case in re~ard
to hallucin:j,tory secondary qualities is peculiarly embarrassing: for
Holt by reason of the fact that he admits that they are often the re-
sult of intra-orp!:anic stimulation. If these hallucinatory qualities
are identical with the density of intra-or pianically-aroused high
frequency nerve oscillations, i t becomes a passing marvel how they
may be asserted to be "out there" in space, not, to be sure, "in 'real
space,' as we are accustomed to say ;but. . . . in a 3"naGe which is in all
respects comiparable to mirror s-nace" (op_. ci t
.
,
t)» 3^4) . would see^
that Holt, for all of his denial of havinp- done so ( •'Tide op« cit. ,P»5r?),
has lodged these hallucinatory qualities firmJy within the skull.
The full extent of the difficulty which is here Involved does
not appear until inquiry is made into Holt's later develo^-jment of the
nature of "specific response" of the organism in relation to behavior
in general. Be it noted that he asserts that hallucinatory colors,
shapes, and positions are thus responded to ( 2d_. cl t
.
, p . 554) . ATien
later he camo to state precisely what he meant by "srjeoific response",
he phrased the matter as follows : " ''fhen. . . . an organism with integrated
nervous system is stimulated, the organism by virtue of internal energy
released, proceeds to do something, of which the strict scientific de-
i
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Bcriotion can only he that it is a constant function of some feature
of the environment ; and this latter is by no means necessarily the
stimulus itself. The organisrr; responds specifically to BOTnethinp;
outside,
,
lust at the fallin,p: body rnoves specifically toward the earth's
center" (J. P. P. and S.^T. , Vol.XII, lOir.^p. 371). On the sane page fro-
which the foi^^going quotation is taken occurs the follov/ing very sig-
nificant definition: "Behavior is an^ process of rel ease whi ch is a
func t i on of fact or a external^ to the rnechanism rel eased^t italics Holt's),
It is hardlv necessary to point out the fact that, since Holt, evilly
nilly, locates hallucinatory objects ivithin the organise, it becomes
quite impo ^sibl e, on the principles of the systeni of thoueht under
consideration, for the organist^ to respend specifically, i . e. , to behave
with reference to such hallucinatory objects. The diffic^jlty may
perhaps be made clearer as follows f if consciousness is a cross section
of the universe selected by the nervous system, and if hallucinatory
objects have their locus within the nervous system, then it is quite
incomprehensible that such objects should ever find their way into
consciousness, for the nervous system is solely, capable of selecting
things which are "out there."
In the long discussion the criticism of /vhich we have just
brought to a close, Holt succeeds in offering?: an account of thi e p:enesis
of hallucinatory secondary quali ti es, - - vi z. , that the^'- are the result of
intra-or ganically-aroused high frequency nerve oscillations--, but fie
problem of their locus leads, as we have shown, to consequences disastrous
to hia general theory, for he can not logically crowd them into con-
sciousness. In all of these fifty-five pages, however, he has not at-
tacked the real problem of error as it confronts the realist. "Not
the illusory or hallucinatory imaee as such ,but 3uch an image
when it ass erts itaelf to b_s_ or when the reali st asserts it to be a
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real object, Ib the crux for realian" (od_. cl t
.
, p. S.'Sfi ), 30 Kolt sUites
the issue. In the closin<^ sixteen r)aF;es of the? essay, a brave pretense
is made of meeting this crucial issue squarely. After having thus
clearly state! the issue. Holt nrocee'ls blandly to point out that,
after all, there exists no such issue. Iraafre^ assert nothingCp . .T'P^7
;
the gist of realisn is, not that everything is real, but that everything
that is, is and is as it i s (p. r^B^'^ ) ; 'vhen we speak of error we do not
mean the "fairly una^ibiguous phenomenon" (p • 30 3) which currently passes
by that name, vi z« , an assertion based upon certain of our experiences
which assertion proves to be contrary to existential facts, but rather
we mean any kind of contradiction, whether logical or dynamic, -'-every
case of colli ai on, interference, acceleration and retardation, 3:* owth and
decay
,
equilibrium, et caetera, et ca etera, is an instance (p. 3p4 ;" nature
is a seething chaos of contradiction" (The Concept of Consciousness , p,
'376). Now, since we always experience the object out there and since
everything- that is, is and is as it is, we are never in error with re-
p:ard to what any given object of consciousness is: wo experience error
only when objects which stand in some sort of contradiction to one
another occupy the selected cross section of the universe which chances
to be our consciousness for the moment. Thus, in atte^'fpt ine- to make a
place for error in his realistic world, Kolt has flatly denied t>B, t
error, in what we must insist is the only significant sense of the
term, the sense, moreover, in v^hich his fellow realists employ the ter'^,
exists. H9 has ,then, proceeded to convert the universe into a cluttered
chaos of counterfeit Errors, every one of which is just slS good as golden
truth because utterly veridical concerning its object. In this con-
nection the full text of the article cited from 'TcGilvary (Zlde. supra
.
p. 104) is relevant. f^cGilvary reduces the conception ad absurdum. in
his article. RoR-era criticises it acutely in Essays in Critical Realism,
pp. 143-147.
Vc
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By far the nost destructive cri tici en, however, whlc'n has
been directed against Holt's theory of error has cone fl" orr his o-m
hand. This criticis'^ -vas dropr>ed casually in an article hy Holt on
"Professor Henderson's 'Fitness' and the Locus of Concepts" ( J. P. P. and
3.1.1. , Vol. XVII, I'^'-BO, pp. 36F)-381). Prefacing his discussion with the
remark that there is for any concept entertained by the nind a definite
locus or rane-e of applicabili ty,w i thin which the concept may be a use-
ful instrument of thought, but outside of which the concept becomes mis-
leading or meaniiigless, Hoi t proceeds to remark:" In <^eneral the miscar-
riage of truth is perhaps not so frequently error, in thi e f am.i l iar sens e
of an assertion vvhi ch is si P-n i f
l
eant but untrue ( sic' ) , as i t i s verbiage.
This is the most insidious hazard of thought" (italics Tine). Obviously,
Holt here employs the term error in the sense in which he so coolly
cashiered it in his essay on error. 'forse yet, having found that
Professor Henderson assigns to teleology a locus in objective physical
nature, Holt remarks, "Now I trust that it is not an early book of mine
(six years earlier than the date of the criticism, we might add*') called
The Concept of Consci ousness that has so grievously m.isled Professor
Henderson. Probably not, for if he had read that book he would have
seen at once what an absurd hocus-pocus I there con.iured up be cause I_
did not at that t im.e know the true locus of the ' timele ss and c han^e -
loss ' entities " ( loc. cit_. , p. 377 ) , The italics are mine. After re-
ferring to the muddle which he made in the chapter on "The Neutral
Mosaic" in "The Concept of Consciousness" , Hoi t proceeds: "In Professor
Henderson's own words, the laws of nature 'are exclusively rational : the
y
are the product of the human re-ason,and are not conceived by science to
have objective exist ence in nature. This is al so cl earl y true of the
relation between the properties of the elements and the course of evolu-
tion' (italics Holt's). If these things have no objective existence in
cI
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nature, then also teleology has no objective existence in nature. Their
locus i
s
in the human mind, and there alon e lo they operate as c au ses .
iDUCh abstract^ entiti es a'^d rel ati ons can rriake Professor Henderson 'vri te
The Fi tness of the Environnien t (or me, a similarl y mist aken book** ( loc » c 1
1
«
,
pp.277f. Italics rnine). This is indeed an astonishinj? confession.' The
"timeless and changeless" neutral enti ti es, -.vhich, we were assured, were
so utterly objective and which constituted the very stuff of the uni-
verse, cross sections of which were conscious ness, turn out after all to
have no objective locus whatsoever. But observe our quandary.' The
locus of the^e entities is not in objective nature, but rather in tha
human mind, which, have we not been reneatedly assured on the very best
of authori tyjj i s nothing but a cross section of wholly objective universal
nature. The unshot of our discussion is too patent to be dwelt urion
at length:The Concept of Consciousness is, by Holt's own confession, an
absurd hocus-pocus ; Hoi t has flatly repudiated his stoutly rralntained
conception of consciousness in admitting that there are certain entities
whose locus is exclusively within consciousness. The result of these
considerations for Holt's theory of error is no less than stagsretring*
He can no longer assert thnit the nervous system selects from the total
objective universe a cross section of objects, real or unreal, which
cross section is_ consciousness. He must differentiate between the status
of the objects which have their locus exclusively in consciousness and
those which also have their locus in objective nature. 'Vhen he has done
this, it will be quite unnecessary for anyone else further to criticise
the theory of error which he set forth in "The New Realism" and "The
Concept of Consciousness," As we turn from, the consideration of Holt's
work to take up the next phase of our investi c-ation, we can not repress
an expression of mild amusement that one so testy and intolerant and
"oock-Dure" as Holt should have to confess that he had made a wordy mess
of things.
rf
132«
In our examination of Holt's ;vork8 .ve found f^at that
author devoted by far the greater Dart of his discussion of il-
lusory experience to an attempt to show how such experience mi^t
arise in a realistic ^orld and to indicate the status of such an
apparent anomaly in such a world. The precise point of Holt's in-
quiry might have been better suggested had he entitled his essay in
"The New Realism" "The Place of Illusory Experience in a Pan-Ob .jecti v-
iatic Vorld." He is bent upon the obliteration of the "subjective."
It is entirely possible in a world never so realistic for error and
illusion of all sorts to have their locus in the subjective order.
Pitkin shares Holt's determination to obliterate this latter order
and to that end endeavors to 'vork out a thoroughly objective account
of erroneous experience. This endeavor on Pitkin's part is the culmin-
ating phase of a sustained and systematic attempt to construe exper-
ience as a whole in objective terras.
As early as 1905, Pitkin broaches the general problem in an
article entitled "The Relation Between the Act and the Object of Be-
lief" (J. P. P. and i3.^^,Vol.III, 190 5,pp.r.r!F>-nil). The point of the
article is that the object of belief is quite independent of the act
of believing. Pitkin expresses the matter thus: "The obvious fact
that 1 can believe now, an hour from no w, to-morrow, and ten years hence,
that I went downtown yesterday is as good proof as one could wish for
the lack of essential interdependence between believing and believed
events. T'^e time of going dO'vn-tO'W] is not a determinant of the time
of believing:nei ther is the converse true. And the same can be said
of every other possible quality of the two factors" floe, ci
t
.
,
p. bob )
.
Erroneous beliefs resul t, then, not from any error in the belief activity
as such, but from, error in internretinp; the object of belief, which object
transcends the act of believing in the sense that it is independent of
the latter. The transcendence of the object, in the sense indicated, is
(L
BS3
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In no wise affected by classifying the object as " sub Jective" , for that
it is still independent of the belief-activity can be shovn "in cases
of chronic hallucination, where the patients finally corae to disbelieve
in the actually given character of the objects" (lo_c. cit,. ,r). f^lO ) . "Vere
the ob jects, vhich are assumed to recur identically to patients of this
sort, essentially dependent upon and constituted by the beli ef-ac tivi t.y,
they would vanish with the ceasation of belief in them. Pitkin's con-
clusion is that it is entirely possible to "a.eree with both prapmatist
and epi stemological transcendental ist without straddlinpr the fence*' ( loc«
c i
t
» , p » 5 in ) . It should be noted carefully , however, that Pitkin here
uses the terra transcendentali st in the narrowly United sense which we
have stated ;it is not at all his intention to subscribe to the doctrine
that objects of belief have a transcendent reference to certain other
entities of a different order, which entities they somehow "copy" or
symbolize. Pitkin proceeds: "We may admit that nitrous oxide can make
us hopelessly gullible, believing everything that pops into our mind
or even having a feeling of certainty without quite knowing what we
are certain about; and we must also errant that perfectly definite ob-
jects of thoue:ht, i_. e. , Ob jects beinfr thought, may induce the beli ef-activ-
ity and make it refer to themselves in a certain way. In each oa.se we
are granting that certain conditions are necessary to induce the cred-
ulous attitude, and in neither case are we admitting that the objects
believed in depend for their (real or merely believed) existence and
nature upon the conscious activity of beli eving"
(
loc
. ci t.
,
pd. , HjOf \
Pitkin continues the same line of thought in a discussion of
the nature of universal s which appeared in the same volume of the same
journal from which the foregoing citations are made, pages 600-608. Con-
crete experience, to put the matter briefly, is not the result attained
by detailed scientific analysis of the process whereby a belief con-
cerning an object comes to be entertained; i t is, rather, "nothing save the
f
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intended as intended " ( loc » cit^. , p. 60 1 ) . To be sure " -.ve have full
right to inquire into thia intendinp^ process, provided ve do not
perpetrate the vast blunder of supposing that our analysis of it some-
how changes the nature of what is actually intended. "/hat is changed
as a result of our new studies is solely the value of the intended
things; for knowledge of the lirritations of how they became intended en-
lightens us as to their use in the next case. For instance, we may have
really meant something which does not exist in the way we held it to,
and a thorough insifr'nt into the nature of thinking processes may warn
us away from intending non-ozistent things"
(
loc. ci t
.
,
p. ^0 1 ) . A few
pages further on in the same article, ve are told explicitly vhat is
meant by the concept 'thing.* Thus, "a careful study of what we really
mean by a 'thing' reveals, on the one hand, a 'center of function
'
(some-
what as Lord Kelvin described the molecule) ; and as a result of such an
internretation we find that what we call individual objects in space
are primarily the true 'abstract universals, ' being the 'effects' of
countless simpler objects Arhich a misleading terminology has labeled
'mere sensations,' 'feelings' and the like" ( loc . ci t . ,pp» ^^'O^f )
.
The particular phase of Pitkin's thought now under consider-
ation comes to its culmination in t.vo articles which appeared in the
Philosophical Review for 1906. In the first of the^e articles, the
concept of 'self-transcendency' is examined in detail. The discussion
was called forth by the publication of Colvin's view that self-transcend-
ency is the ascription of extram.ental reality to a content, —-that it in-
volves a transm.ental intention or reference. Pitkin is unable to draw
any fundamental distinction bet.veen 'content' and 'object ' (Phil . .Rev.
,
Vol. XV, 1906, p. 41 ). A relative distinction may with propriety be '^ade
between the t.vo, "' content ' being the psychological term for the very
same thing which in common parlance is the sensational phase of an
^object'" (lo£.._ciL.,p..il). That no fundamental distinction between
i
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oontent ani object nay be maintained, ,7'ierebv the for'^er mi rht be con-
traated .vi th the latter ae 'merely mental ',13 evident from the fact
that "the s;ajne object can coma and .-zo in the conscioua world without
gaining or losing in meaning or function thereby'' : vhereas if every
new appearance or disappearance of the meaningful object were attended
by Bome unifora diacoverable variation in its meaning, ther e might con-
ceivably be ground for doubting its more than merely mental character.
Pitkin now firids himself facing the problem of construing the self-
transcendency involved in temporal and spatial ej ection, logical refer-
ence, representative experi ences, etc . His solution of the problem of
temporal ejection is typical and will serve to illustrate the manner
in which he deals with the difficulty in each of the specified phases.
He readily admits that past things are not truly given in present ex-
perience,ir by past things we mean not m.erely the objective things
^ the
themselves, but ^precine way, medium, or process whereby they were ori,'?-
inally mediated. In any given instance of recall of a past object,
part of the given content is the group meaning of all the various past
contents which have contributed to make up the object recalled. Such
group meanings or group quali ti es, inhering as they do in the present
content , render it possible to say that "when I now 'recall' Paris....
I really 'have it in mind,' grasp its meaning, qui te as awaredly and
as thorou.ghly as if I were seeing it immediately" ( lo£. cit. , p. 43 )
.
Reference to past things is not, then, a pointing to somethlncr which
transcends the immediately given content of co nsciousness; i t is rather
a direct reference to a peculiarly qualified given thing. Similarly
in the other types of transcendence referred to, the apparently tran-
scendent thing referred to is present in the given content bv virtue
of the 'group quality' resident in that content.
The final article which requires comment at this juncture bore
the caption, "The Intention and Reference of Noetic Psyc hoses. " It ap-

13fi.
Tjeared in the Philosophical Review, Vol .XV, 1906, 130. A rathe^
extenied quotation from theae pages -vill preoaro U3 to summarize
Pitkin's thought up to this point. 'Ve read:*'Ther9 is the object, the
thing by virtue of being attended to and meant; and there is the object>
the thing experi enced as other than a mere phase in psychosis. Ob-
jectivity in the former sense is the primary logic species, while ob-
jectivity in the second one is the other-than-osychic kind. On the
one hand,ve have simply a stabl 9, identical reference-ob ject, vhich,
when studied in the light of its context, behavior, and implications,
may prove to be either psychical or physical as the case may be. I
am only urging the real difference bet'veen ^object of thought, or refer-
ence' and 'thing referred to as objective.' 'Vill, effort, attention, il-
lusion, sweetness, and 30 on are all objects in t'lis sense but not there -
by extraraental. On the other hand, atoms, nerve-cell s, and ether vibra-
tions are objects by contrast 'ivith psychic states" (loc_. ci t .
,
p"b. 51?f )
.
Three remarks are in order by way of comment upon the fore-
going reviev of Pitkin's earlier work. In the first place, we find
thus early in our author's writings expressions of the characteristic
doctrine of the New Realists to the effect that physical objects are
directly anprehended in consciousness. The reference to "objects being
thought" , to the mislaadine terminoloffy which has labeled obiects as
"mere sensations, feelings, and the like", to 'content' as beins: the
"psychological term for the very same thing which in common narlance
is the sensational phase of an ' ob jeot these and,in particular , the
assertion that no fundamental distinction can be made between content
and object are unmistakably clear confessions of faith in the immediacy
of our knov/ledge of physical objects. In the second place, Pitkin is
obliged, in order to carry out his ob jectification of veridical exoer-
ionce,to extend the category of the objective so as to include two very
c
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easily diatinguiahable claasea of 'ob jecta
'
, vi z. , the naychical and
phyaical, vhich, thou.P-h given directly in exneriance just aa a merest
payciiloal content i a, neverthel eaa differ fundamentally from the latter.
Obviously the reduction to the ain^le oate^rory of objectivity of two
claaaea of content which are thua confeaaedly separated toto caelo
from each other is a triumph of doubtful value. In effect, Pi tltin re-
taina the category of the sub jective,but duba it paychically objective.
In the third place, Pitkin givea thua early evidence of concern over
the problem of error. He frankly admits that ve are liable to mean
non-existent things, but pointa out that our error ia not a defect in
the belief-activi ty aa 3uch;it ia rather a mi ainterDretation of the in-
tended object. He offers no auggestion aa to ho:v thia mi ainternre tation
oocura and auggesta no criteria
-Arhereby ve may discover the fact when ve
are being duDed by auch miainternretation. Hi a vhole treatnient of the
problem of erroneoua experience ia here exoeedin.ely hazy and confused.
If he really means that content and object are ultimately quite indis-
tinguishable, if the physical object is directly given in experi ence, if
even past objecta are immediately present in experience by virtue of
group qualitiea in preaent content, it ia very difficult to understand
how a meant or intended physical object could possibly be m.iainterpreted.
It vould seem, therefore, that in order to make a place for erroneoua ex-
perience Pitkin liere quite explicitly invokea the cashiered cate<?ory of
the aubjective, there being no obvious justification for his inclosing
the term in quotation marks. He unhesi tatinp-ly admits the presence in
conaciouanesa of content vhich 'meana* or 'intends' a non-existent ob-
ject. If content and object are in all cases ultimately indi stingui ah-
ablsjit would seem necessary to discover the content to be non-existent
in order to learn that the same was true of the oblect. '7e must pro-
nounce unsuccessful Pitkin's early attempt to construe experience in
purely objective terms.
c
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Pitkin '3 Uiought with reference to our oroblem enters unon
a new phase in his ecsay entitled ^ -.Vorld-Pictures" , which appeared in
the James Volume, 1008 . In this hi^Jily inp:enious and interesting es-
say, Pitkin assumes the position that our exDerienoes are '*a3r>9cts or
Dhases of real ob jeots" (oo. ci t .
,
d» 224)* Trees and stars actually
get into our minds, not, to be sure as ''a rat crawls into a hole", but
nevertheless in a oerfectly intelligible sense. 'Ve may define a thin
as what it does, in which case it must be located wherever it acts.
This does not, of course, mean that its nature and nowers are identical
at every point within its ' SDhere of influence,' As a concrete il-
lustration of what he means, Pitkin writes Thus, sneaking exactly, ve
may say that the sun itself gets into a> nsciousne ss, provided we do
not identify the whole star with the mass of sas at the centre of our
planet's orbit. The sun extends far beyond its outermost frinp-e of
quivering molecules, out into the most distant and unimagined abysses
of the universe, wherever its ether disturbances reach. Only a series
of practical abstractions has led men to narrow its bournes to the
central fire" ( op. ci t . , p. '12^ ) It is not to be supDOsed that the
whole nature or 'essence' of the sun is present in every act of the
latter: hence, when the sun is in somebody's mind it is not there in
the same sense in vhich it is in the heavens. An as-oect or phase, vi
z
the effect which" it produces in the consciousness associated with an
organism, of it is, however, really in the mind. Reals thus get into
consciousness, but this is only one aspect of the knowled.c-e process.
An equally important aspect is that the reals which thus e-et into
consciousness are there taken to be world-pictures which represent
part of the nature of reality. There is here no confusion of con-
tradictory theories, for, looking at knowledge from the standpoint of
the things that succeed in forcing themselves into consciouai ess we
may properly say that the objects have made themselves known, whereas,
C
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J looking at knowleige from the standpoint of all of the other factors
involved in Droducing and interoreting the simple exoeriencea vhich
have come to be kno'Am as aspects of real objects, we may properly say
that 'disDOsitions 'purposes *, and 'association* interpret the characters
that flo'v into consciousness and make them mean asneots of particular
reals(cf. on. oit *
.
p» '^'^8 ) . We are admonished, if this latter is a mystery,
to "think it over at leisure" for the reason that "fast debate solves no
puzzles but only arouses thought" ( 22.* ci_t_. , r» . ? T> ) . 7e could vish that
the 'sorceror' had further enlightened us at this point, for, as -ve shall
discover later, it is precisely in this connection, ^hen attempting; to ac-
count for the variant internretations of the content of consciousness,
that Pitkin fails most di3ro.ally to work out a tenable theory. It misht
almost be said that the only word he has to offer concerning this problem
9 is an exhortation to his reader, if the matter prove mysterious, to think
it over at leisure. The most si enifleant innovation which Pitkin intro-
duces into his thought in this second phase is the altered conception of
the nature of physical objects as content of consciousness. In his earlier
writin.ois the object as content of consciousness was equated with the ob-
ject as independently existent in the physical , other-than-psychical order.
The object in consciousness now becomes, not the identical physical ob-
ject as it exists independently of consciousness, but a mere Dhase of
the physical object's activity reflected in some sort of effect produced
within a sentient organism. It is at once apparent that this doctrine
does serious damage to the notion that consciousness is in no sense con-
stitutive of its objects. If the object as known is merely the effect
within consciousness of the action of some independent entity, there ap-
' pears no sufficient reason for asserting that the conditions of the ap-
pearance of the object in consciousness are in no wise determinative of
the character which it there exhibits. Similarly, there appears no suf-
€€
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ficiant reason for any assertions concerning the total nature of the
independent object of which the object in consciousness is the sensa-
tional phase. The difficulty i3 further comr^lioated by the fact that
it is not possible to identify all content of consciousness 'vhich pur-
ports to be such as the sensational phase of independently existent
physical objects. Pitkin blandly dismisses this vhole 3tag!?ering
oroblem of hallucinatory experience by saying we need not trouble
to decide just noiv" ivhether or not all influencoS which are registered
in consciousness e^ianate from certain spatial centers. It would seem
to be clear that, on Pitkin *s princinles as here set forth, the hallucina
tory object is as good a world-r>ioture as any most veridical perception
inasmuch as the one quite as much as the other is the effect of some
antecedent cause and, consequently, an aspect or phase of that cause.
Pitkin continues the development of the line of thought
under consideration in a series of four articles under the general
caption "Some Neglected Paradoxes of Visual Space'*, which appeared in
the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and ocientific Methods for 1909
and 1910, pages 60 l-o03, 645-655 and 93-100, ?04-215 in the respective
volumes indicated. Pitkin defends two principal theses in these
pages, viz. ,( 1 ) the space which we see is real space itself, and {2)
there is no need to invoke a noumenal self or an a priori synthesis
or an associative mechanism of local si ens to account for our ex-
perience of space and positional relations in space. Not only does
the realist maintain that he com.es to know the real spatial world
order through direct experience: in the same manner he comes to know
the real things in the said world order. He does not assert that the
order as known or as immediately presented is in any strict sense a
copy or duplicate of the order as existing independently of his private
perceptions and thoughts { loc_. cit. , Vol . VI , p. ^?=^4) :he rather supports a
sort of representative realism, very much after the fashion of the real-
€f
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ism exoounied in " 'Vorld-Pictures." This representational theory is,
be it carefully noted, a thoroughly pur<red variety of reprasentation-
ism,for "it 'vill regard adjacent or intersecting extensions seen as
'representing' objective extensions only in the manner that the line
in which two nlanes intersect or the field in which two forces cross
'represent ' these planes or forces. As the line i_s both Dlane3,and
yet is but the smallest part or feature of each, so an empirical ad-
jacency or intersection is^ the adjacent or intersecting things, though
only a minute phase of them"
(
loc . pit
. ,
p. 654) . It is Pitkin's con-
viction that such an interpretation may be so consistently developed
as to preserve a genuine real! sm, providing for the measure of epists-
mological dualism which the natural sciences demand and at the same
time repudiating the "pious brand" yl oc . cit . , pp» ff54f ) . Here, a.eain, we
remark by way of criticism that Pitkin offers no suggestion as to the
genesis and locus of hallucinatory experience in his realistic world,
that illusory experiences are here made genuine phases of independently
existent things, and that, as before, there is no basis provided for any
assertions concerning the character or even the existence of any things
except the minute phases immediately given.
Pitkin makes use of essentially the same sort of conceptions
as the foregoing in his essay in "The New Realism" when he addresses
himself seriously to the problem of erroneous experience. Only the
last twenty-four pages of that essay immediately concern us in the
present connection, for it is in this section of the work that Pitkin
sets forth his theory of consciousness and his account of the problem
of truth and error. The first sixty-six pages of Pitkin's contribution
to the volume, beinff devoted to an attack from the biological point of
view upon sub jectivism, are not precisely eermane to our present purpose.
The distinctly new element in the relevant portion of the essay is the
m
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interpretation of the knowleige situation after the analogy of a geometric
projection system. Lovejoy'3 criticism of this attempt of Pitkin's
to construe consciousness and account for error ( vid[e £upra, Dp. >51-34
)
is so decisive and exhaustive that it leaves little to be said. '^Ve
shal 1, ho 'vever, adduce certain considerations in further confirmation of
some of his strictures and suggest a few supnl ementary criticisms. In
the first place, I^ove joy is unquestionably correct in assertine th^it
Pitkin* 3 account of consciousness is epi stemological dualism some-
what circumlocutorily expressed." It is altoj^ether probable that
Pitkin was quite aware of the dualistic imnlications of "'"'is theory.
We have found that within three years prior to the aprtearance of "The
New Realism" he expressly committed himself to a not-pious brand of
epi stemologioal dualism, --a dualism which was in princinle identical
with that exposed by Love joy and identical, also, with that implied in
the earlier essay entitled "World-Pictures," Pitkin was undoubtedly
aware of the dualism of his position when he wrote, —as was Montague —
,
but he was convinced that the type of dualism, for which he stood sDonsor
was compatible with the tyoe of epi stemoloprical monism to which the six
realists jointly subscribed. 3y defining a 'thing' in relativistic
terms and characterizing the content of consciousness as a Dhase or
aspect of such a thing, he sought to strike a balance between the claims
of both extreme epi stemological monism and extreme epi stemological dual-
ism. In the terras of the essay under discussion, consciousne^is is a
projection field, the content of consciousness is a pro ject-compl ex, while
the independently existent objective environment is the projected complex
( cf , The New Realism, p. 453). The project-complex is a projective phase
of the projected complex, but onl
y
a phase of it. The projected comolex
does not, in its entirety, make its way into the projection field of con-
sciousness "as a rat crawls into a hole." It would seem, therefore, that
Pitkin miffht pronerly charge Love joy with having misinterpreted him in
m
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auggestinc- that his doctrine, while implicitly duali stic, 1 s ostensibly
moni Stic , epi ateraologically considered. Such is not, hoivever, th e case.
Pitkin is on record as havins; approved the statement that "the content
of knowl edge, that A^hich lies in or before the mind when knowledge takes
place, is numerically identical with the thing knov/n** (op. cit . ,p. 34).
Observe that we are not here told that the content of knowledge is a
'phase' or an 'aspect* or a 'picture' or an 'effect' of the thing known.
It is numerically identical wi th the thing known. There is here no
slightest trace of dualism. Here the object gets into the mind pre-
cisely as a "rat crawls into a hole." Again, on page 47S of th e same
volume in which Pitkin published his essay and subscribed to a state-
ment flatly contradictory to the interpretation of consciousness advanced
in that essay, Pitkin writes, "As the term may enter into or n:o out of a
particular relation, wi thout thereby being changed essentially or destroyed
so too can an object of knowledge exist prior to and after its entrance
into or removal from the knowledare relation." The object as ?aere con-
ceived is clearly not one of the constituent factors in the projected
complex, for these factors never enter bodily the consciousness relation,
—
their presence there being mediated by projective indi scernibles. In this
passage, once more, Pitkin is talking the language of a uinqualified episte-
mological monism. Love joy is perfectly justified, therefore, in c?iarpi;ing
Pitkin with having repudiated his epi stemological monism in his attempt
to construe consciousness after the analogy of projective ereometry . It
is significant that this repudiation of epistemoloccical monis'" is oc-
casioned by our author's desire to find some means of accounting for
erroneous experience.
One serious defect in Pitkin's analogy has escaped the notice of
his critics. .Ye refer to the fact that the analogy is far from complete.
Ne read " the three factors of the biological situation correspond to the
tjicoe. factors of the projection system. The reagent is the pro j-.c tori al
f
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j?eferen t, the environment la the projected cottidI ex, ani the copnltive
field is the projeotion fi el ( ot2_. oi t« , d« 4.'^'3 ) . '/hat we have here by
no raeana does Justice to the Icno.vledge aituafon. 7e have objects, an
organism whioh is by those objects stimulated to react, and, as a result
of the reaction of the stimulated organism, content of consciousness vhich
is a projection in the field of consciousness of the independent objects.
We have no provision made in the analogy for the process of interpretative
judgment which determines which one of the infinite number of possible
objects in the projected complex is represented by a eiven factor in
the project complex. The omission of the vastly important processes in-
volved in judgment and belief , renders Pitkin's analogy ^vholly inadequate
to cover the case of knowledge in any form. A second serious defect in
the analogy is that it makes no provision for any but peripherally aroused
experiences. Pitkin should not have offered this account of the nature
of consciousness if he did not intend t!iat it should be taken seriously
as an adequate and exhaustive representation oT the nature of e kno v-
lodgo situation. Manife3tly,ho vever, the analogy as presented in the
ipsissima verba of its author takes it for granted that every factor in
the projection field of consciousness is a projection of some factor in
the projected complex, vhich is the existent physical environment, —exter-
nal to the reagent organism. 'That, ve may inquire, -vould be done on these
principles ^ith a centrally aroused hallucinatory object of oo nsciousness?
In the first place, Pitkin has provided no way for it to find its way into
consciousness and, in the second place, he has no suggestion as to how it
might be identified as hallucinatory once i t, ner impossibile , should worn
its way into a conscious project-complex. The problem of error has led
to disastrous results in Pitkin's case: it has obliged him to modify his
epi steraolgical monism beyond reco cmi tion: i t has prompted him to put forth
a hopelessly inadequate theory of consciousness: i t has finally left him
with no means at his disposal for determining the objective reference
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of any content of conaciouanesa, for hia pro ject-coiriDlexea are admltterl-
ly pi'O.iec tively indiscernible. In making thia fatal adrniasion he haa
rSven his whole realistic oaae away in tiiat he haa made it quite ira-
posaible to detect error as auch and equally inipoaaible to recocrnize
aspects of real objects when auch chance to be given within the projec-
tion field of conaciousneaa. Ke haa aucceeded as well aa ever sub-
jectiviat did in walling himself within the ir^pervioua confinea of
the immediately Kiven.
The contribution of Marvin to the discussion of our problem
need not detain ua long, --and for t'vo reasons. In the first place, thia
wri tep/s^vanc ed any ingenious original theory to account for the oc-
currence of error as have Montague, Hoi t, and ^itkin. His treatment of
the matter has been purely incidental, being scattered throu^ihout the
various articles and books which have come from his pen durinfr the
last twenty years. In the second place, in hia independent writings
Marvin does not commit himaelf to the type of epis temolo^ical moniam
which generates the exceedingly acute error-problem. T2iere has been
singular consistency touching the matter of point of view as to this
Tjroblem in all of Marvin's works from his Introduction to Systematic
Philosophy" (l^^OZO to hia "First Book in Metaphysice" ( 19S0 ). To be
sure, Marvin did set the seal of his nhilosophic approval upon the
extreme expression of SDistemoloFical monism which apnears in the
opening essay in "The New Realism*" Tliat expression could hardly
have been made more explicit or more uncompromising. 'Then we read
that a philosopher has agreed to such a statem.ent as the f ollowinp::
"Things when conaciouoness is had of them become themselves contents-
of consciousne ss ; and the same things thus figure both in the so-called
(^D.cit
external world and in fc^ie manifold which introspection reveals^, we may
bw pardoned if we uPiderstand him. to have intended to subscribe to the
doctrine that things as they exist independently of consciousness are
f
I4r>.
identical qualitatively with thinp;s as given in consciousness; we
surely could not ask for a more unqualified assertion that content
of consciouGness and the v sry external object are nur.erically identical,
it should hs added in this connection that ''arvin ha,s in one other in-
stance expressed himself in language vhich is, to say the least, onen to
a sirailar interpretation. 'Ve refer to hiy ninth die lum in his contribu-
tion to the renowned platform. The passage in question follows The
proposi tion, 'Thi a or that object is known,' does not imply that such
object is conditioned by the knowing. In other words, it does not
force us to infer that such object is spiritual, that it exists only
as the experiential content of sorr^e mind, or that i_t may not bo ultimate-
ly real ^'ust a.3 known ** (op» cit.,D.474. Italics ^ir.e) » Such a qualified
that objects
assertion of the bare possibili ty
^^
may conceivably be given in conscious-
ness precisely as they are in themselves independently of consciousness
is a very different doctrine from the one just quoted from the intro-
ductory essay of the volume cited. It i s, hov/ever, the oriinion of the
present writer that the qualified statement represents the most extreme
form in which Marvin, uninfluenced by other m.embers of the group of joint
authors with whom he collaborated in writing the co5perative volume, would
express the doctrine of epistemological monism. Obviously, he is here far
iia
from asserting that the ob jecty^known is_ numerically identical with the
object as it might exiat independently of being known. Ke does not lay-
down the doctrine of epi stem.ological monism as a dogmaTne rather suggests
it as a possible hypothesi s, and this without indicating- that it mi eht be
even such 'Vith reference to all_ objects. It i3 highly probable that when
wlarvin subscribed to the doctrine in its rigorously universal form, he did
30 with m.ajor mental reservations in the form of qualifying interpreta-
tions of certain of the terras employed. If such is not the case, he was
guilty, .'hen giving his assent to the opinions expressed in the intro-
ductory essay in question, of flatly repudiating his oft-roi t erated crin-
f
147.
ciples. The justificatior. of this assertion will appear as 've proceed.
"s no,v present a aumnary statement of the principles whereby
Marvin construes the knowledge situation. First a^ong these principles
is the doctrine that reality is directly experienced,.
—
is iTmn ed i a t el
y
present in consciou^mess. Stated in this unqualified fashion, the position
adopted appears to be precisely that of the extrene episte'Tiolopdcal T;On-
iom .vhich 've have criticised at length, but which we declined iy- the
paragraph immediately preceding the presentjone to impute to Marvin. Our
reason for declining so to do lies in the fact that 'Marvin is exceedint--
ly careful to guard himself against the charge of having asserted that
the object as perceived or as conceived is identical with the independent
object. It is Hhe given* or 'the factual', the crude ra-.v material of
sensation, devoid of all elements of interpretation and innocent of any
existential assertion, which constitutes the real as immediately given
in consciousness. This is naked reality ;behind it there lies no tran-
scendent world. To assert the existence of such a world is to talk non-
sense'. The existential world is this factual sum-total plus the entire
system of propositions necessary to explain the concrete factual detail
of the given. The realn of truth, or reality, is even more inclusive; it
embraces the existential world plus the subsistential order of what
'Montague A'ould designate as 'merely valid* judgments. This entire realm
is, moreover, theoretically , open to inspection; it wears no mask effectually
and forever concealing its true features from the curious view of man.
Man makes multitudes of errors, to be sure, but these errors are all mis-
takes in interpretation of the given; they are theoretical explanations
of the factual which err by reason of being inadequate to account for
the facts which they "=.re intended to explain. The sole valid ultimate
test of triese interpretative explanations is reference to the factual,
to the given, — the term.s being used interchangeably.
'.Tarvin's interpretation of the factual requires further com-
t
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raent. "That the universe is the object oT our krxO vied c-e, that it i3,
in Other word a, the material given us to interpret, and that thie task
of our knowledp;e in interpretation, thi s is the belief of our tirnes"
(An Introduction to oy3t3r?atic Philosop>iy,p. 356), thus the conception
is formulated in general terms. More specificaliy, we are told, "The
senses, as such, do not and cannot deceive. The senses can inform us
as they will, their ^vhole infor^iation and their contents are one and
the same" (op. oi I.
,
p. S.^"^) . Again, "If 've could get back to the early
state of infancy, where we believe things are seen but in no way
recogni zed, then we should be in a position to say (provided you re-
gard sensations as cognitions) we have a cognition of the object, but
a cognition that cannot be called true or false, and so must p-ive us
fact with no interpretation of the fact" (on. cit_.
,
p. 381) . Yet again
,
"The facts are .vhat our eyes tell us, if we but cease accepting the
interpretation given in our perception as either true or false. If
we say the object we now see, no matter whether it be the book our per-
ception tells us it is or not, is a fact; this illustrates our meaning....
The object is a fact, I do not care whether I be dreaming, normally see-
ing or having an hallucination, there the object is. No matter what it
is, it is a fact directly given" ( op, ci t. , p. 36^) « And finally, "The Given
is obtained, in short, by robbing the interpreted fact of .all interpreta-
tion and so leaving us the fact and not'^ing more. The Given is the
reality, the absolute, in short, the object robbed of every trace of in-
terpretation, relativi ty, or aught else in the form of knowledge'* (op. ci
t
.
,
p. 373, footnote ) . The foregoing citations make perfectly clear the sense
in which Marvin may be properly described as an epi stem.ological monist.
They likewise m.ake it clear that "arvin's position is not open to the
objections which the problem of error generates for that form of episte-
mological monism which asserts that content of knowledge, without any
qualification, ia numerically identical with the external object known.

14'^
.
The nature and ganosis of error in thlK scheme we have al-
ready indicated. IVhat immediately follows is by way of illustration
and elaboration of the prior summary account. "A truth,** we are told,
I
"is a correct interpretation of some fact. '-/hat clains to be a truth,
but is not, wo call false, or erroneous. ".T-iat is held to be a fact, but
is not, we say, does not or did not exist" (op. ci t . , p . 550 ) . In develop-
ing the conception here formulated, '/Tarvin cites numerous instances of
illusions, hallucinati ons, dreams, and erroneous memories, concluding that
all of our knowledp-e ia knowledge about facts, that it can be proved
true only be an appeal to facts, and that "deception is always the work
of jud^?ment,or what can be transformed into a .judgment" (oo. ci t. ,pp. 3r^Ff ).
Inasmuch as there is an act of judpinent involved in every perception, per-
ceptions may be either true or false. It is precisely this doctrine
which Marvin would have to repudiate flatly in order to accept the form
of epi steraological monism to which he subscribed in the introductory
essay in "The New Healisra" and which he expressed in an exceedingly
tentative manner in the ninth dictum of his section of the first plat-
form (vicie supra, pp. 14 5f) . He writes:"Perceptions, being always to som^e
extent a recoprA tion, or an interpretation, are to be rep-arded as true or
then
false. '.Ve raust/^not confuse the object with our perception of it. Our
peroeption can be false, and looked at from this point of view is not a
fact" (An Introduction to Systematic Philosophy, pp. S^^^Of) . SimilaT'ly, in
"A First Book in Metaphysics," he tells us that the world of co^^mon
sense, far from, being a transcript of what is immediately driven, is "a
most elaborate and wonderful world hypo thesis" (op. cit
. ,
p.4'^) « " The
world of com.mon 3ense_, "so runs the s tatement, " i_s_ man ' s first great
world hypoth esis; i t is no_t a ^rj.^ o£ perceived fac t, rather it is a__
THaORY,n£ matter how well established a theory** ( op. c i t
.
,
p . 47 ) , It
•
—————
—
"
should be observed that in the work from which this citation is taken
perceived fact' is used as the equivalent of 'fact* or 'the given' as

these terras are employed in the earlier -vork before quoted. Marvin's
position has not altered; he has merely made a slight change in his use
of terminology.
It is at once apparent that there is abundant room for error
in Marvin's realistic world. The only assured possession -vhich a real-
ist of this persuasion has is the ' factual ', the 'given,' Concerning
such, he makes existential ludgments at his o.vn risk. His judgm.^ts
may be correct; only trial and error and perpetual appeal to 'facts'
can tell him whether or no he has succeeded in formulating a true
theory. Marvin does not shrink from these sober consequences. He
frankly declares, " All propositions except what we actually perceive
or deduce from what we perceive are tentative, that is, are hypotheses.
They are not certainties. They are subject to correction by what we do
perceive, and tomorrow's research may prove them false" ^op_. ci
t
»
,
p . 104^
«
The situation is not entirely hopeless, however, for "facts we do know;
and this knowledge is gradually extending the remainder of our know-
ledge, and is constantly eliminating its errors" (op. cit . «p. 10-*^).
Before dismissing Marvin's treatment of our problem, we shall
offer two criticisms of the doctrine as he presents it. Firstly, by
Marvin's own admi ssion, the 'factual' or 'given' is never certainly
apprehended in its character as mere datum, except it be in the instance
of the hypothetical first sensations of an infant
(
vide supra, p. 148 )
«
He does venture to go as far as to say "it is an exception of exceptions
to have a sensation that is not any more than a sensation, that is not
a perception" (An Introduction to Systematic Philosophy, p. 3(^1 \ thus sup--
there
gesting thatA^re rare mom.ents in the experience of adults when absolute
reality is apprehended by them, but even then he is not sure that such
an experience would be cognitive. 'Ve presume this to mean that the
favored adult would be unhappily incapable of recognizing reality, even
though his experience should contain one of the exceptions of exceptions
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which brinf; man and the real face to face.' There Is somethinc- positive-
ly pathetic in the plip:ht of a philoBODher who asaerta that ve annre-
hend the real directly, but never recop-nize it as such, --always insistinf?
upon aalllnp; it something el se, i . e.
,
always nassine existential judcr-
monts upon it, .vhich judpments are explanations of it or theorie s about
i_t^, never precisely it . IVe have always pitied Vords worth a bit in that
the disillusionment and sophistication of the years prompted him to
opine that heaven lies about us in our infancy, only later to fade, with
all its vision and gleam, into the light of common day. 7e are inclined
to pity also the philosopher according to vhose view reality lies about
us, even reveals its realm within us, in our infancy, but taunts us from
behind an ever-increasing screen of theory as we older grow. Put blunt-
ly and brutally, does not ^^arvin as much as admit that we do not directly
know reality as it is? If so, does he not then disclaim even the form
of epistemological monism which he professes? Secondly, and finally,
Marvin's emph-isis UDon the inveterate tendency of .judc-rnent to err in
the interpretation of fact, by reference to which tendency he accounts
for the occurrence of error in all of its forms, is hardly consistent
with the dogmatic inflexibility of his ex cathedra solutions of basic
metaphysical Droblems. A writer who holds that "our whole world con-
ception and the results of the sciences" (A First Book in Metaphysics, p.
105) are "only working hypotheses" might reasonably be expected to
write a more or less tentative and hypothetical metaphysic. However,
the world conception which Marvin offers is submitted as no tentative
hypothesi3;it is sober earnest and definitive truth. Throughout its
statement, we are led to believe, the judging process has for once be-
come miraculously infallible and has given to the factual its sufficient
interrjretation. Consistency would require that Marvin should express
himself hypothetically throu<?-hout his work, rather than in the flatly
categorical manner which marks his entire philosophical product, --but
rt
t
t^e '^lainis of consistency seeTn to have been a bit mjtweighe'i by Varvin's
devotion to realism.
The discuseion of Perry *s atternDted solution of the problem
of error requires the consideration of his peculiar conceptions con-
cerning independence, immanence, and the nature of consciousnegs . To
each of these conceptions he has accorded extended treatment. Ve be-
gin our investigation of his thousht with an examination of his theory
of independence. Perry's contribution to the volume of cooperative
studies by the six realists is devoted to the discussion of this con-
centioFijthe purpose of his essay being to indicate precisely what is
meant by dependence and by independence. Realists and idealists alike
have, Perry asserts, employed the latter term freely without giving at-
tention to its exact import (The New Reali sm, p. 104 ) . The realist '"ight,
to b3 sure, content himself with saying that he means by independence
the negative of what the ilealist means by dependence, but no advantage
is to be plained by the continuation of vague usages, whereas the fact
that the realist has forced the issue relative to dependence and in-
dependence properly imposes upon him the responsibili tv for defining:
the terms with such preoision that the issue may be clearly drawn and
profitably di scussed ( oo. ci t . ,p. 10'5)« Accordinp^ly, Perry proceeds to
indicate with painstaking detail the sense in which a realist em.ploys
the term 'independence' when he insists that entities are independent
of consciousness. It is not sufficient for the realist to express his
sympathy with the modern trend of thought toward identifying reality
with the elements, nrocesses, and systems of experience. Neither is it
sufficient for him to maintain that these el ements, processes, and systems
are independent of being experienced, thou o-h they are capable of enter-
ing: into experience. He must state definitively what it m eans for an
entity to be independent of experi ence . An analysis of the possible
meanings of the term 'dependence' discovers five such irreducible mean-

in,e8, vi z»
,
relation, whole-part, exclusive causation, implying:, beinp: exclusive-
ly irapliel (op.» cit_. , d. liTi ) . Eliminating 'relation' in general
,
Perry con-
cluies that "in order to prove the dependence of a on b it in necessary to
show that a contains b ; or that a is the cause or effect of b in a system
which exclusively determines a;or that a imr)lieg b ; or that a is implied
exclusively by b'* ( op , cit» ,t3« 11^)» Any relation ot>ier' than these specified
is a non-dependent relation. Objects may, therefore, Stand in relation to
consciousness without thereby becoming necessarily dependent u-non con-
sciousness. IndsT)endence having been defined, Perry oroceeds to formulate
in general terms a realistic theory of independence.
This theory reduces to the follr:>winF decalogue: ( 1 "jAll simnle
entities are mutually independent; ('^)siraple entities are independent of
the comDlexes of which they are members; ( ZOcompl exes are mutuallv inde-
pendent as respects their simple constituents; (4)coraplexe3 as wholes are
dependent on their simple constituents; (?^)a first complex is der^endent
on a second complex when the second complex 1^5 a Dart of the first: (^)a
first coranlex is dependent on a second complex when the first is either
cause or effect of the second within a system which exclusively determines
'the first; (7)a first complex is dependent on a second complex when the
first im-olies the second; (8)a first complex is dependent on a second com-
plex when the first is implied by the second, and is not otherwise imolied:
(9) a first complex is independent of a second complex whenever the first
is not dependent on the second in any of the senses enumerated, re g:ardl ess
of their being otherwise related; ( 10 )a first entity may acquire deoendence
on a second entity Cf^'f. or> . ci_t.
,
pp. 113-1'?4)
,
This theory of independence Perry next oroceeds to apply to the
case of knowledge. He can readily admit at the outset that whenever an
entity is known or in any other manner exnerienced it is related to a com-
plex, for this admission does not commit him to conceding that the entity
in question is 'dependent* upon the consciousness com-olex. 'le advances
f%
at once to the assertion that simole entities are not dependent on con-
sciousness, in.ised, that there ia no sense in which they can be said to
be dependent at all (o_o. ci_t
. ,
p. 126 ) . As a corollary to this concluaion,
it is obvious that, so far as their simple constituents are concerned,
complexes are independent of knowledge, however dependent they may be
upon the latter for their pattern as compl exes (Q^t cl
t
. , p. 129 ) . 3im-
ilarly,the propositions of lo.?ic and mathematics and physical complexes,
in spite of the fact that they may all become objects of consciousness,
are independent of consciousness ( oo, ci t
«
, pt?» 1^9-1?'^ )
.
The foregoing account is offered as specifyin?" the tvnes of
objects which may be regarded as independent with respect of a primary
consciousness. It ia supplemented by a list of instances illustrative
of independence of subjectivity on a secondary consciousness. Five
such instances are c i t ed
,
vi z
.
; ( 1 ) th e independence of the subject of
consciousness of being known; (3) the possible independence of one con-
sciousness of another ;{ 3 ) the independence of mental content of intro-
spection; (4)the independence of value of judgments abo-ut value; (P')the
independence of perception and simple apprehension of reflective thought
( 22.* cit . , pp . 144-150 )
.
The precise definition of independence is for Perry prepara-
tory to the statement of the correlative conception of immanence. For
him these t'vo conceptions are indissolubly linked to^rether. Indeed, he
is of the opinion that "^it would not.... be far from the truth to say
that the cardinal principle of neo-realism is the i ndep enden c e of the
immanent** (Present Philosophical Tendenci es, p. ?1? ) . It is clear that
immanence could not be asserted after this fashion were there not ad-
mitted ( l)relations, e_. g. 'knowing* or 'experiencing,* ?/hich are con-
ceded not to involve dependence and (3)simple or neutral entities of
some sort which are conceded to be capable, wi thout prejudice to their
of
being or nature, AP^Q^i^^Anto and out of such relations of non-dopendence.
t
Perry's ditacusaion of the former of these nrerequiai tes 've have re-
viewed in the ordoedinp; paragraphs. GonoerninF his discussion of
the latter, it is in order that something be now said. Perry is
anxious to find some terra to designate the ' alphabet of beinp-j or
the elements of exDerlence,' which shall emphasize the indifference
of these ultiraates of exoerience, " not only to their subjective re-
lations, but to their physical relations as well" ( ^p. cit
.
,
p. 31^- .
ouch a term he finds in the expression 'neutral entities. ' The
realist must resolutely resist every impulse to discover a home for
these neutral entities; they must not be domiciled even in 'eKperience*
itself. It must, of course, be p-ranted that they find a nlace when they
be
enter into relations, but it must uncomDromisin.crly^inBi sted that they
"bring into these relationships a character which they possess quite
independently and by themselves" ( op. ci t. ,p. 31<^ )
.
Ve pass now to Perry's view of consciousness. This view is
expressed in the terrainolo.pcy of behaviorism, the subject in conscious-
ness being conceived as the living and responding organism. Conscious-
ness is, thus, "a process containing a nervously endowed organism, a spe-
cific type of response .to stimulation, and portions of an environment
selected by the response" (The New Realism, td. 134) . Or, more tersely ex-
Dressed, the conception of consciousness is that it "consists in a comi-
olex relation bet.veen a sentient and interested organism and some narts
of its environment" ( oo. cit.
,
p. 14'^ 1 . Or again, "mind is behavior, or con-
duct
,
together with the objects which these emoloy and isolate" (Pres.
Phil. Tend., p. 303) and, hence, mental content may be directly and accur-
ately observed by a second raindfcf. The New Reali sm., p. 148 ) . Finally,
"consciousness is a species of function, exercised by an organism. The
organism is correlated with an environment, from which it evolved, and
on which it acts. Consciousness is a selective response to a pre'^xist-
ing environment. There must be something to be responded to, if there
t
156.
iy to be any response. The spacial and temDOral distribution of
bodies in the field of action, and the more abstract logical and math-
ematical relationships which this field contains, determine the possible
objects of consciousness. The actual objects of consciousness are se-
lected from this manifold of possibilities in obedience to the various
exigencies of life" (Pres. Phil. Tend. , rjp. oS^f )
.
Perry has at hand in the conceptions which we have detailed
the weapons with which he defends his realism. Neutral entities, rela-
tions of non-dependence, and consciousness conceived as a selective
response of an interested organism to its environment, ---.vhat more
could one ask in order to demonstrate the independence of the imman-
ent or the immanence of the independent? Furnished with these con-
ceptions. Perry unhesitatingly nropounds his doctrine of immanence or,
as he indifferently denominates it, eDistemoloeical monism. Before
proceeding to inquire into the admissibility of this doctrine in the
system of Perry's thougJit and, more -narticularly^-nto its bearine on
i a
Perry's solution of the problem of error, it Aessential that ve indicate
more fully and exactly the nature of his deliverances touching; the
status of objects of knowledf^e. In his earliest Dublished volume,
Perry formulated the doctrine of epi steraolcrgical monism, thoufth he
did not therein advance it do omatically as hia own position. On
page 174 of this maiden effort in philosophical writing of books,
—
"The ApDroaph to Philosophy" —it is asserted that when no specific
and exclusive nature is attributed to the inner world, real iiSm may
flourish without the renresentative theory of knowledge. "In such
a case," the passage continues, " the object would be regarded as itself
canable of entering into any number of individual experiences or of
remaining outside them all, and without on either account forfeiting
its identity." In 1913 the 'would* in this formulation of 1905 be-
comes an eraDhatic 'is.* The doctrine is given the following expression
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" I^pi sieraolo crioal monism means that when things are known they aro
ilsntical , el enent for element, wi th the idea, or content of the know-
ing state That which is commonly called the 'oh^^ect' of know-
ledge merges, according to this view, with the idea, or is the whole
thing of which the idea is a Dart. Thus when one perceives the tulip,
the idea of the tulip and the.- real tulip coincide, element for element;
they are ore in color
,
shape, si ze, di stance, etc . Or, If one so desirepi,
one may reserve the name 'real tulip' for the whole of the tulip, as
distinguished from whatever portion of it is actually embraced within
the idea" (Pres. Phil. Tend.
,
p. i;^F. ) . Again, "contents of mind coincide
di 3 tributivel y, or element for element, with parts of nature" foo. cit .
,
pp.'278f). And again^ * epi s te'^ological monism' means that when per-
ceived, things are directly and identically present in consciousness;
in virtue of being perceived, they constitute what is called content.
And realism adds the further assertion that, in certain notable cases,
at least, things are none the less independent for being so perceived"
(The New Reall sm, p. 143) . In order to be thoroup-ji-going, we are fl-^ally
advlsad, realism must make its doctrine rigorous and assert indepenlcr; ce
"not only of thougiitjbut of any variety whatsoever of experi encing
,
whether it be perception, feeling, or even the instinctive response of
the organism to its environment" and it must affirm that "things may
be, and are, directly experienced wi thout owing ei th er their being or
their nature to that circumstance" (Pres. Phil. Tend. , p. 315^ . 3uch is
the extreme form in -vhich Perry glvos expression to his theory of im-
manence or epistemological monis"!.
Let us now inquire into the admissibility of this doctrine
in the system of Perry's thought. First be it said that Perry frankly
admits that ''the case for realism rests on showine that to be content
of a mind, is not to be dependent on a mind" (The New Realism, p. 14? )
.
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It should be at once pointed out that the success of Perry *s advocacy
or the case for realism rests unon (l)the success of his atter^nt to
demonstrate that 'neutral' or 'simple' entities exist or subsist and
(2) the success of his attempt to demonstrate that conaciousness is a
merely sel eotive , not a cons ti tuti ve, responsefof an organism to its en-
vironment. As Pratt has sufficiently proved, Perry suavely begs his
neutral entities at the beginning (vide suora , p. 4^)^ He trium.phantly
'proves ' ^ that there are such conveniently serviceable entities by first
launching a negative criticism against idealism, in -vhich it is asserted
that the idealist has failed to establish his claim, that objects of know-
ledge are not independent of kno7ing,and then coranlacently Dointlne- out
that, if ve accept in general the doctrine of the externality of relations
and in particular the doctrine of the externality of the consciouG ness
relation, the related entities may be confidently affirmed to be 'neutral'
or 'simple' in that they are not dependent for their being or nature on
their relations. It 'vould appear that the case for realism rests on a
rather unstable basis.' Assuredly until he has offered a more convincing
proof than this, Perry should be a bit guarded about dogmatically as-
serting the independence of the immanent. This rem.ark is doubly justified
by the further fact that Perry's behavior! stic account of consciousness
falls far short of carryine universal conviction of its adequacy.
Not only does Perry fail, as indicate4,to prove his doctrine of
epistemolocrical monism, but he makes certain ,f^rave admissions vhich render
the doctrine logically untenable in relation to "nis thought as a 'vhole
and he fails decisively to harmonize the doctrine with the facts of er-
ror. Our first concern shall be ,vith the damaging admissions. 'Ve have
noted that Perry's attempt to prove that there are neutral enti ti es, and,
therefore, to prove that objects may be independent of the relations in
which they stand, resolves into an attempt to shov that consciousness is
a non-consti tutive, external relation. Love joy has rightly pointed out
I
15.^
(J. P.P. and 3.?.T. , Vol. X, 1913, pr).5;?4ff) that the externality of the con-
Boiouaneas relation 'nuat be raade a riproroua univeraal nropoaition if
the oonoeption is to be raade to serve the purpose to which the Neo
Realists put i t, namely, that of arguing frora the nature of oonscious-
neos to the independence of objects. This is preoisely what Perry at-
tempts to do, and hi a e,nti re at temibt to prove the indenendeno e of ob~
jeotn reduces
,
as we have shown, _to. an_ argumont from the all eged external-
i ty of the_ consciousnes s relation . It would obviously be quite .eratui-
tous to conclude that objects are independent because consciousness is
an external relation and then forthwith to ad'^it that, after all, con-
sciousness may not be, in crucial ins tances, such an external relation.
Thi 8, ho wever, i 3 exactly what Perry does. Indeed, he o-oes even farther
and admits that. in certain instances consciousness not only, may not
be such a non-cons ti tutivo relation, but assi;redly i_3 constitutive.
Several of the senses in vhich dependenoa on consciousness is admitted
are matters of relative indifference to us so f;ir as our m.ain problem
is concerned. Thus, we are not greatly concerned vith the admi^^sion
that the parts of consciousness as such are dependent on the whole of
.oonsciouaness for the readily apparent reason that an object-of-con-
sciousness cannot be such without consciousness (The New Reali s-^, p. 1?'^ )
.
Nor are we concerned with the admi ssion, appearing on the same page on
which the preceding one occurs, to the effect that, in a limited sense,
the parts of consciousness are reciprocally dependent within the system
of consciousness, since a thinp: is a part of consciousness bv \7-irtue of
the action of tbe other parts and once it is such its be''^a^'ior becomes
conformable to the laws of conscioijs ness, though we mie-ht press this ad-
mission in such fashion as to show that it so far reduces tine exnorienced
part to a function of the conscious subject as to involve fatal conse-
quences for epi 3tem.olo,o:ical monism in the extreme form in which Perry
m.aintains that doctrine. This admission m.akes it impossible to assert
i%
I
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the di atributi ve coincidence, element for element, of percept and ob-
ject vithout oreditinp: consciousness with an astounding facility in
the matter of organi^inp,
,
e. f^. spatially, the 'independent* nhysical
objecta. Ve are not, finally, narticularly concerned with the admission
that the privative character vhich marks the assemblage of contents of
consciousness make? it necessary to hold that the pre3ence of some
elements alone in one complex is dependent on the selective action
of consciousness nor Aiith the admission that the presence of some
elements together in one complex is dependent on the combining action
of consciousness ^ on. ci t» , r)r}« I58f ) , thougji we find it exoeedinfcly diffi-
cult to understand ho=v,if "A and B m.ay be combinei in a new way: that
is, in a way determined by the agency of consciousness exclusively** 'op »
ci t
»
f pp« 159 f) . the contents of mind may properly be affirmed to coin-
cide, element for elem3nt,with parts of independent nature. 'Ve find
peculiar embarrassment ir. the fact that Perry explicitly represents
this distributive coincidence as extending to the relation s obtaining
among narts in consciousness and in nature ( vide supra , p. 1'^'7 ) ^ a repre-
sentation which ve are quite unable to harmonize with the statement
that consciousness may exclusively determine the combinations in which
its elements may appear. "Ve can discover nothinp; in this admission
if not the flat repudiation of Perry's epi stem.olo,p:iGal monism.
'Ve are, however , more particularly concerned with the admission
that values, works of art, and such higher complexes as hi story, soci ety,
life, and reflective thought are dependent on consciousness (op. ci t .
,
pp.
140-143 K 'Then we are told that values are functions of co nsfiousness
(Pres. Phil Tend. , 33^) , that realism proposes a philosophy vhicli shall
invent action such as to make indifferent things good ( Op. cit
.
,
p. 530 ),
that "there is nothing so precious that its value would not disappear
if all needs, likin,Q-s, and aspirations were extingui shed'* ( c>r). ci t. , o . 335 )
,
that there is ground for confidence that "what is indifferent will ac«
i
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quirs value, and that jvhat is bad will be Tiade ppod --throuirh the oner-
ation of moral agents on a pre'^xisting and indenendent enviroriiiien t" (2£.»
cit. ,p. ^44), that realii-^Ti "involves a aense for things as they are, an
ileal of thinfirs as thay should be, and a determination that, throuFh en-
]i,p;}itened ao tion, things shall in tinie come to be what they should be"
( Op » ci t « , p. 347 ) we fail to recognize in consciousness as thus reure-
aented the non-constitutive external relation to which Perry makes ao-
ueal in order to nrove the indenendence of objects and to nrovide fb r
the immanence of the same. Though the argument for e^i 8temolo epical
monism as advanced by Perry is definitely invalidated by aich admissions
as these concerning the constitutive r6le of od nsciousness in th e creation
of value and the determination of relational complexes, we are not with-
out even more decisive data touching the matter at issue. Vhen we read
that Perry does not wish to '^preclude the possibility of there being
physical complexes exclusively determined by the organic processes in-
volved in consciousness" (The Ne-v Realism, p. 135), we conclude that it is
idle for the same author to insist that, because consciousness is an ex-
ternal relation, content of consciousness is identical with independently
existent objects. The contradiction between the two positions is patent
and not to be removed by adding that "the alteration of the Dercaived
boly by the physiological mechanism, could in any case Drove only t hat
a body otherwi se independent of consciousness is in a certain limited
respect dependent thereon" ( op. ci
t
.
,
pr). loFSf ) , for this addition still
leaves epistemolosical monism avowedly repudiated. Perry cannot con-
sistently admit that a body may ever suffer an "interval of determina-
tion by consoiousneaa" (op. ci
t
. ,
p. 136 ) , yet he frankly admits the- occur-
ence of such intervals. 'Then he goes so far as to leave or^en the
possibility of "cases in which the body Derceived is physically modified
by the sentient organism in the act of perceiving j t" { cit_. , -n. 143, foot-
note) and to assert that "the selective action of consciousness not only
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invests thinsa vi fh the character of 'object' or ' content * ;DUt at the
same time, acoordinc: as it excludes or includes, al so defines character-
istic *'ra,erients, foreshortenines, and aaae^'blacres of thinT8,that '•^ay not
coincide wi th physical and logical lines of cleava ge" (^res. Phil. Te^^d.,
pD.3'^3f),it would seem that he utterly and irretrievably eivea away the
case for apl at etiological monism, for he is here dealing with the crucial
inatance, viz. that of nerception, and clearly concedes diacrenancy bet.veen
frqi. n e'.
objects as parceived and the independent physical objects. Undersoor in c-
^
A further and final concession on Perry's oart ia made in
connection with his discuasion of mediate kno-vledge. After having af-
firmed that in the case of immediate knowledge "the thine: and the kno//-
ledge are identical, except aa respects their relations'' ( op. cit .
,
p 513)
,
our author proceeds to say "it is necessary to recognize that in mediate
knowledge, or discursive though t, there i£ a more connlete difference be-
tween fHe knowledge and the thing. There are even cases in which the
knowledge and the thing known possess little, if any, identical content'*
( op. oi
t
» , D« 513) , Thus, the thing transcends its representation v/ithin
the field of consciousness. The devising of this representation is, to
say the lea3t,a higiily ingenious inatance of selective response to en-
vironment on the part of an organism endowed with consciousness which
is merely an external , non-constitutive relation.'
It has become apparent long ere now to the reader that Perry's
doctrine of immanence, or epi stemolo gioal monism, is t'^e source of much
confusion and contradiction in his vork. As we- have indicated at length,
he repeatedly repudiates the doc trine, even when dealing with normal per-
ception, but moat notably when treating value-experience and discursive
thought. The same motive which prompts its rejectio'^ in these instances
operates with greatly intensified force to compel its rejection when
the facts of error are taken into consideration. This motive ia the
unavoidable attribution to consciousnesa of constitutive functiona in
i
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orier to account for the concrete detail ani orc-anize.i ensemble of ex-
perience. In order to accoijnt for erroneous experi ence ,Perry attributes
such constitutive functions to consciousness and aids to such functions
the capacity wrongly to refer subjectively constituted objects to a
locus in the physical order. "Subjective mani folds, "he writes, "or fictions,
once instituted by the action of consciousness, may become stereotyped. They
nay be remenbered or described; and throu,(?2i tradition and art, they may be
incorporated nore or less permanently into the environment. ouch being
the case, they may be mistaken for vvhat they are not, and thus give rise
to illusion and error" ^op . cit. ,5?4). The mere existe'nce of such a sub-
jective manifold does not, hoivever , consti tute error; not until fiction is
mistaken for fact do^s error occur, for "error and truth arise from the
practical discrepancy or harmony bet\7een subjective manifolds and the
manifolds of some independent order" (op. cl
t
. ,
p. ^2^), Truth and e rror
are thus in a sense pra^atic in their origin, --tlie y arise when some
content of mind is further dealt with in a certain manner. Identical
contents may be variously dealt with, with the result that in one instance
error may ensue and in another instance truth. For example, the content
of perception may be taken to be something to be dealt with physically
in the interest of self-preservation. If the resultant action is well
taken, it is true; if not, it is false or illusory. The same perceptual
content might, on the other hand, be otherwise dealt with,e.^.,it mi^t
be reckoned merely as an instance of illusion, believed or di sbelie-^red.
Success and failure in dealing with content of mind are not subjectively
determined, but rather are determined by " interest, means, and o i r
c
un s tanc e s"
( Op. cl t
.
. p. .^^^ ) . It follows that "if it will not do to fish for merm.gids,
this is because the facts are not consistent with the method I employ in
the interests of livelihood. In the last analysis the reason for my folly
lies in the fact that the image of a mermaid is a composite generated by
the selective abstracting and grouping of consciousness. The fac t loosely
i€
1^4.
exDreased in the judgment, ' there are no mermaids,' is that mermaid is
a sub jective, and not a physical , manifold" ( op. clt. ,r), , There apnears
no certain test whereby one may distinguish infallibly between fact and
fiction, for "I may serenely mistake fiction for fact, and heartily enjoy
my illusions'' ( op« oi t.
,
d* S'lv ) . Apparently ve are doomed to be satisfied
as best ve may with a degree of practical certai nty, for in the sreat ad-
venture of knowledge the achievement of truth is forever attended by the
ri sk of error ( o^. ci t» , p. 323 )
«
Goncernincr this solution of the proble'^ of error, "«e have only
two closely related words of comment to offer, and with these our dis-
cussion of Perry's problems terminates. Our first comment: the solution,
for all of its appeal to a pragmatic method of bringing truth and error
into being, is so palpably dualistic in its account of the knowledge sit-
uation, that it is hardly necessary for us to call attention to the fact.
To speak of any sort of di screpancy, whether practical or otherwi se , be-
tween subjective manifolds and manifolds of some independent order is
assuredly not to use the language of epistem.ological monism. This
doctrine, therefore, which Perry has defended so strenuously and so per-
sistently, is here again definitely discarded. It is so discarded be-
cause it is manifestly irreconcilable with the facts of error as Perry
admits those facts to obtain. Our second comment:here again in the dis-
cussion of the problem of error Perry so qualifies his conception of the
nature of consciousness that that conception is no longer available for
proving the independence of objects and thereby the possibility of the
immanence of the independent. A consciousness capable of conjuring: up
mermaids, of creating fictions and then mistaking: them for ffeLcts,is indeed
a hi trhly complex relation between a sentient and interested ore:ani8m and
some parts of its environment ( vid e supra, p. IfS'^O . Once consciousness is
assigned this avowedly constitutive character, as it_ must be .i^ Perry is
to hav e any explanatio n of error , the inevitable result is some form of
4
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episteinological duali 3T3 ,auch as lurks vithin Perry's account of error*
or an epiatemolop-ical monism of tha idealistic tyve. The f^ tg of
error render epi st e^nolopical monism absolutely deadly to realism. In
vien of the facts of error, Perry cannot retain both his realism and
his eDi stemological monism;in order to cleave to either, he must reject
the other. "Ve have seen to "vhich of these twain he cleaves when the
alternati'/e choice is decisively nresented; were he to reject the other
outright, his realism would suffer not at all and he,and all of us, would
be s-oared much confusion and vexation of spirit.
In passin.s: to the consideration of the work of S-pauldins;,
with which our inquiry closes, we address ourselves to the ^ost re-
cent and in many rosoects the most Lhoroup;h r:cin ^ Neo-Heal istl o U s-
cussion of our problem. This discussion occv.rs in Spa^jldin s-' s "The
_) Ns"; RT-tionalism^ the treatment of error being interwoven with the en-
tire critical and constructive argument of the volume. The author's
purpose in writing the volume is to present such a complete philosoph-
on Neo-Realis tic principles as was hinted at in the introduction to
"The N'^^-.v Reali 3^" ( vide O'o. c i t .
,
p . 1 ) . Manifestly, no such system could
lay clai"' to completeness which should fail to include an account of
erroneous -^xperi e>-'G5, an inquiry into the nature and status of which
is clearly necessary in any attempt to construe experience as a whole.
Accordingly, Spaulding is at frreat pains t'^ show that there is room in
his realistic world for error i^ all of its forms, and this without any
prejudice to the foundation principles of his svstam. By way of antic-
ipation of our cri ticism of his effort to do this, we m.ay here remark
tha!, ,ve regard opaulding's statement of the nature of error ^orroot
p
but are convinced that this correct statement cannot be harm.onized
with its author's fundamental doctrines.
The key to ooauldingls thought ^.s a vhole is his much ex-
ploited solution of the e;"0-centric predicament. This solution he re-
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S,iirda as the most impor-tant realistic doctrine (The Ne// Katloralisra, d.
36.'3'. He may «vell suspect that this solution is, perhaps, the niost
S3ntial of these doctrines, as -.uell (op. cit . ,n.5«Pufor upon its succg^.g
depends absolutely the cogency of Liie entire pan-ob jec tivi stlc inter-
pretation of the vorld. It -vill be recalled that ive charged Perry -.vith
having begged his neutral enti ti es ( vide supra, Pp. 4? and 1^8), vith tT^e
result that his epi s temological ninnism is ^vithout logical warrant. Perry
certainly does not succeed in extricating himself frora the ego-centric
predicament. Spaulding is clearly amre that he must su.cceed in so do-
ing if he Is to have grounds for advocating pan-objectivism. Let us in-
quire into the method whereby he seeks to accomplish this indispensable
extrication.
Spaulding defines the ego-centric predicament as "the situa-
tion that knowing cannot be eliminated from the vvoi'ld that we know" or
a.3 "the impossibility of experimentally elimi nating a knowing process
as really occurring, or as implied as really o ccurri rig , from the world
that we know" (op. ci t
.
, pp . ^^0^= and 310f). 3paulding solves the predica-
ment by admitting that knowing cannot be experimentally eliminated from
the world which we know and then proceeding to show that it can, never-
theless, be ideally eliminated by the method of analys i
s
in si tu. Ke
insists that "such an analysis and elimination is, in fact,m.ade by every
philosopher and scientist who, even in a philosophy that explicitly main-
tains the opposi te, advances any position as a portrayal of the re al _sta te
of affairs regarding knowl ed ge" ( op.> c i
t
.
, p . ? 1 1 ) . Kis reason for this as-
sertion is that, at least in this one instance, it is tacitly granted and
presupposed that ''knowing is related to its object, and yet does not al_te£.^
modify
,
or consti tT:.t6 that ob jec t** ( ££. ci_t. , p . ^ll ) . Most mom.entous con^e-
quences follo'-; for Spaulding from this solution of the ego-contric pre-
dicament, ror,be argu©s,"if in one typical instanc e, knowing ca>^ be related
to, and yet no_t cause, alter , or modify, that which is kno-vn,so that in this
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one caaa kriOwlng i s ideally e l l^ lna led, the.ri thfc pre auirip tier: is, that
in all j:i,3 oi knowi ng the same atate of af fai r s subaia ts'* ( ot. , c 1
1
.
,
p. 212^. By such a solution oT the ego-oantric Drelioa'n on L, ripaului
cut.-xire the central doctrine of his realism, viz.
,
that the relation
between kno .ving and the knoA'n Is external , i . e non-causal - rd non-
cons ti t^tive ( 22.* 2iL* » T3 . c'^'-i ') , —^''that kno vvin,- is not constitutive of
the object Vrno vn'* ( op . c 1
1
.
, d » 4T 1 ; . This is a specification of the
theory of e^:ternal relations, .vhich general theorv Snauldinc- vigor-
ously defends by the citation of various analyses in si tu,"v7 hich anal-
yses he offers as evidence in corroboration of t'-^e validity of his s.c-
count of the knowledge si tuation( Of. op . cit
.
. dp. ^300-:^ll^
.
Let us not, hOvvever,be too liasty in granting that Snaulding
has proved his case in his "one typical instance." It will conduce
to clearness if we cite one of the concrete illustrations which he
eTioloys to sho.v ho<v philosophers who deny that the ego-centric pre-
dicament can be solved do actually thenselvss solve it in the very
act of making their denial. '}Je select Gpaulding's criticism of HuTian-
i sm, thoi^cli the cases of Phenomsnalisr, cub lec live Idealism, Positivis"".,
Naturalism, or Pragmatism vould serve our' purpose equally veil. Snauldin
points out that Humanism, "explicitly concludes that .ve cannot know
'things' as they are, but only as we make them, and, therefore, as they ap-
pear to us" and that it at the same tim.e "implicitly DresuD^os es, as a
basis for this conclusion, a genuin e knowledge of some ' things ' as they
are, and finally concludes with a theory which, as a whole, nre sent s a
state of affairs that is pres'.imed to be real, and not 'manufactured' in
any sense" ( op» ci t« , p . 29^ ^ . ''7e must confess that we fail to discover
in this "typical instance" the prom.ised ideal analysis and elimination
of object kno v:i from the knowing thereof. Let us frrant that Humanism
tacitly assumes a "state of affairs" , vi z. the 'content of the "v-.iniGtic
theory concerning the knowledge situation, Lo obtain quite independently c

168.
it3 uoxiif, l.nown. lliat are we to derive fron this concsssion? Plainly,
we may properly derive only the rather unenli ghtening tautology that
Kumahism assumes , contrary to its theory, that itn theory of the know-
ledge situation is really true and "not 'manufactured' in any sense."
-Ve are by no means .justified in concludins;, as Spaulding does, that the
Humanist has found in his theory a 'state of affairs* which i_3 actually
true
,
regardless of its being known , IVe do not mean to say that oDaulding
accepts the Humanistic theory concerning the nature of knowl edge: what we
do mean is that he would have to pcrant the objective truth of that theory
in order to be able logically to employ the sam.e as a means of sol'-'-inn:
the ego~C6ntric predicament. In fine, if the Humanist does attain "a
genuine knowledge of some 'things * as they are**
^
whether known or un-
known, why then, the humanist attains a knowledge of some 'things' as
they are, whether known or unknown. If , hov/ever, the Humanist merely
presupposes or tacitly assumes that he has attained a genuine know-
lodge of somethings' as they are, whether known or unknown, why then, the
Humanist merely presupposes oi' tacitly assumes that he has gained such
genuine knowledge. In the latter case, and this is the only case which
3paulding can consistently admit, there is positively no ground for as-
serting that f'^e Humanist does actually know an object,viz. his theory,
as i t would be if_ ijt were unkno-.vn . All of the plausibility of the
proffered solution of the ego-centric predicament derives from the
fact that its author naively makes this wholly illicit inference* In
this "one typical instance" the knowledge situation is analyzed and
the knowing is ideally eliminated from, the known only by taking it for
granted that the Humanist discovers an independen tly real state of af-
fairs ', only, that is, by assumin g- that the Kiimaniat knows the object of
his consciousness as ijt would be if unknown ; but as this is precisely
the point at issue, it is clear that Snaulding's solution of the ego-
cantric predinftmert, beo-s the queBtiori ouit'^ as f*! «, crr^ n 1 as '°e"n^y'3
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doea. i''ailing deciBively to show that the Hu^naniBt'e kno vin^? proceBeea
io not " cause, al ter, or modify, that '.vhloh la 1^'nown " , which la in this
caae the Human! etic theory concerning the 'state of affairfi* which ob-
tains in the knowledge si tuation, .JDaulding la nre surriptuous indeed to
presume that, in all cases of kno.ving, the kno'ving neither causes, nor
alters, nor modifies the known. He finds that by far the best v;ay to
secure a nonconsti tutive knowledge relation is to beg it at the begin-
ning.' '7e shall discover that he does so only to .re.lect it in the end.
Convinced that he has extricated himself from the eco-centric
predicanent, 3paulding proceeds on the oresumption that objects kno.vn
are in r.o v/ay modified by being known, i . e. , that known objects are
identical with objects as unkno'.vn. This is epistemolocrical monism,
or the theory of imnanence. It is tenable in a realistic philosonhy
only on condition that consciousness can be sho^vn to be wholly non-
constitutive of its objects. On the basis of the -oresumption in favor
of this conception of consciousness supposed to be established in his
solution of the etro-contric predicament
,
Snaulding rejects all inter-
Dretations of conaciousness which attribute to it any constitutive role,
or conceive it as in any sense prerequisite to the existence of objects
of any sort. Thus "consciousness is found not to be a substance
,
energy
( pace Montaguei
)
,
medium
,
or menstruum " ( op . cl t .
,
p . 44'0 ) . '''hatever else
knowing and consciousness may be, they cannot be substances; precisely
what they are may properly be matter for debate, for "they may be spe-
cific relations, or sDecific events, one or both, or even SDecific di s -
emboiied qualities that do not inhere in any substance" ( op#ci_t_. , r) . 4'5 ^
.
Indeed opauldinp- is not himself clear as to how consciousness is to be
conceived. In various passages, e. g. oj^« ci t. , pp . 4'?,80 , ^9 1, 4^^,he un-
qualifiedly commits himself to the relational theory, whereas in certain
other passages, e. g. ^g/ ci
t
. .op. 478. 48 5. 469.a nd especially 48S,he quite
as unqualifiedly rejects the relational theory in favor of the hypoth-
0
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esis that consciousn es?? ia a dimension.
Vhatever the preci3e terms may be in w?dch conaciousnesB ia
to be described, Spaulding is unalterably convinced that it must not be
conceived as in any manner determinative of its content. That the beinp:
and status of the objects of consciousness are independent of their be-
ing in relation to consciousness he maintained in his contribution to
the Platform, in which document he wrote, "the entity is known as it would
be if the knowing were not taking olace" (The New Reali am, d. -i^s ) and ''any
entity may be known as it really is in some resnects without its being
known in all respects and without the other entities to which it is re-
lated being known" ( od_. clt_. , d. 480 ) . Scattered literally from end to end
of "The New Rationalism" there are reiterations of this epi stemologically
monistic doctrine. Thus "objects known are neither modified nor created
by the act of knowing" ( op..oit , p. 43 ) ,and again "knowing and experiencs
do not make any difference to the Hhing* known and experienced" ( Op. ci t. ,
p. 84), and again, granted the ego-centric predicament solved, it follows
that "the world as unknown can be quite the same as the world as known
,
and knowing must be concluded not to be cau sally related to that world"
( orp.»ci t
.
fV.21l) f and again, once more granting the solution of the predica-
m.ent, " the known ob ject may be discovered to^ be^ r el a t ed to the
^23.!?Jl^--.5 *
but not to he_ caused , al tared , or modified the reby" ( 22.' 'ilii* , p . ?'^8 ^ , and
finally *^ enti ti es, includin g terms and r el a t i or. 3_, can « . . .b_e known as t hey
really are
,
this knowl edge being 3ometime3 identi cal wi th. immediate_ exper -
ience , and sometimes wi th that which i a, or which resul ts from , analysis and
raa soriing" ( op. ci t
.
,
p« 4rfO ) . Similar passage*? mi^t be cited from all
parts of the volume, g. pp. 11, 42 ,37,88, qigf, 37^3, 384, and 431. It would
be impossible for a ^Dhilosopher to comirait himself mors unreservedly t'-^an
the view that
opaulding does to /ythe objectively real world is given directly in con-
sciousness precisely as it would be if wholly unrelated to anv conscious-
ness.
0
Let us no'.v inquire into the nature of t^e entities which con-
stitute opaulding*3 utterly objective realistic vorld. He does not
limit the entities which may be known in their true character to the
objects and relations of the nhysical universe and to conscious proc-
esses, but rather insists also unon "the factual ity and knowableness of
enti ti es that are neither physica l nor mental
,
nor * individual ^ in the
usual sense of this terra as meaning spatiall y and temporall y r?articular -
ized" (on. ci_t. , D. 11"* . He denor.inates all such entities ' subsi st ents '
in order to distinguish them from the temporally and perhaps also
spatially particularized 'existents.' In the class of * subsi stents
'
are incluled ,vha,t are frequently called universals and also "'ideals'
such as justice, and still other enti ties, such as numbers, and the ideal
systems of mechanics" (o_p_» cit «
, p» 11) . Finally, worths and values, th ough
they are ideals which are never co^rpletely attained, are nevertheless
real entities.
This general sketch is rendered more explicit by the further
definition of the terras 'existent' and ' subsistent. ' Not all 'mention-
ables* are entities. SxamDles of such raentionablee which are strictly
non-entities are such word-combinations as 'round square* and 'black
whiteness,' Round and aquare'and black and white, resDectively* exclude
each other and subsist at different loc i ( op. ci t. , Dp.4g9r / .*^A3 en ti ti es" ,
opaulding concludes ," w9 can accept only such as do not involve, if they
are ooraplexes, characters that exclude and force one another into differ-
ont universes of discourse, or such as furnish ryo occasion for exclusion
in that they are absolutely simple" ( od_. cit_. , n . 40n ) , "'Jhatever fulfils
these conditions, oDaulding denominates a 'consistent' and adds " al
1
' consistent s
'
,
then , are to_ be accepted as enti ties, and an entity is to
be defined as a ' consi st ent '" ( pp. ci t
.
, p. 4^0 ) , It follows fror the fore-
going definition that " whatever appears to, or is p:iven as content in,
any mode of awareness, be this perception, memory, dream, illusion, imagina-
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tion, reason, or intuition, is therewith a 'consiatent' and an entity. For
the fact of the mere * gi venneas ' of the go -pre sence of several character-
istics eatabl i
a
hea their conai st enc y, and, therefore, the 'entity-character*
be
of the comi^lex" ( op^ ji t
.
,.p. 4^0 ) . Entities are to ^divided into two classes,
vi z. exi stents and subsi stents. The latter constitute a p^erus under
^hich the for'rer "lay be classified as i sr)ecies,for '* all exi stents sub-
sis t , but not all subsi stents exi st '' ( op..Gi t
.
,
p . 40^ ) . .Jub si stent
'
, 'con-
sistent', and 'entity' are, therefore, strictly synonymous terns. The dis-
tinction betveen these ter-ns ani the terTi 'existent' occasions Gnauldinp-
grave difficulty. It will be rene'^bered( \rlde .supra, pn.4P and 1?1^ that
attention has bt3en called to the fact that onaulding first attempts to
differentiate these terras by reserving 'existent' to desi gnat e t ha t
which is te^.porally, and perhaps also spatially, narticulari ze'i . He is
himself a;vare that such a limitation operates, as Pratt points out ( 'ride
supra, p. 4R ) , to make existents out of some entities which are referred
to the status of subsi stents. He, therefore, adrai ts tYei.t such spatio-
temporal partioul ari zation is "not enough to define or characterize
existents" (The New Rationalism, p. 49 1 ) . The reason for this admission
is that such subsistent entities as dream ob.iects have spatial and
temporal particularity. He concludes that "t>~'erefore a complex 3x1 s tent
must have that full quota of chara c teri sties , or be that full quota, which
the sciences of physics, cherai stry, biology, psychology , and the like,fjnd
it empiri call y to have" ( ")p. cl t. , p. 49 1 ) . The difficulty which confronts
opaulding at this point is sufficiently obvious: who shall arbitrate with
regard to .vhat, precisely, constitutes that ''full quota of characteristics"
whereby the existent shall be distinguished from the merely subsistent
complex? iio single existent could be assuredly identified as such with-
out the settlement of m^any miajoi* disagreements which the descriptive
sciences have never yet been able to settle inter se. Moreover, should
all of the sciences reach a unanimous consensus of opinion concerning
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the full quota of characteri stica properly attributable to a ^iven entity
remain
as existent, there would al '.vaya /^tbe haunting possibility that the empirical
investigation mipiiit be incomplete. In view of the inconclusivenes s of
the test which opauldin^ proposes for trie discrimination of existent
from aubsiste'^t complexes, v/e must insist that he fails to differentiate
them. No ,vonder he ends by do;?Tnatically assertine- that subsistents
"are not exi stents'* No ivonder, al so, tha t ha has a sorry tim.e iefinine:
the status and locus of those subsistents which be iden tifi ':=-s as e ob-
jects of erroneous experience.
In general, as would be expected, opaulding affirms the objectiv-
ity of such subsistents as well as of exi stents. He wri tes, '* thus the ob-
jective universe contains not only the straight stick, but also the bent-
ness;not only the parallel rails, but also the convergence : not only the
rustling of the curtain, but also the flimsy gho3t;not only the existent
poisons, but also the imagined ones of the dream and the hallucination.
In this manner does the realistic account augment the usually accepted
objective richness and manifoldness of the world in which we live" (on..
ci_t
.
, D . ^78 ) . More specifically, " the ghost that is imafcinei to be stalk-
in<z in a room is really there, though as a non-exi s tin
g
reality. 3ome
place in the cosmos must certainly be found for it, and if this locus is
not consciousness, i t can be space_, al though the ghost does not belong to
the universe of discourse of existent ob jects" ( op. ci t , n . 44^^
.
'.Vhat,one is prompted to inquire, can be the status of truth and
of error in a world such as the one which we have just outlined? It
would seem that error could not enter such a world, though it should try
to force its entrance as a thief in the night.' i^ith consciousness a
strictly non-constitutive relation or dimension into which objective
subsistents and exi stents come and out of which they go, all in their
stark ob jectivi ty, wi th all objects known. as they would be if they were
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not known, -vhat podsibility is there of error in the acceDte:! sense of
the term, viz. in the aense of takinc; an object as kno'vn to be what it
is not 'really^, or as unknovn? It ,vould seem that f-ere ia no such
possibility. This i'^pression is deepened when we read that S-oaul lin?'
s
realism "accepts at face valu e the entities which are revealed by reason
as well as those which are piven by sense experience and enotion" and that
it "takes 'things* as it emDirically finds them" (or), ci t
. , p.408 and r).438).
If, in all seriousness, this realism accepts experienced entities at face
value and if this face value is identically the value which these entities
have as unexperienced, —and ve have onauldins;* ?. most e^^nha + ic assertions
to the effect that such is the case--, then it would assuredly seei?3 to
follow that we cannot err in our apprehension of objects, —that is,unle^
this realism has greatly erred. That it has done so, and most grievously,
becomes apparent upon an examination of its account of the nature of truth
and error, an account which we have already pronounced correct, but irrecon-
cilable with itH author's fundamental doctrines ( ''ride sunra
,
p. IPr^ ^ . In
formulating; his conception of the nature of truth, 3pauldinp; assum.es a
world of sheer fact, without minds or consciousness in it and then proceeds
"Let us assume, next, that under certain conditions cons ciou8n®3s, awareness,
or 'knowing'appears, and that accordingly our world becomes known (as it
really isjin certain 'details. ^/hen there is thi s very specific relation-
ship between a knowing nrocess and that which is known, we will say that
truth exists or subsists. Yet it must also be granted that conscious
processes can take place, and yet thi 3 specific relationship be lacking, i.e
that there can be error as well as truth" ( op
.
ci
t
.
, n . 70 ) . There is no log-
ical warrant for this admission on opaulding^ part of th e possibility of
error. 3uch an admission involves the rejection of his central doctrine,
viz.. that the object as known is precisely and identically the object as
unknown. Throu^out the entire book under consideration wherever our
author broaches the question of truth and error, he disavows this his
II
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darlinpi; do.cjria either iiririliol tly or exiolioi tly. He can consi atsntl y al-
lO'V only th030 instances of knowledge in which "^our .vorld becomes known
(as it really i3)in certain details,
"
Far fro*^ nalntainin'? thia consistent posi t ion, Spaul di ng re-
peatedly adTTjitB that error occurs, even going so far aa to concede that
there is an irreducible psychical element in error, and concluding, that
all knovledge is hi,"hly tentative.. After having discussed the case of
the ti*^e~honored straigJit stick .vhich, im^iersed in jvater,is seen is bent,
he writes, "In this situation the only error that is inherently irre-novalole
from ©onaciousness seems to be that of 'taking,' in tii e absence of know-
ledge of I'cfrac tion, ,vhat is really a straigxit stick to be a bent one"(o'D.
ci t » .p. 294) , This, it would seem, is error enough; in fact, it is all the
error that there is in the whole situatic^i If, by ^^Daulding's own ad-
mission, ve are justified in asserting that this error is "inherently ir -
r emovable from consciousness," may we not properly inquire ';iiiat now hap^jens
to the solution of the ego-centric preiicament? Ve were led to understand
that by means of an anal y si s in situ the object, as it really is, is al-'ays
eliriiinaple from, the knowing ther eof* That which is "inherently i rremov -
able " can hardly be said to be " elimiiiabl e" fro"^ consciousness. We are
not ir this instance fixinp: unon an isolated obiter dictum and mas-nif yiner i i
unduly to the hurt of our -Dhilosopher . at least four other extended
passages, of utterance quite as unequivocal as that quoted(cf. on. ci t . , pto.
894f , 57ff , 429, and 48 7), he commits himself to substantially the same dam-
aging admission. ITot to multiply instances, .ve cite only the last of the
passages indicated. It cornea to focus in the statement that "the only
residual • aub jec tive ele'^.ent in error is..., the 'taking' of ' aomethin-s:'
to be that which it is not" ( Op . c i t
.
. d . 48 7 ) . This is assuredly a sufficient
residual subjective element in error to give much pause to a good pan-
ob jectivist.' 3uch an element positively cannot be adm.itted without hope-
lessly compromising the true Neo-Realistic faith, for its admission endows
r1
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fHe subjective order ^vith power to mar, if not to make, its objects,
qualifying consciousnesB to 'alter* and to *modify\if not wholly
to 'constitute' its content. Thus again hae the problem of error
forced a staunch realist to forswear his cherished faith.'
In closing our discussion of Snauldin^, we pause to remark
that in his case, as in the case of Perry (vide 8ur>ra ,pp. i^Of ), the
problem of values leads equally with that of error to the attribu-
tion of truly constitutive functions to consciousness. In the last
few pages of "The New Rationali sn** , notably on pages FiOO and PO^,
Spaulding unambiguously credits the percipient of an aesthetic ob-
ject with contributing to the character of the object as perceived.
We cannot repress the conviction, confirmed as it is by the intellec-
tual travail of soul of all of the foremost representatives of the
New Realistic movement in America, that only by such an attribution
can there be won a definable and tenable distinction between truth
and error and that only by such an attribution can worth be found
in the world.
IV. Conclusions.
We are now ready to formulate our conclusions and deductions
from our inquiry. First, we remark the very significant differences
which obtain among American New Realists. Attention has been called
to the existence of such differences at numerous points of our dis-
cussion (e.g. , vide supra
, pp. 10, 15, 15, 63f , lOBf )« 'J7e have found the
utmost disagreement to prevail am.one: New Realists concerning all
matters, great and small, in their respective views. The ultimate and
independent object, for instance, is for Fullerton a touch-movement-ser-
sation construe t; for McGilvary, any quali ty, however abstractly taken;
for Perry, a neutral entity; for Spaulding, an entity, a subsistent, or a
consistent. Again, while Perry does not hesitate to say (cf.,The
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Present Conflict of Iieal8,p. 3^4) that the conception of the Inmanence
of consciousness distinguishes the "band of choice spirits" 'vhich he
represents, our investi nation has revealed the fact that these sa"ie
choice spirits are far from agreement touching the manner in which
this immanent consciousness is to be conceived. 'Vitness the dis-
agreement of Hoi t, Montague, and Pitkin in the supplementary essays ap-
pended to The New Realism ( vide supra, p. 10). IVitness, also, Perry *b'
explicit adibission that consciousness is not always an external , non-
constitutive relation ( vide supra , pp. 24, IPO- 1(^2 ) and McGilvary's
similarly explicit admission ( vide supra , pp. 104f) « Divergent con-
ceptions of the nature and explanation of error could not fail to
proceed from such divergent principles. We are not, therefore, sur-
prised to find Holt virtually denying the existence of error in the
generally accepted meaning of the term, and each of the other New
Realists in turn attempting an independent soliation of the problem
of error. The general conclusion which we draw from the existence
of these many and significant differences which divide the New Real-
ists is that the commonly accepted general principles ft'om which all
of these writers set out appear to be, as Sheldon would say, infertile.
These principles seem to be incapable of rendering a tenable account
of the concrete detail of experience.
Second, the various attempts of the New Realists to escape
from the ego-centric predicament (e. g. , Perry, vide supra , pp. 42, lP6,and
Spaul ding, vide supra
,
pp. 1^5-169 ) must be pronounced unsuccessful. The
New Realists all beg their way out of this predicament. They discover
no adequate ground for their assertions to the effect that things, apart
from their being known, are identical with things as kno'wn. The New
Realists tacitly assume that, at least in certain crucial instances, we
have knowledge of independent entities or states of affairs and then
tf
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they confidently assure us that they have proved such to be the
case, l_.e. , that they have definitely escaped from the ego-centric
predicarcent. Thus a logical fallacy underlies their whole "proof
for their characteristic doctrine that the independently existent
object ia directly apprehended in knowledge. Since it is precisely
this doctrine which generates for the New Realists the peculiarly
embarrassing problems which the fact of error raises, we conclude
that these philosophers might properly have taken the trouble to
establish the doctrine in question before proceeding to deal with
the difficulties to which it gives occasion.
Thit'd, the New Realists beg their external relations, Includ-
ing the consciousness relation. As Leighton has said, their doema of
purely external relations is one that "has no meaning in a world of
intelligible experience** ( vide supra , p. 40 ), and as Hartmann has said,
"TOiether for a so-called realist or for a relativist, the conjunction
of things and relations appears inevitable" (J. P.P. & B.M. , Vol .XI, IP 14,
p. 600). Admitting that, as known, things are always foiind in conjunction
with relations, the New Realist proceeds to conclude from the fact that
we are able to think things in abstraction from their concrete particular
relations that the relations in question are wholly external to the
things. However, when the New Realist attempts to specify what a thing
might be stripped entirely of all of its relations, he presents us with
a blank negation. Moreover, as Barrow has pointed out (J. P. P. «& 3.M.,Vol.
XVI, 19 19, pp. 337-347) , in his most rigorous attempts to define reality
in abstraction from relations, the New Realist employs a relation in
his very definition and thus makes the relation internal. "The defin-
ition in any form in which I have seen it,** so runs the crucial portion
of Barrow's criticism, "does include a relation, the relation of change.
....the realist defines reality as that which is in certain ways con-
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atant through change. The particular change stressed is the cOTning of
a knower into relation to the real existence" (loc. cit
. ,p« 539 )« Not
to press this point, which we conceive to he perfectly well taken, we
remark that, once admitted, the doctrine of the externality of relations
to
commits the New Realists/^a pure phenomenalism of the Humian type or
to a Kantian phenomenalism with a wraith of nouraena in the unknowable
backgroiond (cf. Ta vney in the Phil. Rev. , Vol .XXII, 19 13, pp. P34-30 3, and
especially p. 297). It would seem that a doctrine which is gained
either by pure assumption or by illicit inference, which leads to con-
tradiction in its very statement, and which conducts to consequences
which its exponents vigorously reject is scarcely worth defending at
great length. Once the New Realists frankly abandon this doctrine,
one of the major difficulties in their treatment of error will be re-
moved.
Fourth, no one of the New Realists has succeeded in formulating
a purely relational theory of consciousness capable of accounting for
the actuality of errors, ae distinguished from their possibility, and for
their detection. Montague's plurality of causes (vide supra , p. 114) and
Pitkin's projective indi scernibles (vide supra , p. 143) are conceptions
which provide prettily enough for the possibility of error, but furnish
no means for its recognition. Holt's theory of consciousness, as has
been already remarked, makes error, properly so called, impossible. His
theory is, moreover, open to the same objection which McGilvary brines
against the theory of 'Voodbrid^e ( vide supra , p. 94), viz . , i t makes no
provision for individuating consciousnesses. If consciousness is a
mere cross section of objects selected by an organism, it would seem
that two or m.ore consciousnesses would necessarily coalesce in case
two or more organisms should selectively attend to identical objects at
one and the same time. A theory which not only obliterates error, but

180.
makes consclousneBses Interpenetrative or coincident must be rejected
in default of much more positive proof of its validity than Holt has
offered. Our conclusion is that f^e conception of consciousness as
a purely external relation is incapable of givinje an account of so
capital an item of experience as error. '.Ve suspect that the failure
of the brilliant and ingenious New Realists to furnish such an account
demonstrates, not their incompetence, but the impossibility of the task
to which they have addressed themselves. This suspicion is deepened
by the consideration which follows.
Fifth, in every instance in which the New Realists have ad-
mitted the existence of error in the generally accepted sense of the
ter^ijthey have, at some point or other in their description of its con-
stitution or detection, assi pTied truly constitutive functions to con-
sciousness. On no other ground can Woodbriige characterize error as
a misreading of meaning. McGilvary's insistence upon the mysteriously
selective nature of consciousness, its skill in the matter of taking and
leaving, suggests that consciousness is for him an exceedingly agile sort
of "non-constitutive** relation. Montague expressly admits that our per-
ceptual activity in attending to an object contributes to the nature of
the object as perceived. Pitkin in assigning to consciousness the functinr
of determining the reference of a given projective indiscernible to its
proper correspondent in the projected complex converts consciousness into
an agent which cannot be adequately described as a mere relation or dimen-
sion. Perry's admission that consciousness forms subjective manifolds,
e. 2. , mermaids, and is capable of referring these creations to an erron-
eous locus among physical manifolds and Spaulding's admission of irre-
-9 ducible psychical elements in error are similar concessions in point.
We conclude, therefore, that the New Realists should either candidly admit
that their account of the nature of consciousness is inadequate or else
i
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devlae an explanation of error conaietent with their theory of con-
sciousness.
Sixth, the problem of value in general —moral, aesthetic,
religious— has forced the New Realists to modify their theory of
consciousness as a mere relation obtaining among mutually independent
entities. In particular, Perry ( vide supra , pp. 160f, 1(^2) and Spaulding
(vide supra
,
p. 176 ) have made significant concessions touching this
point. For both of these philosophers consciousness here becomes a
true agent, a builder of values. These values are not mere heaninge
together of independently existent entities. They are genuine new
creations. As such, they have no pror^er place in the world of the
New Realists, for we have been repeatedly assured that in that world
consciousness clays no creative part. It is no more effectual in
the making of new things under the sun than is the relation of being
north of or greater or smaller than. We conclude that the relational
theory of consciousness, di soredi ted by its failure to account for er-
roneous experience, is doubly discredited in that it leaves life stripped
of all its worth. We submit that a New Realism of ideals must of ne-
cessity either revise the conception of consciousness current among
A-^erican New Realists, and so furnish ground for the values upon which
ideals are based, or else pursue a friutless quest. It is a fact that
in so far a ideals are adequately grounded in the writine-s of the
various New Realists, the ccrounding is achieved at the expense of the
relational theory of consciousness.
Seventh, the New Realists have undoubtedly stated their
episteraology in a form which over-states their real intention. It
will be recalled that Kremer urcres this consideration (vide suT>ra ,p«
105) in defense of his lenient treatment of the epiatemology in question.
We,hq^ver, offer no apology for having taken the New Realists at their
rC
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word, for they have inainted that that is exactly what they desire to
have their readers do. In their rnore sober moments, they lay no claim
to infallibility, certainly not to omniscience. Kremer is quite right
in saving.
"
Aucun r^aliste ne se piau© ^'ptll© omniscient?!! se contente
de oonnaissances partielles,mais suffisantes dans lejur ordre** fLe Neo-
Realieme Araericain, p. 239 ) , The New Realists certainly do not lay
claim to omniscience. They never tire of pointing out that our
knoivledge is partial, but nevertheless adequate after its kind. Yet
in their enthusiasm for objectivism they have committed themselves
to an epistemology which admits only of infallibility in the know-
ledge of objects. We refer, of course, to the doctrine of the immanence
of the object, or epistemological monism. Over and over again they have
advocated this doctrine in the most extreme and unqualified form in
which it could well be expressed. Their advocacy of the doctrine has
not been rendered any less earnest by the fact that no New Realist
succeeds in reTjaining consistent with such an epistemology at all
times. Their procedure in this connection confirms the words of
Santayana:** Professional philosophers are usually only apologists: that
is, they are absorbed in defending some vested illusion or some eloquent
idea" (Winds ot Doctrine, p. 193 ). The eloquence of the idea defended by
the New Realists might possibly be called in question; that their doctrine
of the immanence of the object is a vested illusion should be sufficient-
ly apparent in view of our extended inquiry into the difficulties in
which it entangles its defenders. It is hardly too much to say, with
Love joy, that their principle, carried to its logical conclusion, would
conduct to nothing short of the "solipsism of the specious present" (of
•
J.P.P.& 3.M.,Vol.X, 1913,p.569), For American New Realists, eoistemo-
logical monism has proved to be a cul -de- sac , — there is here no thorough-
fare.' We conclude that if the members of the new movement wish to re-
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main realists --thia we presuTie they do.'— i they must abandon their
the relation of
characteristic theory of /(the "object known to the knowing Droceas"
and substitute for it some form of raediatism. This they»in fact,
habitually do, under one or another guise. Rigorously applied, their
theory of knowledge does not provide for the transcendence of the im-
mediately given in the specious present.
Eighth, our investigation leads us seriously to question
the fruitfulneas of the severely analytical method enDloyed by the
New Realists. The ne v philosophers are quite willing to stake their
philosophical fortune on the success of this method, strenuously ao-
Tjlied. Yet when they so apoly the method, the results attained are, to
say the least, di sa-ODOintirig. Spaulding's case may be cited as tyoical.
The most explicit and sustained defense of analysis which has been
produced by a New Realist ooraes from his pen. It constitutes his
contribution to The New Realism (cf. op . c i
t
.
,
dp . 155- 247 ) . One is
amazed to find in the text of such a defense of analysis as an adequate
and ultimate method for philosophy the recognition of "a non-rational
element in nature, --at least so far as our present knowledge goes" (od.
ci_t. ,p. ^^41) , Even more amazement results from readin^'^The time may
corae when the new properties of the whole can be deduced from those of
the parts, but at the present time this deduction is impossible, and it_
is an open question as to whether this impossibility 1 s due to the
structure of existence , or to our ignorance" (od. cit
.
,p. ?A1» . Underscoring
mine). Attention has been called to Spaulding's failure to render an
account of either error or value experience in general by means of a
purely objective analysis, our conclusion in this connection is that
the method of analysis is inadequate to apprehend significant wholes,—
hence the falsification of reality which the New Realist presents, notably
in his theory of consciousness. " Die Theile" he may hold in his hand;
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•^das geistige Band" eludes hira(cf. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea
of God, p. iB-'^O ) . 'Ve conclude our discussion with the following very
significant vvords from the nen of Norman Kemp Smith:" It will probably
be agreed that the most important and fruitful of the changes that
have taken place in the ohilosophical discinlines since the eighteenth
century has been the gro.ving recognition that logical analysis and
dialectic, however indispensabl e, can T)lay only a subordinate part in
the solution of the problems traditionally assigned to philosophy**
(The Present Situation in Philosophy, Phil . Rev. , Vol. XXIX, 19 "^o, pp.
23-34). The failure to recognize this DrinciDle we conceive to be
the root fro^ which spring the difficulties for the New Realism which
have concerned us in our investigation. The modern analysts find ex-
perience too large for logic, with the result that their logic suffers,—
and we investigate The Problem of Error in American New Realism.
V. Summary of Fundamental Pronosi tions.
The Introduction. Our problem should be approached by
means of a summary sketch of the historic forms of realism. Realism
is a term which has been used in many senses and applied to many wide-
ly varying philosophical positions. Socrate3,Plato, Aristotle, the School
men, Spinoza, Descartes, Leibnitz, Hegel, Herbart were all realists of one
or another sort. The New Realists, though they do not form a school,
are united in their common opposition to subjectivism in all forms
and in their desire to be pure Ob Jectivi sts. For all of them, the
problem of knowledge is fundamental. The problem of error is, there-
fore, likewi se fundam.ental for them.
Summary of Criticisms. The criticisms by other investiga-
tors which are reviewed in the body of our discussion may be summar-
ized as follows. Love joy reduces the New Realistic polemic to realism
as such (the independence of the object) and epi stemological monism
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(numerical identity of percept and object, or immanence of the object),
both of which are rooted in the relational theory of consciouanesg.
These general principles generate no solution of the nature and poBsi-
bility of error. This problem ia logically Drimary for the New Real-
ists, and crucial as well, yet they offer competing explanations. Their
general principles obliterate the distinction between mere apnearances
and objective realities. Holt's reduplication argument admits episte-
mological dualism. The same author's vibration-denai ty theory of sense
qualities (l)is based on insufficient data, ('3)assumes a cause to be
identical with its effect, (3)r)erverts the facts of experience of qual-
ities. His attempt to objectify error ( 1 )confu3es logical contradiction
with dynamic opoosition, (^)require3 the ob jec ti fication of the Drecise
sort of contradictions which Holt has pronouticed iauossible. Monta^crue's
identification of the consciousness-relation with causali ty ( 1 )confuBe8
logical cross-reference with factual dependence, (2)involves episterao-
logical dualism in its self-transcendent reference, (3)fail8 to show
that there are perceptions wherever there are causal implicates and
that all perceptions are of their causal implicates. The same author's
theory of subsiatenta offers only a verbal solution of the' problem of
error and the selective reference-reading functions assigned to con-
sciousness in connection with it are inconsistent with Montague's
theory of consciousness as a relation and as causality. Pitkin's
theory of consciousness as a projection system ( 1 )involve3 erjistemo-
logical duali sm, (2)accounts, at best, for only those error^vhich con-
sist in wrongly identifying different really existent thinsrs, (3)r)ro-
vides no means for detecting errors, (4)make3 all perceptions and judg-
ments equally erroneous. The New Realists do not agree as to whether
consciousness is or is not wholly and always non-constitutive of its
objects, but their immanence and independence theories depend for their
r
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validity uoon its being so. At best, they only show that their relational
theory of consciouaneas la not absurd; they do not prove it ^o be true,
McGilvary's didtinotion between space-occupancy and anace-rnonopoli zation
does not make clear the relation of "material ** objects and " irarnaterial'*
objects to old-fashioned "^real" objects and '^unreal" objects, and fails
to prove the possibility of multiple space-occupancy by objects in any
significant sense of the term. The same author's attempt to solve the
problem of the temporal lag in perception by appealing to the selective
nature of consciousness results in his making consciousness constitutive
of the temporal locus of the object as perceived and thus renders him
an epi stemological dualist. His distinction between contemporaneity and
simultaneity fails to prove the numerical identity of percept and object
perceived, as does also his theory of the date-transcendence of conscious-
ness.
Moore characterizes Montague's theory of truth and ©rror as
the "aviary theory"
,
employing a famous fi^re from the Theaetetus. This
theory makes it impossible to discover what sort of bird one has dra'.?n
from the epi stemological aviary, i_. e. , to distinguish between truth and
error. On the principles laid down by Montague knowledge is either all
truth or all error.
Sheldon has also criticised Monta^^ue acutely. He points out
that Montague's unreal subsi stents do not have the full ontolo^iical
status '.vhich their author promises for them; they are merely a receptacle
for errors and throvir no light on the nature of error. Again, potentiali ty
as employed by Montague, is an ambiguous terra and hence can not be proper-
ly employed to explain error. Moreover, it could explain only the possibil
ity of error, but not actual errors. Sheldon points out in criticism of
Holt that this author's objective description of consciousness does not
account for the selective principle of mind and that his analogy between
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error and contraiiction breaka down because errors exist unresolved,
whereas the opDOsition of physical forces is resolved in their effects.
Thilly shows that Monta;rue's theory of energetics fails to
establish the numerical identity of percept and "real" object or to
provide a solution for the problem of error. He holds that Woodbridge'a
theory of specific objective qualities which produce specific effects in
the organism involves epi stemolo epical dualism because it is based upon
relativity to the organism.
Leighton attacks the general theory of independent entities
and external relations. Knowledge, he maintains, is essentially relational.
He concludes that it is therefore futile to attempt to know what any ob-
ject might be independent of the knowledge relation. "The dogma of pure-
ly external relations has no meaning in a world of intelligible exper-
ience" (vld^ supra, pp.40, 1^8 ) . Similarly, entiti es devoid of all relations
are a pure fiction, qui te as unintelligible as purely external relations.
Pratt directs his criticism especially against Perry and Snauld-
ing. He finds that Perry begs the question when attempting to prove the
realistic position. He insists that every epistemology which would avoid
solipsism must admit transcendence and inferential knowledge. Perry
fails to disprove the peculiar privacy of the content of consciousness
as distinguished from the objects of consciousness. His identification
of perceptual effects with physical causes violates the law of identity.
Spaulding has not been able to define existence so as to make normal
mental entities existents and hallucinatory ones non~exi stents.
Drake contends that the realist must reject epi stemological
monism because ( 1 )contradi ctory qualities can not coexist at the same
point in space at the same time, (2)" there is no ap-narent mechanism for the
projection of sense-qualities into objects"
(
vide supra
,
p. 51), (3)"our
sense qualities exist at a tine later than that of the events in the
II
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Objects that cause them*' ( vicLe supra, p. 51 )
.
Adams maintains that the distinction bet'jreen veridical and
non-veridical perception presupposes a non-Derceptual standard of refer-
ence, ouch a standard he finds in an underived, unacquired knowledge of
vhat reality means, this knowledge being a function of the mind itself.**
Dewey urges that if percention is held to be essentially know-
ledge, ideali sra follows. Naive realism is therefore far superior to pre-
aentative realism. The difficulty with the latter disappears if percep-
tions are conceived instrumentally, i_. e. , as the means whereby we infer the
existence of objects and check our inferences. Subjectivism and objectiv-
ism are both inadequate, since each tries to define one member of a pair
of things exhaustively and exclusively in terms of the other. Greighton
and Tawney have also pressed this last point.
Cohen attempts to break the force of L-ovejoy's criticisms of
the New Realism by appealing to a doctrine of radical relativism. Love-
Joy's criticisms would not be valid against such a theory as Cohen's, but
the New Realists do not accept Cohen's views. His attack upon Lovejoy's
strictures leaves those strictures intact as directed against the New
Realism.
Bode contends that it is impossible to remove the distinction
between objects whose conditions coincide with those of consciousness and
those which exist whether there is consciousness of them or not. If there
is numerical identity between perceot and object perceived, then the object
must possess simultaneously all of the qualities revealed in different
perceptions of it
.
S^llars rejects the relational theory of consciousness and sub-
stitutes for it the viev that consciousness is an attitude taken toward
objects considered as real.
Many other writers, e.£. Strong, Fite, Rogers, Kremer, '-Vright , and
II
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Bliss, have written critical liBcuaaions of our probleiijbut reviews of
their works are omitted, the typical significant criticisma having been
fully covered in the discussions reviewed.
Summary of the Writer's Criticisms.
Fullerton was long unaware of the basic differences which divide
the New Realists. In 1915 he discovered that there is no "school" of Neo-
Realisn. This author agrees with the Platform Realists in holding that ob-
ject:? exist independently of their being known, but disacrrees with them in
his conception of the nature of these independent objects. For him they
are, usually, touch-movement-senaation constructs. He attempts, in ajeree-
TTient with the Platform Realists, to prove that ob.^ects are given directly
and unaltered in perception, but seeks to avoid the difficulties of both
the representative and preaentative theories of knowledge by invoking a
doctrine of symbols. But this doctrine does not provide for direct know-
ledge of things as they are and it is internally inconsistent in that it
make3 "secondary" qualities representative in a sense of which Fullerton
has denied the possibility. Fullerton 's theory of consciousness differs
from that of the Platform Realists in that he is a dualist of the parallel-
ist type. In his earlier works, he considers "secondary" qualities to be
subjective. He holds that we exoerience the objective world as directly
as we do our subjective states, but this would require that we hold the
latter experience to be symbolic, not immediate. He furnishea no criterion
whereby we may discover precisely what touch-movement sensations adequate-
ly represent the objective order as it is independent of experience. All
of his attempts to show how two individuals preceive the same world fail.
It would seem that only error is possible on his principles. 'Vhen he as-
serts that the subjective order is non-spatial and non-temporal and then
proceeds to assert that subjective phenomena, viewed as elements in the ob-
jective order, are spatial and temporal, he involves himself in contradiction
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Hi3 rigorous doctrine of paycho-phyaical rjaralleliBm is inconalatent with
his view that error is purely sub jective, i_.e^. , that erroneous exDeriences
have no objective reference. In his later work, he conceives "secondary"
qualities to be objective, thus retracting his former view. His solution
of the problem of error, viz
.
, that our knowledge of things is built up
gradually by a process of trial and error, amounts to inferential or rer>re-
sentative realism. His thorough-going ob jectiflcatlon of ''secondary"
qualities and of perceived relations contradicts his explanation of error
as purely sub jective, since he provides no rasans for distinguishing sub-
jective from objective qualities, and thus makes error impossible in the
end, in spite of having made truth impossible in the beginning. The root
of his episteraologioal difficulties is his desire to mediate between pre-
sentative and representative theories.
For '>Voodbridge reality is a system of things standing in various
sorts of relations. These things are all " ob jective" , "physical" ," empir-
ical." They have specific distinctive qualities. Special sense organs
make possible the perception of these objective qualities. Relations are
external and non-constitutive. Consciousness is such a relation,— a sort
of continuum which constitutes the beino- together of things exuerienced.
'^oodbridge * s view of consciousness makes error impossibl e, since that view
involves the direct apprehension of the object precisely as it is in in-
dependence of consciousness. His assertion that consciousness is the
same kind of relation as space, time, or species, is inconsistent with the
fact that objects can not slip from all space and time relations and still
remain the identical objects which they were when in such relations, where-
as Woodbridge insists that objects may oass entirely out of all relation
to consciousness. According to his principl es, things could only pass
from one consci Dusness relation to another. In short, the "ubiquity of
the knowledge relation" is implied in this phase of his thought. 'ifhen he
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identifies conaciouanesa with Tneaning, he, in making known thinga repre-
aentativo of each other, altera them eaaentially froTi '?hat they were aa
unknovm and araugprlea in the Doaaibility of their beinc miarepreaentati ve.
He is attempting to provide for error, but ia in fact rejecting hla doctrin*
that conaciouanesa ia wholly nonconsti tutive. He, moreover, runs into con-
tradiction with hia doctrine that a ayatera of logical relatione exiata
independent of conaciouanesa, according to which doctrine it would aeem
that conaciouanesa as meaning could never err. Hia theory of percention
contains unmistakable implications of epi atemological dualism. His bio-
logical theory of oo naciousneas, wi th ita emphaais uiDon relativity to the
imperfect percipient organism, makea no provision for a distinction between
veridical and non-varidical perceotiona, --ho has no warrant for making any
assertions about the nature of ob Jects, except a£ known .
McGilvary conceives the independently existent world to be a
complex of perceivable qualities held together by perceivable relations.
Consciousness is for him a unique relation of togetherness of objects in
a field of view. It is an external relation, in no sense constitutive of
its content. Yet it is a sel active relation, one which abstracts qualities
from their conttexts, omitting now one related quality and now another, now
one relation and now another. This selective function places conscious-
ness in a class radically different from all mere relations. McGrilvary*3
two classes of purely subjecltive quali ti es, --those having no objective
analogues and those which are often indistinguishable from their objective
analogues— , have no place in a consciousness which ia an external relation
of togetherness of *'real'* objects and which is always a correlate of phys-
iological processes. Even admitting the possibility of M^^Gilvary's sub-
jective" objects and ** objective" objects, we must insist that his prag-
matic means of distinguishing between them fail to provide any criterion
for the certain detection of the ob jec tive** ob jects, since McGilvary begs
C
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the queation by assuning that the senaa'* of different oerciplenta may
be direc tly compared. He ends by naklng hi a realism very tentative and
may, after all,
by admitting that conaciousneaa ^have very truly constitutive DOwers.
the study of
Before examining the work of Montasue, wl th/^whose writings
our investigation of the Platform Realists begins, we remark that an
ensemble treatment of these philosophers is possible only in so far
as they have jointly subscribed to certain doctrines. They require
separate treatment because of the wide differences in their individual
views. Montague divides objects into '*real subsi stents" , which include
existential and universal propositions, and "unreal subsi stents" , which
include all proposl tions, particular and universal , which contradict the
true propositions which constitute reality. All of these subsiatents
are independent of consciousness. Consciousness is an external relation,
or "the potential or implicative presence of a thing at a space or time
in which that thing is not actually present." But Montague unduly limits
both implication and cause in equating:: consciousness with physical causa-
tion. His attempted explanation of error provides no means for dis-
tinguishing truth from error, because no way is provided for determining
what is the "simplest" cause of a given cerebral state. Even if this
solution of the problem of error were successful , it would involve Montague
in a denial of epistemological monism, which doctrine he has approved
quite as clearly as he has also rejected it. His attempt to show that
percept and object are quali tatively, though not numerically, identical
fails because he admits that our perceptual activity contributes to the
nature of the object. Indeed, Montague at times expressly denies the
qualitative identity of percept and object perceived. At other times,
he contends that the perceptual effects of a thing, though not qualitative-
ly identical with it, are "exactly and adequately implicative of it", --but
this amounts to a representative theory of perception. This author sug-
gests no means of di s tin tmi shiner between the "unreal su"bsi stent" and the
c€
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exiatential object.
Holt ia a moat emphatic ob .^eoti vi st . Hia world conaiats of
neutral entities,- real and unreal aubaiatenta
—
,d1u8 external relatione.
Theae neutral entitiea are of " auch atuff aa logical and natheraatioal
manifolda are made of* ( vide aupra ^ p. 150 ) . Consciousneaa ia a "croaa-
aection of the universe, aelected by the nervoua ayatero"
(
vide aunra ,p.
181)« The neutral entitles are in no way conditioned or affected by
their being known. Holt 'a arigament based on the facta of duTjlication
and diatortion in physical nature begs the queation in that it aas um ea
direct apnrehenaion of phyaical ob.^ecta. Aminythia argument involves
the admisaion of epiatemologioal dualiam, since it makes the percent a
distorted duplicate of the object Dercei ved, - -but Holt haa insisted that
consciousness is a croas-sec tion of objects . In fact, there is no place
within his idea system for illusion in the accepted sense of an exner-
ienoe which incorrectly reoresents its object. Holt's attemr)t to re-
duce secondary qualities to serial densities of high frequency nerve
impulses ( l) fails because the units with which he deals are primitive
qualities , not neural oscillations, (S'if correct, involves its author in
a rejection of his episteraological monism, since it brings the secondary
qualitiea into the nervous system, with the result that they can not be
•'out there wherever the things responded to are** (p. 126 ). This problem
is even more embarrassing for Holt when hallucinatory secondar;/ qualitiea
are concerned, for he asserts that they are often in tra-ors"anicall y aroused
and yet insists that they are not located in the central nervous system.
We fail to see what other locus they, as neural vibrations, could Dosalbly
have. Holt's theory of behavior as specific response of an or^niam to
"something outside" makes it impossible for an organism to behave with
reference to hallucinatory objects as he has located them. In fact, such
objects could not even enter consciousness for him, since consciousness is
C€
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simply a oroas-aection of things "out there," Holt 'a identifioation of
error with contraliction anounta to a dogmatio denial that error, in the
only significant sense of the term, exi 3ts. On his grounds, all experience
is veridical. Finally, Holt in a recent article admits that the sole
locus of the "timeless and changeless" neutral entities is "in the
human mind" and that "there alone do they ooerate as causes",-- a con-
fession which vacates his whole theory of consciousness and forces upon
him the problem of distinguishing bet.veen the entities which have only
such a locus and those which have objective status as veil.
Pitkin also sets out to construe experience in ourely objective
terms. For him the object of belief is independent of the act of believ-
ing. Erroneous beliefs result from error in interpreting the object of
belief. The object of belief transcends the act of believing in the
sense that the former is independent of the latter. Pitkin does not
mean that an object of belief transcends itself by reference to some
other entity which it copies or represents. He holds that no fundamental
distinction can be made between . content and object of awareness. The
transcendent character of temporal and spatial ejection, Ibgical reference
representative experiences, etc
., is explained by the theory that the trans
cendent thing referred to is present in the e:iven content by virtue of
a "group quality" in the content. Thus, in his early work, Pitkin is a
confirmed objeotivist. However, his objectivism is secured at the cost
of disregarding basic differences, which he himself admits, be t we en the
psychical and the physical. Moreover, if content and object are in all
cases ultimately indistinguishable, Pitkin has no ground for holding that
may
content ^ean or intend a non-existent object, as he does when tryin^r to
explain error. Plainly, in this case the content would have to be non-
existent as well as the object. Pitkin has here fallen back uoon the
sub jective, without any quotation marks, in order to account for error.
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In the second Dhaae of his thought , rsDreaented by World Pictures, Pi tkin
defines a thine as what it does and holds that may locate the thing
wherever it acta. An aspect or phase of any object may, therefore, be in
one's mind if the object act upon the organism with which the mind la as-
sociated. Thus reals find their way into consciousness. These reals are
taken by consciousneaa to be world-oictures which represent part of the
nature of reality. On these princiol ea, erroneous experiences of all sorts
muat be conceded to be Just as good world-T^icturea*' as are the raost verid
ioal perceptiona. The same criticiam holds, in princinle, arrains t Pitkin -s
peculiar renresentative realism ( vide supra , pp« 140f ) , which would make hal-
lucinations and illusory experiences phases of independently existent
things. In the final phase of his thought, represented by his essay in
The New Realism, Pi tkin represents conaciouanesa after the analogy of a
geometric projection system. But this representation, wi th its atatement
of the relation between project-complex and projected complex, is frankly
dualistic, and so clearly contradicts Pitkin's clearly expressed epiatemo-
logical monism. It ia an attempt to account for error by means of the
theory of projective indi scernibles which brings Pitkin to this contra-
diction. Moreover, hi a analogy ia defective, since {l)it makes no provision
for the extremely complex processes of Judgment and belief,and ("^Ht makes
provision for only peripherally-aroused experiences. The fatal difficult^''
with the attempted explanation of error ia that it affords no means for
determining of what object in the pi-ojected complex a ^iven object in the
pro ject-oomplex is the projection.
Marvin has not devoted a great deal of attention to the problem
of error. In spite of having twice subscribed to the doctrine of enietemo
logical monism, he is not an exponent of the doctrine in extreme form. To
be sure, he holds that reality is directly experienced, but the real as thus
given is "the ^iven",or "the factual", the crude material of sensation with
cc
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out any element of internretation. The existential worlfl is this factual
sum total plus the system of proposi tions nece ssary to exr^lain the factual
Reality, or the realm of truth, includes this plus the subaistential order
of "merely valid" Judgj^ents (Montague), All errors are mistakes in the
interpretation of the given. Inasmuch aa there is an ac* of judpment in-
volved in every perception, perceptions may be either true or false. The
world of common sense is not a world of perceived fact, but "man's first
lereat world hypothesis a THEORY" ( vide supra^ p. 149 ) . This account
makes room for plenty of error and IJarvin admits that all kno'vledge, ex-
cept that of actual perception, is bijB;hly tentative. By 'vay of criticism
we observe: (l)Marvin holds that we apprehend the real directly, but hastens
to add that we never recognize it as such, which would seem to mean that
we. do not, after all, know reality, and (2)Marvin*8 docjnatic writiners do not
evidence the tentative character which he ascribes to all knowledge.
Perry lays great stress upon the independence and immanence of
neutral entities. For him the subject in consciousness is a li^inp: and
responding organism. Consciousness is a selective response to a preexist-
ing environment. He insists that when things are known they are "identi-
cal, element for element, with the idea, or content of the knowing state"
(vide supra , p. 1*=^? ) . Perry begs his neutral entities, without which his
case for realism falls, and his theory of consciousness lacks proof. The
alleged proof of neutral entities reduces to an attempt to show that con-
sciousness is an external , non-constitutive relation. If we are to ar?u6
from the nature of consciousness to the independence of ob )ects, conscious-
ness must in all cases be non-constitutive. Perry, however , admi ts that
consciousness is constitutive in the creation of value and the determin-
ation of relational compl exes, and even that there may be physical com-
plexes exclusivel
y
determined by the organic processes involved in con-
sciousness. He makes the same admission in the case of mediate knowledge.
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In order to account for error, he attributes functions to consciousness
which make it thoroughly constitutive of certain of its objects and he
adds to such functions the ability wrono:ly to refer subjectively con-
stituted objects to a locus in the physical order. But this solution
of the problen of error rejects epi sternoloffical monism, —or the doctrine
of the immanence of the object--, for it is undeniablv dualistio. The
facts of eri'or force one to abandon either realism or immanence.
Spaulding's conception of the nature of error is valid, but it
is incomcatible with his main principles. The key to Yds thought is his
"solution" of the ego-contric predicament problem. He formulates the
problem as consisting of the "impossibility of experimentally eliminating
a knowing process as really occurring, or as implied as really occurring,
from the vorld that we know" ( vide supra
,
p. 1*^6 ). But knowing can be elimin-
atod ideally by analysis in situ . Such an analysis and elimination every
thinker makes who advances any position as a "portrayal of the real state
of affairs regarding knowledge" (vide supra, p. 1^6 ) « From this crucial case,
Spaulding concludes that the relation bet';7een knowing and known is externaL
But the ideal analysis and elimination in this crucial case fails because
Spaulding has to assume the truth of the position asserted as a "portrayal
of the real state of affairs regarding knowledge." Thus, Spaulding begs
his non-constitutive knowledge relation at the beginning. Assuming that
he has extricated himself from the ego-centric predicament, he proceeds to
set forth his epistemological monism. Consciousness is a non-constitutive
relation or dimension. Entities may be known as they really are, whether
they be terms or relations. Entities are subsi stents, or oonsistents. They
include exi8tents,but exclude non-consistent "mentionables. " In criticism
we remiark that Spaulding is unable to differentiate exi stents from mere
subsistents. He affirms the objectivity of non-existent subsi stents, thus
endeavoring to account for error :but with non-ccnsti tuive consciousnecs ap-
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prehending terras and propOBltions juat as they are when unknown, error is
impossible. Thus, Spaulding is self-contradictory in adnitting that error
occurs. JVhen he admits that certain errors are "inherently irremovable
from consciousness" and that there is a "residual sub.iective element" in
error (vide supra, p. 175 ) , he also admits that the ideal analysis and elimin-
ation by means of which he "solved" the Droblem of the ego-centric predica-
ment fails to solve. Thus the problem of error wrecks Spaulding's objectiv'
ism and makes consciousness for him constitutive. The problem of values
also forces Spaulding,as it does Perry, to conceive consciousness as con-
stitutive of certain of its ob.jects. It would seem that only on such
grounds can a definable and tenable distinction between truth and error be
made and worth be foimd in the world.
Summary of Conclusions. ''e conclude from the fact that very
significant differences obtain among the New Realists that their cor^mon
general principles are incapable of rendering a tenable account of the
concrete detail of experience. 'Ve conclude from the fact that the New
Realists have all failed to extricate them^selves from the ego-centric
predicament and hence are without warrant for the assertions which they
make about the identity of the object as known with the ob.-ject as not
known that they should prove their principle first, before concerning them-
selves with the difficulties to which it gives rise. ''?e conclude from
the fact that the doctrine of the externality of relations is illicitly
derived by the New Realists, leads to contradiction in its very statement,
and conducts to consequences which its advocates vigorously reject, that
the doctrine in question is not worth defending. The failure of the New
Realists to formulate a relational theory of consciousness which will ac-
count for error leads us to conclude that this theory is itself erroneous. I
The foregoing conclusion is strengthened by the further fact that every I
New Realist who has admitted the existence of error ,in the generally ac- I
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cented sense of the term, has been obliged by that admission to relinquish
the theory that ccnsciouaness is a wholly non-constitutive relation. Thin
ia
conclusion ^further strengthened, finally, by the fact that the nrobl era of
value in general has forced the Ne^v Realists to renresent conscioucneas
as quite other than a nurely external relation. '^e conclude from the
fact that an "undeviating epi stemological monism'* is to be found in the
writings of no reDresentative of the New Reali an, though they have all
tried valiantly to preserve such a doc trine, that the New Realists must
reject epistemological monism if they wish to remain realists. Finally,
we conclude from our entire invest! p-ation that the severely analytical
method of the New Realists is inadequate to the task of interpreting ex-
perience as a whole. The rigorous analyst may hold the parts in his
hand; the spirit's living bond he can not grasp.
The End.
cI
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